121.893/9–1947
Memorandum by Mr. Philip D. Sprouse to General Wedemeyer 97
[Nanking,] 10 August 1947.
- 1.
- Set forth hereunder are Chinese reactions and observations obtained at first hand during the Mission’s recent visit to North China and Manchuria.
- 2.
- It should be noted that there was common agreement among all Chinese in regard to one aspect of the Chinese scene—that is, the necessity of peace if China is to be saved from utter destruction, chaos and suffering. Divergence comes in the views regarding the manner in which peace may be obtained.
- 3.
- National Government officials previously unknown to me uniformly stated that peace could be achieved only by the destruction [Page 719] of the Chinese Communist forces and that U. S. financial and military aid was necessary to this end. These officials made no mention of any conditions to be attached to such aid and, in general, believed that the Communists could be destroyed within a year or two. Other National Government officials previously known to me set forth the same general thesis, but qualified their statements by saying that the U. S. should aid China but should not give such aid until the Government—that is, the Generalissimo—was prepared to carry out necessary reforms to restore to it the confidence and support of the people.
- 4.
- There was general agreement among all Chinese, except the Kuomintang strict “party liners”, that the key to the situation was the Generalissimo and it was generally felt that the Gimo would not carry out the necessary reforms except under US pressure. Independent Kuomintang members and non-party Chinese were partially divided in their views on this subject. Some of them felt that the present Government could not survive unless the Gimo carried out reforms. Others felt that the Government must not only carry out reforms but must also reach a compromise settlement with the Chinese Communists if the Government were to hope to avoid eventual defeat and Communist domination of China. Still others felt that the Gimo would never carry out the fundamental changes necessary to meet the Communist challenge and that the U. S. could not prevent eventual control of China by the Chinese Communists. These Chinese opposed U. S. aid to the National Government on the grounds that it would make additional converts to the Chinese Communist cause, that the Gimo was incapable of reform and that the U. S. might, in the long run, temper the Chinese Communist movement and not force it into the hands of Comintern Communist extremists. Prevailing throughout was a feeling of deep pessimism and, on the part of the majority, a fear of the U. S. S. R.
[Here follows report on conversations in Peiping, Tientsin, Mukden, Tsingtao, and Tsinan.]
Philip D. Sprouse
- Submitted by Mr. Sprouse on September 19 to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth).↩