121.893/8–847: Telegram
General Wedemeyer to the Secretary of State 93
57. Dear Mr. Secretary: The Mission has just returned from an extended tour of North and Northeast China. While some new information has been obtained, most of it reaffirms and strengthens material already available. Character of information follows same pattern. For psychological reasons, we are visiting as many areas as possible. Although the National Government stages and arranges contacts, we tactfully insist upon hearing or obtaining views of individuals and groups of all categories.
Militarily I view the situation in Manchuria as practically untenable for the Nationalists. Nationalist withdrawals are conducted prematurely and usually are brought about through clever maneuvering on the part of the Communist forces without any engagement in battle. The Communists have the initiative and are able to conduct operations when and where they will, restricted only by their own limitations, communications, terrain and weather. If sufficient troops were moved from Central and Northern China to reinforce adequately the Manchurian area, the situation south of the Great Wall particularly in Shantung would probably deteriorate rapidly. Even now the area between the Great Wall and the Yellow River is strongly disputed with lines of communications and strategic points changing hands continually. It would appear that the National Government from the military viewpoint must soon make the clear-cut decision with regard to holding Manchuria and jeopardizing retention of North China, or withdrawing from Manchuria in the hope of gaining a modicum of control and stabilization in North China.
National Government has proven inept in handling the situation [Page 713] from the political and economic angle in Manchuria, thus contributing to the debacle. Nationalist troops have been guilty of looting; they are often arrogant, discourteous and assume the attitude of conquerors, instead of Chinese forces with the mission of protecting the local people. They were prepared for harsh treatment from the Communists but they expected friendly cooperation from the National Government officials and troops.
Immediately prior to departure from Mukden, General Chen Cheng, the Chief of Staff, arrived. He requested a conference. I made a few suggestions to him with reference to the situation in Manchuria, emphasizing that I did so as a friend and not in an official capacity. I suggested that the Generalissimo’s personal representative in Manchuria, General Hsiung Shih-Hui with his entire headquarters be removed at once; that a military commander definitely possessing qualities of leadership and integrity be placed in command of all military forces; that a Manchurian civilian be designated as the Generalissimo’s representative in connection with all political and economic matters. I pointed out the fallacy of having two military commanders in the same area with overlapping and conflicting responsibilities. Further, I indicated that psychologically the appointment of a civilian of Manchurian origin whom the people could respect would be worth ten divisions toward regaining the sympathy and support of all Manchurians. It was uniformly impressed upon us; the Manchurians do not want to become Communists but they resent the carpetbagging tactics of the Generalissimo’s representatives, military and civilian, sent from China proper. Tu Li-Ming’s removal is encouraging and I anticipate further changes.
Efforts were made through planted evidence to the effect that the Soviet Communists are assisting the Chinese Communists in Manchuria. These efforts are childlike in conception and naive in presentation. There can be no doubt about the connivance of Soviet Russia with the Chinese Communists in Manchuria and North China, but the evidence offered by the Chinese Government is not the basis at all for this conviction on my part.
The Soviet Communists have been masterful in attaining their objectives in the Far East, with the one exception, Japan. Without participating directly and without providing damaging evidence, the Soviet Communists have created or are in process of creating conditions that strongly contribute to the establishment ultimately of a satellite or puppet state in Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, Manchuria and throughout Korea. There is an increasing trend on the part of the Nationalist Government publicity agencies to depict the situation in China as an international problem. I feel that this is true, but the [Page 714] discouraging aspect is emphasized in the apathy and ineptitude of the Chinese Government toward making any contribution whatsoever in the solution of the problem.
One might properly compare the existing philosophy of the Chinese to that which maintained to a certain degree during the recent war. After Pearl Harbor, Chinese leaders recognized that the United States and other Allies were committed to the defeat of Japan. The Chinese therefore could make the minimum contribution while building their own fences. Recognizing this attitude when I reported here as theater commander in the fall of 1944, I took steps designed to compel the Chinese to fight the Japanese. As you know we enjoyed a modicum of success. Every artifice will be resorted to on their part to compel United States aid and to minimize concurrently Chinese contribution. Today we must again be alert to Chinese machinations and compel them to make realistic contribution in the global effort first to retard, then stop Soviet aggressions, and later to penetrate peacefully through political, economic and psychological means those areas within the Soviet orbit. The Chinese will avoid these responsibilities again in order to strengthen reactionaries within their own country, while we and other Allies bear the brunt of the task. They are familiar with our program in Western Europe and through the Balkans. They sense the fact that we would assist in establishing sound economies and political entities outside the Soviet orbit.
Concerning corruption, many Chinese civil and military in positions of responsibility feel that the situation is hopeless and although their previous code of ethics may have been quite high, today they are determined to amass fortunes before a debacle occurs. Many Chinese in lesser positions of responsibility, in fact throughout all strata, who really desire to be honest, are compelled by economic pressure due to spiralling inflation, to resort to dishonest methods. They are not necessarily trying to acquire great wealth but merely to eke out a bare existence for themselves and their families.
The Chinese Communists follow clearly the Soviet Russian pattern and also the methods employed by the Nazis in their heyday. They establish schools in villages and about forty percent of the curriculum includes propaganda for Marxism–Stalinism—against American-British so-called imperialism. They apportion out land and produce to the very poor people, particularly to those who cooperate. Frequently they provide those people with arms, admonishing that they must now defend the property given to them against the corrupt forces of the National Government. Even United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration supplies being distributed in Communist-controlled areas are often apportioned out on the basis of [Page 715] loyalty to the party or to further the cause of the party. Throughout Communist-controlled areas there are placards and slogans conveying the message—“Down with American imperialism”. Their current propaganda bitterly denounces my Mission. They attribute all of the difficulties in China to policies that I as an individual, am supposed to have initiated when theater commander. Their tirade includes statements to the effect that I am a Nazi sympathizer trained in Germany. Their radio and placard attacks follow assiduously the line of other Communist organs outside of China.
All of us continue to exercise the greatest vigilance to preclude embarrassment to you and the President with regard to contacts with press and statements to Chinese.
Monday, August 11, the Mission will leave on its next trip which will take us to Formosa, Shanghai and Canton in that order. By the time we return, you will have departed for the Rio Conference. Our best wishes go with you.
Sincerely yours,
- Copies sent by the Secretary of State to the Secretaries of War and Navy on August 11.↩