893.00/12–2647: Telegram
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 28—3:47 a.m.]
401. There are indications that Nanking’s projected political and military reorganization North China, designed to strengthen Nationalist position this area, if going forward is nevertheless falling somewhat short of desired result. Note in this connection following phenomena.
- 1.
- Hopei Provisional [Provincial] Government still remains in disorganized state.
- 2.
- Fu Tso-yi in taking over new post has assumed obligations which are perhaps beyond powers of his own politico-military organization to handle.
- 3.
- Demands of Manchurian situation, where Government is evidently still endeavoring prop up tottering structure by dispatch reinforcements, will probably make further incursions into military strength on which Fu relied originally and
- 4.
- There seems logical grounds for belief that neither Li Tsung-jen nor local troop commanders will extend to Fu same wholehearted cooperation that he could expect from his own troops (reContel 375, December 64). One local official told me recently that Shansi chairman Yen Hsi-shan has already informed local authorities that all troop dispositions Shansi will be made by himself (Contel 377, December 64). With reference mooted formation of people’s militia for local defense, informed me earlier in response to my question that it was unnecessary give those militia forces arms, that essence of CIA5 plan was to set up good system of intelligence re Communist movements with military action to be undertaken by mobile regular troops drawn from central reserve. Since Nationalist Government from 20 years’ experience has been unable evolve satisfactory tactics for catching up with fast-moving Communist forces which scatter in all directions before advance of superior force, it seems unlikely that Fu has discovered superior new tactics. My impression is that Fu proved powerful enough to control situation in hinterland and is superior tactician in comparatively limited operation, may have been drawn into situation beyond his political and military departments [talents?] when he was given charge of operations five provinces. Fact that major proportion of territory those five provinces is in Communist hands and area subject Fu’s authority is therefore more limited than appears from nominal jurisdiction given him, represents aggravation instead of diminution of his difficulties. Fu’s own troops, adequate for Inner Mongolian border lands, will be spread very thin in 5 provinces.
Believe that comparative quiet of Communist forces West Hopei and Shansi–Suiyuan–Shansi border region can hardly be adjudged by Nationalists to be cause for assurance that lull will long continue; it appears likely that Communists are presently making dispositions in anticipation that new opportunities will be offered them by reason of Nationalist troop movements and that they will strike new blows soon. Evident intention of Nanking to reinforce Manchuria by drawing on North China would appear to fit into Communist calculations. Attack of Communists on all fronts on present scale can only be predicated upon their twin belief that Nationalist control is crumbling in important sectors of Manchuria and North China, and that they have sufficient strength to overcome remnants of Nationalist strength there.
Sent Department as 401, repeated Nanking as 533, paraphrase to Tientsin.