893.00/10–2447: Telegram
The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State
Tihwa, October 24,
1947—6 p.m.
[Received October 26—10:37 p.m.]
[Received October 26—10:37 p.m.]
62. Analysis by General Sung (reference my telegram to Nanking 400, repeated Washington as 61, October 23) of possible plans of attackers follows:
- 1.
- Despite the supposed presence of Red Army personnel this force may have entered zone only to eject the Kazak troops and take back the mining project (“wolfram” mines at Fuwen, see Tihwa telegram to Nanking 215, May 22,44 particularly sections 3 and 4, and despatch 32, August 2945).
- 2.
- On the other hand even without active Soviet help it may still be planning to drive on south to the Peitashan area with the intention of eliminating the Chinese National troops stationed there. Assistance could be expected on this plan by a simultaneous attack of the Outer Mongolians from the east. Success in this sector might embolden the two bands to launch a joint full-scale push across the desert on Kitai (see Tihwa telegram to Nanking 200, May 1445) in an attempt to cut the important northern line of communications. This menace would greatly distress Chinese Army and if accompanied by a sortie from Outer Mongolia threatening sole present through motor road at Hami, might panic and paralyze Chinese military effort throughout the entire province.
Sung added that he hoped to prevent premature Chinese publicity such as followed previous Peitashan incident. He felt that former might have been a Russian trap calculated to elicit just the type of response it did in order that world opinion, put off guard by first canard, might fail to recognize present attack as planned by USSR from the start.
Sent Embassy as 401, repeated Department as 62.
Paxton