893.00/12–1047
The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
Dear Walt: For what they are worth, I outline below my reactions to the situation in North China and Manchuria following my recent visit to those regions.
If it were not for the fact that miracles happen in China, I should say Manchuria is gone. General Ch’en Ch’eng is a sick man. The best diagnosis I can get is perforated ulcers which require an operation (at least he is bleeding internally) and there is no surgeon available. Ch’en says he will be up and about in a few weeks but he tired very quickly during my conversation with him and the environment in which he is living doesn’t seem to me one conducive to curing perforated ulcers. He has gathered around him a bunch of thieves who can be expected to take full advantage of the fact that he is confined to his bed. I gathered that the appointment of Lo Cho-ying as deputy was at Ch’en’s specific request. Ch’en is said to have great faith in Lo’s administrative ability and an unwarranted belief that he can control Lo’s graft. Certainly the evidence is against him.
I don’t believe the Manchurians want communism, but the Government doesn’t seem to offer an alternative. It is venal to the core and the communists have seized and kept the initiative. If Manchuria is to be reconquered it is essential that new spirit be instilled into the native population as well as into the armed forces, and there is no evidence that this is being done. The only bright spot I saw in the picture was Wang Hua-yi, who seemed sincere in his belief that he could rally the native Manchurians against the Communists if General Ch’en would give him the green light and adequate equipment. [Page 398] Ch’en was withholding assistance from Wang, however, because, according to Wang, of his deep-seated fear that Hsiung Shih-hui had left such bitterness behind him that any native Manchurian force if armed might reasonably be expected to turn immediately against the Government. Dave Barrett85 thinks a couple of divisions or so of reinforcements from south of the Wall would enable Ch’en to take the initiative and handle the situation, yet basically I can’t believe the area can be pacified for long with other than native Manchurian troops. The southern troops have come as conquerors, they speak a different language, and their presence is bitterly resented. The native Manchurian front men, installed in office by Ch’en, are busily engaged in gleaning what was left by Hsiung Shih-hui and the populace sees nowhere else to turn than to communism.
I am enclosing, in this connection, a copy of Dave Barrett’s report to the Military Attaché on the results of our trip.86
As I said above Ch’en is a sick man confined to his bed who should be in a hospital and who could not conceivably direct a campaign with real efficiency. He seems of high moral character—was freezing in his bedroom because others in Mukden had no coal—but he must be oblivious to the complete carpetbagging graft that is going on around him or would put a stop to it. His henchmen impressed me as “carpetbaggers” of the first order; window dressers or front men to greet the guests and pretend that Manchurians have something to do with the administration of the area.
General Chin Chen, Mayor of Mukden is a typical old war lord assuming a civil office. He entertained me at luncheon in a foreign style residence, garishly furnished, his table laden with food despite the austerity program and with his number 4 concubine by his side. He is obviously a grafter and seemingly proud of it. Wang Shu-han, Deputy Director, Political Affairs Commission, Northeast Headquarters is much of the same ilk. Dr. Chang Chien-fei, Special Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in the Northeast, speaks Russian and seems quite an efficient person although I don’t believe he has any authority.
Black as the situation appeared to me, the casual visitor, every official with whom I talked expressed complete confidence that the Communists had suffered disastrous losses in the fighting last Autumn and would be easy to handle come Spring. Every official of whom I inquired expressed no concern over the ammunition situation, the [Page 399] relief situation, or the food situation in general for that matter. They have obtained one large and one small ice breaker from Tientsin to keep the port of Hulutao open; they have agents purchasing grain in the Yangtze Valley and seem to have supreme confidence that Hulutao and the railroad from there to Mukden will be kept open and that everything is going to be hunky-dory.
I am not convinced that the Communists plan to attack Changchun and Kirin this winter but if they do I am inclined to agree with Dave Barrett that there is a 60–40 chance those places will be lost. The key to the situation seems to be the airfields and I gather they will be difficult to defend. I came away convinced that General Ch’en intended to defend Mukden come what may and he may be able to do so. Certainly he evidenced supreme confidence in his ability to do so.
North China
The Generalissimo, it seems, got really frightened when the Communists captured Shihchiachwang without hardly firing a shot. His removal of General Sun and the appointment of Fu Tso-yi tended to increase confidence in North China momentarily. I found in Peiping, but particularly in Tientsin, complete disgust with the present Government, and almost a hopeless prayer for some change other than to communism, although in Tientsin, I was told, certain businessmen were already trying to visualize how they could operate under a Communist government. I found the importers in Tientsin complaining because Government allocation of quotas discriminates against them, the Government statistics having included in Shanghai imports all those which in normal times, although cleared in Shanghai, were destined for Tientsin. The exporters complained because the Government did not permit them to barter with the Communists. The Communists apparently have ample supplies and will gladly barter, but merchants on the Government side of the line are not permitted to do so. Communist action in North China seems to have resulted in almost a complete economic strangulation of that area. Typical, it seems to me, is the fact that the Government is transporting cotton from Paitingtzu to Tientsin by air so as to keep the Government mills in Tientsin occupied and prevent unemployment there. It is an uneconomic transaction which could take place only in the Soviet Union or in present day China.
Peiping seemed shoddy like the down-at-the-heel student awaiting that day when peace in China will make it once again a great cultural and tourist center.
Faithfully yours,