Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00/12–2247: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

Nanking, December 22, 1947—noon.
[Received 2:44 p.m.]

2436. On December 20 General Chang Chih-chung⁹⁸ told me that Generalissimo had that day sent for him for lunch and the only other person present was Generalissimo’s son Chiang Ching-kuo. Chang said he remonstrated with Generalissimo over continuing and ineffectual military struggle in which he was being worsted and during which social, political and economic disaster was threatening the nation. He urged upon Chiang that only solution lay in resumption of PCC agreements,⁹⁹ and when Generalissimo remonstrated that he could not take the initiative in proposing renewed negotiations Chang stated that he had reason to believe the Communists were ready to respond to such a proposal. Generalissimo had then told him, he said, to go ahead very carefully in an effort to bring this about. For the first time in his experience, he said, Generalissimo listened to him quietly and without disputing the force of his argument gave him permission to go ahead.

In talking with me, Chang recalled a remark of Chou En-lai¹ when they went with you to Manchuria.² He had proposed to Chou that Russia be brought into the Manchurian settlement, but Chou had replied at once and vehemently that this would never do for it would make the issue much more troublesome.

General Chang also informed me that prior to his conversation with Generalissimo he had approached the Soviet Embassy here in an effort to get help in persuading Chinese Communists to resume peace talks. He had warned the Soviets that Chinese could never be won over to Russia against America and that continued chaos and misery in China would not benefit the Soviets. He insisted, he said, that in aiding China America had no ulterior motives against Russia and that the Soviets were misled by their own suspicions. He said the Soviets seemed impressed and asked what he wished them to do, to which he had replied that they might advise Chinese Communists to cease fighting and consider some better solution.

Chang authorized me to inform you of the above but otherwise he requested I observe strict secrecy. He is still not well, but hopes to report developments within the next month.

The above seems to us a further manifestation of the deterioration of the Government’s position. The Communists are winning on all sides and it is inconceivable to us they would accept peace negotiations at this time. It may be, of course, Communists might agree to negotiate in hope of discouraging extensive American aid to China program and of hampering any such program upon which we might embark. The fact that Chang approached Soviet Embassy causes us concern, particularly as we find it difficult to believe that he take such a step without authority.

Stuart

98. Chairman of President Chiang Kai-shek’s Northwest Headquarters.
99. January 31, 1946; United States Relations With China, pp. 610–621.
1. Head of the Chinese Communist Party and delegation during 1946 negotiations.
2. For North China trip of the Committee of Three, February–March, 1946, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. ix, pp. 341 ff.