893.00/12–647
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State 82
[Received December 17.]
Subject: Assessment of Current Military Position of Central Government and Suggested Application of American Military Assistance.
Sir: I have the honor to observe that for some time we have considered the possibility that our periodic messages concerning certain isolated phases of the military position of the Government may not convey to officers of the Department a complete impression of the over-all military situation in China. Even though the Department will have noted that few, if any, messages from the Embassy or Consulates bearing upon the military position of the Government have been optimistic in tone, it has remained a fact, until the fall of Shihchiachuang in late November, that the major urban centers have remained in Government hands and the Government from time to time has given wide publicity to the recapture of such points as Kalgan, Yenan, and Chef of as triumphs of Government arms.
It has long been our feeling, however, that the mere retention of urban centers in a nation such as China has not reflected accurately the military strength of the Government. In a predominately agrarian society such as China’s, the occupation of an urban center is of continuing military value to the occupying force in proportion to the degree of full and free economic and political intercourse obtaining between that city and its adjacent countryside after the occupation [Page 388] has taken place. If this condition does not obtain, the mere military occupation of a city, in the sense that the occupation denies it to the enemy forces controlling contiguous rural areas, becomes a source of weakness to the occupying force.
In the prevailing situation in China the inter-relation between military, political and economic developments is more marked perhaps than in any other area of the world. Assuming, as we do, that the Department is currently studying methods whereby there may be created in Eastern Asia conditions of greater stability than now prevail, we believe it desirable at this time, and largely in non-technical terms, to assess the military position of the Central Government of China with a view to determining whether or not its position has deteriorated to a critical point, to express our opinion with regard to certain of the causal factors involved in this deterioration, and to suggest action which may serve to improve the situation.
The Department will recall that some months ago the Central Government established at Hsuchow an advanced military headquarters under the command of General Ku Chu-tung, Commander-in-Chief of Chinese Army Ground Forces, assumably for the purpose of coordinating all military activity in connection with the Government effort to clear North Kiangsu and Shantung of Communist forces. More recently the Department will have noted the centralization of Government military activity in the central Yangtze Valley area in a similar headquarters at Kiukiang under the command of General Pai Chung-shi, Minister of National Defense, to halt the incursion of the Communist General Liu Po-cheng into Central China.
More significantly, however, the Central Government on December 1 announced the formation in Peiping of a North China General Bandit Suppression Headquarters under the command of General Fu Tso-yi. This headquarters, according to preliminary accounts, is charged with the direction of all Government military activities in Suiyuan, Chahar, Hopei, Jehol and the area through which the trace [track?] of the Peiping–Liaoning Railway passes. The establishment of all of these headquarters indicates to us the growing concern of the Government with the deterioration of its military position. In the case of the establishment of the headquarters at Peiping, we consider it to be an indication of the Government’s real, if belated, appreciation of the realities of the military situation, particularly because of the appointment of General Fu Tso-yi to a position of great command responsibility. Without attempting to discuss at length General Fu’s competence it is our opinion that he is an able and aggressive commander whose technical reputation among American commanders familiar with China is of a high order. Laudable [Page 389] as this appointment may be, it seems more significant to us that there has been appointed an officer who has not been noted for his close associations with the dominant military cliques close to the Generalissimo and in making the appointment, granting command responsibility over such a large and critical area, the Generalissimo appears to have proceeded contrary to his previous custom of dividing and diffusing, rather than concentrating and delegating, military power and responsibility.
The current military position of the Government cannot be appreciated without a review of developments immediately following the surrender of Japan. On V–J Day the Central Government was presented with the primary objective of the reestablishment of its authority in North China and Manchuria. The Government attempted to do this by the military occupation of the larger cities in these areas and the interconnecting land-lines of communication within the areas themselves and between these areas and the Yangtze Valley. At higher Chinese staff levels, in theory at least, there was an appreciation of the necessity to establish governments in reoccupied cities sufficiently effective to attract wide popular support from contiguous rural areas. At that time it was the opinion of the then American China Theatre Headquarters that, failing the establishment of popular and effective civil administrations, the military resources of the Central Government were inadequate for the purposes of the operation. In particular, it was held that any attempt to occupy Manchuria would so deplete the strategic troop reserves of the Government that a Government-Communist military stalemate would result both north and south of the Great Wall and that this stalemate would slowly resolve in favor of the Communists.
This estimate of the situation then prevailing has been borne out by subsequent developments. American advice to the contrary, the Government committed itself to a purely military reoccupation of Manchuria without consideration for long established regional sentiment in the Northeast. It is undeniable, as the sum of American reporting of developments in this period shows, that the Central Government administrations in all reoccupied areas was immediately welcomed. However, the development of malfeasance and misfeasance in office usually alienated rather than gained popular support for the Government. Stemming from this initial blunder, or ineptitude, the Government military position during the past 24 months has steadily deteriorated.
