121.893/10–347
General Wedemeyer to the Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary: Early in the week I was invited by Doctor Wellington Koo41 to a dinner party at the Chinese Embassy in honor of Doctor Wang Shih-chieh. I attended the dinner party, assuming of course that there would be other guests. However, I was greeted by the Ambassador and Doctor Wang. No other guests appeared. It became apparent that the object of the so-called dinner party was to elicit information concerning U. S. attitude toward [Page 782] China. As you well know, both of these men are intelligent and I had to be alert during the course of the evening. They were most friendly and initially introduced topics of conversation that were wholly innocuous.
After dinner Doctor Wang asked my military opinion on the situation in Manchuria. I told him that the Chinese Communists had the initiative in that area and had the capability under present conditions to gain military control of the entire Manchurian area. How soon this could be accomplished would be contingent upon many factors including the ability of the Nationalists to move reinforcements into the narrow finger they now control and further, the degree of success that the new commander, General Chen Cheng, might have in imbuing his officers and men to fight effectively, in obtaining the support of the civilian population, and in improving the logistical setup in the area.
Doctor Wang emphasized the importance of obtaining military equipment from the United States, particularly the urgency of ammuition for Chinese units equipped with American weapons, of completion of the 8–⅓ air group program and of obtaining maintenance parts for American motor transport now in the possession of the Chinese. He expressed the view that if these programs could be promptly executed, and assuming continued good work by Chen Cheng, the Chinese Nationalists could hold their present positions in Manchuria and could gradually expand their control to recover the entire area.
Doctor Koo suggested that if it became apparent to the Soviet Union that the United States was giving increased aid to bolster the Nationalists’ efforts in North China and Manchuria that the Soviet authorities might be expected to increase their aid to the Chinese Communists, adding that it might develop into a situation resembling Spain. This was a very sound observation on the part of the Chinese Ambassador, but I did not express a view. Doctor Wang appeared somewhat perplexed in weighing Koo’s expressed ideas. Doctor Wang stated that he recalled several months ago a conversation with the Generalissimo in which the latter discussed a suggestion made by General Wedemeyer in September, 1945 to the effect that a guardianship or trusteeship should be established over Manchuria until such time as the Chinese Government could assume full control of the area.
When I returned from China a fortnight ago, you asked if the question of a guardianship or trusteeship had been discussed with the Generalissimo or the Chinese officials. I told you that I had not brought up the subject because I had refrained from giving any indication of my thinking throughout my discussions in China. I [Page 783] did however try to elicit information and views on the subject of guardianship and the Generalissimo several times was on the fringe of the subject. I tried to lead him on, but he did not follow up. Therefore, Doctor Wang’s voluntary introduction of the subject was interesting and wholly unexpected.
In the light of Doctor Koo’s conjecture about Soviet reaction to U. S. aid, Doctor Wang suggested that the situation might then be referred to the United Nations. Doctor Koo interjected that Russia could be expected to object to such a step and asked what would China’s next move be and he asked me directly what would the United States reaction be. I told him that I did not know. However, I did add, that Doctor Wang’s suggestion might be a logical approach, because developments in Manchuria would be placed before the bar of world opinion and further, it appeared to be in consonance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.43 Doctor Wang posed the question, if a guardianship were suggested and Russia refused to participate, would the United States support China in pressing for such an arrangement. I told him that I was not able to answer the question but suggested that he discuss the matter with you.
Another subject introduced by Doctor Wang which would interest you. He expressed disappointment and concern over Doctor Sun Fo’s recent statement to the effect that China might realistically consider orientation toward Moscow inasmuch as the United States was not apparently inclined to assist China. Doctor Wang added that he had radioed Doctor Sun Fo in an attempt to determine the background of such statement which he deemed a contravention of China’s policy. He reaffirmed that China would align herself with the United States in policies designed to prevent the expansion of communism. He mentioned the fact that this position on the part of China was made difficult by the current American policy with reference to Japan.
Doctor Koo asked me if I had read the Washington News report headlined China’s Thirty Days of Reform. He was referring to the enclosed clipping44 which you may not have seen. Doctor Wang then observed that these changes were given impetus by my critical resume issued prior to departure. He expressed the opinion that my critical statement could do harm only if the United States did not assist China in her recovery program, because China was incapable of overcoming present difficulties without our aid. I made no comment to my hosts, however as emphasized in my Final Report, if we are going to stop the expansion of the Soviet Union in the Far East, we must undertake steps soon.
[Page 784]All of the above information I felt would be of assistance to you. I continue to receive requests to speak before various organizations. Mr. Butterworth indicated that you desire my report to be handled as Top Secret. Therefore, I feel that requests for talks should be uniformly disapproved. Some people have indicated that they know you intimately or that they know Mr. Lovett, and that they would apply direct to you or to him in order to obtain permission for such talks. Should any additional information become available I will pass on promptly.
With all good wishes.
Sincerely,