121.893/9–1547
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to General Wedemeyer 27
Dear Al: Your letter of September 3 from Tokyo has just reached me and I am replying at once. I am glad to have your comment on conditions as you found them in Korea.
Regarding your address to the State Council and the published statement I stand by all that I said to you at the time. My Embassy colleagues and I have tried to send subsequent impressions as objectively as possible but none of these seems to me to neutralize my earlier verbal comments. All that you said was courteous and with an awareness of Chinese sensibilities. No Chinese has to my knowledge questioned either your friendly intention or the facts as you presented them. What is far more important from my personal standpoint is my satisfaction that all these things were said and by you. As I remarked to the Gimo afterwards there was virtually nothing which I had not been saying to him privately. But it needed to be said with the authority of one with your special Mission, your broader and fresher viewpoint, and the respect which the Gimo and others had for you personally.
Opinions may differ as to whether it was proper or wise or helpful to have these criticisms made public. My judgment was then and still is that this should have been done because of the extremely serious situation for this Government and to shock its leaders out of their inertia or complacence and to stimulate them to overcome their very real difficulties. I could not have done this and I know of no other way in which it could have been done. The best defense of your action is perhaps the actual reform movements which have been advocated since then, especially by some of those who were present at the State Council. True, they insist that they are doing so not because of your criticisms but because they already had these in mind! And that is partially true. But they realize as never before that they are now on trial before their own people and the world, and must make good. I dare to believe that they will—to a degree and not as rapidly nor as wholeheartedly as we should like.
Now as to the reactions among the Chinese officials. These may be roughly grouped under three headings:
- (1)
- The elders brought up in the ancient traditions of social behavior were pained at the public exposure. Among them one simply does not say disagreeable things openly about his friends—however true. Even these agree that you meant well and had your facts. [Page 775] Their attitude was an inevitable part of the process and can be discounted.
- (2)
- The Gimo himself was chiefly concerned with the practical fear that your statements would stiffen the Communist intransigence and still further estrange the nonpartisans, liberals, and anti-government elements in general. From several indications reaching me I gather that, after asking you to make the statement, he became nervous about the possible consequences and has since been somewhat on the spot with the elders and the extremists in the Party. One of his fine qualities is his willingness to take anything from those whom he trusts but a conspicuous weakness is his excessive sensitiveness to public criticism. In your case, however, it was chiefly the fear of unfavorable results. It is sufficient evidence of this that there has been no change in his insistent desire that you come back as his Supreme Advisor. Actually I question whether anything that you or others of us could say or do would have much influence with the Chinese Communists, whereas your statements removed the widespread apprehension among intellectuals that you would recommend all-out aid to Chiang and his Government regardless of their failings. This has been very valuable.
- (3)
- Another grievance which Premier Chang and others have expressed is what they feel to have been inadequate recognition of the reforms which the present Government has actually accomplished or has been steadily preparing to put into effect. He regrets that you did not give him and his colleagues the opportunity they sought to acquaint you in detail with these. Of course the obvious reply is that you were primarily concerned with calling their attention to what needed yet to be done rather than attempting any comprehensive evaluation of their whole record to date.
Even before receiving your radio message I had been explaining what I knew to be your wholly friendly and constructive purpose, and shall continue to do so on every occasion.
Once more I am very glad that your Mission—including each individual member—came and acted as you did. It was a fine performance, and if it is to result in positive aid to China—as I earnestly hope it will—you will have made it easier for us who shall try to carry on.
Pardon the length of this letter. Finally, it was a real pleasure to get to know you so intimately. I hope this fellowship will ripen with whatever service lies ahead for each of us.
Very sincerely yours,
[For text of General Wedemeyer’s Report on China to President Truman, under date of September 19, see United States Relations With China, pages 764–814.]
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 995, September 15; received September 25.↩