In the first 6 to 12 months after V–J Day Government armies possessed the capability for offensive operations against the Communists in so far as they were able to move large bodies of troops—of divisional [Page 390] strength or greater—through Communist-dominated territory, and assault and occupy Communist-held cities. In North China and Manchuria this capability diminished rapidly in direct proportion to the distance large formations maneuvered from their bases. The Government forces involved soon became irrevocably committed to the garrisoning of occupied cities and the guarding of lines of communication. In so doing, they lost the capability of offensive sweeps through the countryside contiguous to these garrisons with the aim of preventing the consolidation of Communist military strength in rural areas. They failed as well to create governments in their zones of occupation which could attract popular support either in the cities or in the surrounding countryside. Following Government victories at such places as Kalgan, Shan Hai-kuan, Changchun and Ssuping-kai, the Communists recognized the extent and character of the Government capability and abandoned large scale positional warfare except where Government formations at the end of long supply lines became vulnerable to attack. In other words, by mid-1946 Government armies were committed to a strategic plan which involved the sacrifice of mobility and the Communists fitted their strategy and tactics to meet this situation.
In retrospect it now appears that Communist planning involved the following: (a) the isolation of the North China and Manchurian battlefields from the lower Yangtze Valley through the interdiction and seizure of land communications; (b) the development of their own military resources through the distribution of stocks of former Japanese military equipment and captured supplies in areas under their control and through the recruiting and training of new units; (c) the isolation of the various sectors of Government military operations north of the Yellow River; (d) the development of military operations between the Lung-Hai railroad and the Yangtze, in order to prevent the reenforcement of the North from the Yangtze Valley; (e) the progressive isolation and reduction of Government garrisons north of the Yellow River, beginning with those points furthest removed from major bases; (f) the development of a program of psychological warfare and clandestine activity in Government garrisoned centers in order to weaken Government control.
In recent weeks the effectiveness of Communist planning has become increasingly apparent. Government forces north of the Lung-Hai railroad are virtually immobilized at garrison or line of communication guard duty. In most areas Communist strength is sufficient to prevent the Government from weakening the garrison at any given point in order to launch offensive forays or to move to the assistance of an adjacent garrison which may be under Communist attack. The loss of Shih Chia-chuang and the impending loss of Yuan Shih, and [Page 391] the imminent threat to Paoting are examples of the efficacy of the Communist strategy of compartmentalizing the area of battle along the northern sector of the Peiping–Hankow railroad. In effect the Communists have gained the capability to mobilize large formations and utilize them offensively against the Government. Furthermore they possess the capability to concentrate these formations against the Government without serious hindrance, while the Government lacks the capability to move in opposition. In short, in most areas north of the Lung-Hai railroad the offensive initiative has passed to the Communists.
The position of the Government might be alleviated in some degree were it possible for it to reinforce any of the northern sectors from the south. The recent incursion of Liu Po-ch’eng, however, south of the Lung-Hai, through the Ta Pieh-shan, and on to the northern bank of the Yangtze River constitutes a sufficient potential threat to the security of Government control of the Yangtze Valley to prevent any diminution of its present Government garrison. Furthermore the threat of civil unrest in Southern and Southwestern China forbids any large reduction in the already meager forces garrisoning those areas. In view of these circumstances there is no likelihood that the Government will be able to find any significant number of reinforcements for North China or Manchuria except in the form of impressed and untrained replacements for a portion of its battle losses.
As suggested above the Government has attempted to meet the situation by the formation of new command organizations in certain large area—Ch’en Ch’eng, the Chief of Staff, for Manchuria; Fu Tso-yi, for North China and the line of communication to the Northeast; Ku Chu-tung, Commander in Chief, Ground Forces, for the Eastern Lung-hai area and Shantung; Pai Chung-hsi, Minister of National Defense, for Central China. There is no evidence to suggest that this reshuffle of command responsibility will have any pervasively beneficial effect. On the contrary all reports received by the Embassy indicate that there exists in all Government headquarters, at all echelons, both at Nanking and in the field, the deepest pessimism with regard to the possibility of any improvement in the Government’s military position. Of late this pessimism is tending more and more to become abject defeatism. This state of mind is in large degree the result of the Government’s strategy of static defense of fixed positions. Physical stagnation has brought about mental paralysis in command echelons and on troop level any desire to join with the enemy is rapidly disappearing. It will be recalled that at the outset of the second Burma campaign in 1943 it was with considerable difficulty that American officers instilled the offensive technique into selected [Page 392] Chinese divisions, but once those units became confident of their own ability and that of their leaders they performed creditably against an enemy before whom they had been retreating for six years. At the present time American trained and equipped units of the Chinese army have been permitted to abandon their previous rudimentary but effective training in the American concept of finding, fixing, and destroying the enemy and are subject to the dry rot of immobility. As has been pointed out above, the Communists’ capabilities have developed to the point where Government forces can take effective offensive action only with great difficulty, if at all.
