Office of the Historian

SWNCC Files, Lot 52M45

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

[Washington,] June 20, 1947.

The fundamental difference in viewpoint between our Far Eastern Office and the JCS, as stated in SWNCC 83/22,16 lies in the answer each would give to the following question: Is it good and feasible American policy to give direct and substantial military assistance to Chiang Kai-shek in his attempt to eliminate Communism from China by force?

The answer of the Far Eastern Office has been and is “no” because such a course (1) would lead inevitably to direct intervention in China’s civil war; (2) would provoke the USSR to similar intervention on the side of the Chinese Communists; (3) would be inconclusive unless we were prepared to take over direction of Chinese military operations and administration and remain in China for an indefinite period; (4) would invite formidable opposition among the Chinese people; and (5) would constitute a strategic commitment in China inconsistent with … [the study provided by the JOS to SWNCC on May 10, 1947],17 which examines the problem of United States assistance to other countries from the standpoint of “urgency of need and importance to the national security of the United States” and places “China very low on the list of countries which should be given such assistance”.

The JCS answer would seem to be “yes” (1) because Chiang can be assured of success in his campaign against the Communists by American military and economic assistance and (2) because failure to assist Chiang would result in USSR domination of China. With regard to the second point, in consideration of the administrative inefficiencies of the Chinese themselves, the magnitude of the task of dominating China, the easily aroused Chinese resentment at foreign interference, the lack of industrial development and material resources, and the inability of the Russians to give the material assistance necessary to make China a going concern, it is the opinion of the Far Eastern Office that a USSR-dominated China is not a danger of sufficient immediacy or probability to warrant committing ourselves to the far-reaching consequences which would ensue from our involvement in the Chinese civil war on the side of the National Government.

There is attached a memorandum18 giving in some detail our reaction to specific points raised in the JCS paper.

  1. See footnote 9, p. 838.↩
  2. Not printed. In forwarding the study the JCS termed it a background study that did “not represent the final views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since certain changes and additions are now being considered.”↩
  3. Not found in Department files.↩