893.00B/12–3047: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 30—2:41 p.m.]
Following is substance of Changchun’s 454, December 22 to Embassy: Generally serious position Government forces Manchuria have [has?] increased rumors Government contemplating abandon Changchun and Kirin. To date no concrete evidence to support these rumors and Commanding General and Chief of Staff New First Army make categorical denial.
Changchun defense reorganized with formation New Seventh Army consisting New First Army, 38th Division and two Peace Preservation Corps divisions. 38th Division up to strength equipped completely over-age US material. PPC divisions one-third of authorized strength equipped with miscellaneous Chinese, Japanese, US material. Total available strength approximately 25,000 men. Government plans re Kirin not ascertained. Impression is Government plans hold city as long as possible, if necessary sacrificing poor troops there but not at price sending aid from Changchun. Believe Kirin will fall when Communists able make determined attack especially in winter months. Air support deemed essential to attempt defend city but it is believed air support no longer available and such force as could be assembled no longer a reliable factor.
[Page 421]Army morale Changchun low, not paid past 2 months due reorganization confusion, lack of air transport for bank notes, and possible malfeasance high circles delaying funds for speculative use. Unusually extreme cold reputed to have swollen casualty lists to 30 per cent effectives. Unit commanders Changchun reputed to have refused send troops clear up Changchun–Kirwin railway in spite of light Communist resistance on grounds troops unable withstand cold weather.
Economic crisis Changchun increasing daily but as yet no breaks in civilian discipline. Small amount barter trade with Communist area permitted by both sides. Army competing for food and fuel on market. No electricity except for few grain mills and almost no city water past 6 weeks.
In general situation reduced to one of survival. Communists can offer to reopen communications with countryside thus bringing in food and fuel. There is increasing percentage population hoping for arrival Communists to end that economic crisis be alleviated.
Apparent decision Nationalists hold Kirin–Changchun for present perhaps based three assumptions: (1) Mukden area can be maintained with troops presently being assigned that purpose (remains to be seen whether Communists yet able take Nationalist strongholds or willing make sacrifices necessary do so), (2) while Kirin and Changchun now doubtful assets to Communists, Nationalist hold Kirin hampers Communist north–south movement that area of north–south railway and Changchun–Ssuping east–west movement, (3) in spite serious Nationalist military position North China and Manchuria, hopes of successful spring offensive, if only limited in scale and which alone can gain time for Nationalists in Manchuria, apparently still held some quarters, and Changchun–Kirin being held as future springboards. This would appear unsound under present conditions, especially in view continued psychological inability Nationalists make aggressive use still respectable forces their command and inability inspire enthusiasm and loyalty in native troops. These failings plus geographical nature Nationalist position Manchuria have tended make Communists look stronger than they are.
Present Government strategy seems hold Changchun–Kirin maximum time with minimum forces. Troop withdrawals from Changchun have changed relatively secure position during November to precarious one if Communists attack in force. Entirely possible, however, city will hold out against one attack if at least some air support available. Fall of Mukden, improbable at this time, would of course render position Changchun–Kirin hopeless.