In the light of the foregoing it is our considered opinion that the Government military position, particularly in North China and Manchuria, has reached a critical stage. Evidence of the deterioration is plentiful and need not be dwelt on at length in this despatch in as much as it has been the subject of previous reporting from the Embassy and from the Office of the Military Attaché.
It remains, then, to assess the precise degree to which the deterioration has progressed. As has been pointed out above, the initiative has now passed to the Communists, who now have the capability of further reducing the Government’s military strength by attrition and by direct assault. The Government high command is aware of this situation. It is also aware that it is totally incapable of restoring the military situation to its own advantage. Since this is the case, the deterioration of the Government military position at an increasingly rapid rate may be expected. A collapse of any significantly large sector in North China or Manchuria will inevitably result in the rapid development of a military crisis which cannot be isolated. The factors which will make for this crisis are already in operation, and the initiative is in the hands of the Communists. In a very real sense the complete collapse of the Government military position in North China and Manchuria depends on the timetable of the Communist high command.
The military crisis now besetting the Chinese Government has the closest possible interdependent causal relationship with the political and economic crises in present day Chinese society. This is a fact so generally recognized as to require no further elaboration here. It will suffice to state that a general, profound, and long-term improvement in the military situation can only come through economic and political reforms, and that no profound improvement in the economic and political crises can come without a corresponding improvement in the military situation. However, there is much evidence to support the view that, of these three crises, none is immediately more grave than that in the military sphere, and none is more likely to develop suddenly into a situation beyond repair. The certain effect [Page 393] of any large Government military catastrophe on the political and economic positions of the Chinese Government need only be suggested. For these reasons, we incline strongly to the view that, for the moment, the stabilization and improvement of the Government military position holds priority over the solution of the economic and political crises.
While it is our conviction that any measures taken to guard against a Government military collapse must be adopted promptly, we further believe that they must stem from a consideration of two demonstrable facts; the first, that the Government is completely incapable of restoring the military situation to its own advantage without outside assistance; and, the second, that despite the admittedly severe matériel shortage of the Government, its adverse military position stems far less from this factor, in which it is certainly no worse off than the Communists, than from its commission of a series of politico-military blunders of the first magnitude. If the first of these facts calls for a comprehensive program of military aid in the interest of restoring stability in China, the second demands that such aid as is given be so contrived and directed as to retrieve the politico-military blunders already committed and to guard against and prevent similar blunders as the aid is deployed.
As indicated above, we are in accord with views expressed elsewhere to the effect that military aid to the Chinese Government should include the furnishing of stocks of military supplies and equipment. We further believe that the current program of the AAG is properly a part of such a program. However, we are of the firm opinion that assistance of this character, no matter to what degree it may be augmented, cannot be in any sense efficacious unless some means can be found to insure its application in accord with sound military and political principles.
From consideration of the factors involved, it is our belief that the key to the effective application of military aid to the existing Chinese Government lies in the creation of an American Planning Group to work with the Chinese General Staff but having direct access to the Generalissimo. This Group could nominally be a part of the existing Army Advisory Group but in effect operating independently thereof. Such a Group would have the primary function, in accordance with the prevailing politico-military situation in any given area, of developing the necessary strategic plans essential for Government reoccupation and of making tentative allocations of the materiel necessary for the execution of the plan. Any plans developed would necessarily have to receive the concurrence of the Chinese High Command. The personnel of this Planning Group should be small, including officers with War Department planning experience, officers [Page 394] with field experience with Chinese troops and civilian personnel, qualified in terms of knowledge of Chinese society, to plan and advise on military government techniques for application in reoccupied areas. The Group should have available to it intelligence facilities to keep it apprised of the capabilities and military situations of both the Government and Communist forces at all times. The Group should also have available to it field parties with Sino-American personnel having the responsibility of explaining the developed plans to the higher echelons of the Government’s field commands and reporting to the parent group whether any given plan was being energetically implemented. If we were able to demonstrate that we were prepared to carry forward operations which would eventually redound to the advantage of the civilian population, it is probable that to the field parties could be attracted numbers of highly intelligent and progressive Chinese civilians with a knowledge of local administrative problems superior to that of any Chinese military leaders or alien experts.
We believe that a program developed along the lines suggested in this despatch offers a feasible means of assisting the Chinese Government in its present military extremity. This statement is made with the qualification that such a program, if it is to be effective, will depend on the good faith with which the Chinese Government provides cooperation. In making the foregoing suggestions we do not ignore the past inconclusive results of American advisory efforts in all government spheres, but if this or some similar plan were made the price of material military assistance it would serve to convince the Chinese Government that no program of overall American assistance can be expected unless the Chinese themselves are willing to provide concrete assurances that aid is being deployed in useful and productive channels.
Respectfully yours,
Minister-Counselor of Embassy
- Drafted by the First Secretary of Embassy (Ludden) and the Attaché (Schultheis).↩