The Ambassador has the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum of
conversation between two Embassy officers and Dr. Lo Lung-chi of the
Democratic League on October 28, 1947. The memorandum expresses Dr. Lo’s
concern over the National Government directive outlawing the Democratic
League and a reiteration of his over-all plan for a coalition government
as the only feasible solution to China’s immediate problems. In this
general connection the Department’s attention is directed to the
Embassy’s Secret Despatches No. 823 dated July 11 [June 20], 1947 and No. 972 [872] dated
July 11, 1947,34
both entitled “Transmission of Memorandum of Conversation Between Dr. Lo
Lung-chi and an Officer of the Embassy”.
It will be noted in the enclosure that Dr. Lo, through the Ambassador,
proposed to find out from the Government the exact status of the League
and its members; i. e. whether only the League is outlawed or whether
the members of the League are also to be considered as Communists. The
Embassy has been informed that the present order does not call for the
arrest or detention of the League members, but only for the cessation of
activities of the Democratic League as a political entity.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant
Attaché of the Embassy in China (Anderson)
Nanking, October 28,
1947.
| Participants: |
Dr. Lo Lung-chi, Democratic
League |
|
John F. Melby, Second Secretary of
Embassy |
|
Robert Anderson, Assistant
Attaché |
Dr. Lo Lung-chi came to lunch on October 28, 1947, on which date the
National Government outlawed the Democratic League. His house was
under surveillance, all telephone wires had been cut, and
[Page 353]
he was released from
house-arrest shortly after 10:00 A.M. The purpose of his visit to
the Embassy was to request the help of the Ambassador in making
contact with high government officials to sound out what was to be
done with those members of the League who might be arrested. Dr. Lo
tried several times, without success, to contact Shao Li-tze and
Chang Li-shen, Minister of the Interior, from whose office the order
had originated.
Dr. Lo did not wish to return to his residence as he would then lose
all contact with the outside. He believed that he would be in danger
if he did leave the Embassy, and hence was most anxious for the
Ambassador’s intervention. When it was suggested that he would not
be harmed because of his wide foreign connections, particularly with
Americans, he stated that Chinese politics were so unscrupulous and
unlike Western ideas that the military would not hesitate to take
drastic action. (For a man who was in such seemingly imminent
danger, Dr. Lo appeared most calm and spoke in a rather academic,
impersonal manner).
Dr. Lo went on to state that he could not understand why the
Government had taken such action in view of the possibility of a
United States loan when it was obvious that his organization could
have nothing to do with the present civil war as it had no army and
was composed entirely of students, professors, merchants, and the
like. In this connection he stated: “What could the League do
militarily even if it wanted to?”
Dr. Lo repeated several times that he wished to find out from the
Government whether only the League was outlawed as a political
entity or whether the members of the League were also to be
considered as Communists. In addition, he made it quite clear that
it was the League’s desire to have any specific accusations made
public in the form of open, non-military trials, thereby giving the
League an opportunity to defend itself. When asked if the order had
most probably come with the Generalissimo’s approval, Dr. Lo replied
that any order with such far-reaching effects would have had to come
from the Generalissimo and, further, that it was probably not a mere
coincidence that the Generalissimo had departed from Nanking two
days prior to the order.
Dr. Lo then turned to the question of the much-discussed loan to
China, and stated that he did not favor any loan; but if there had
to be one, it should by all means have foreign supervision to
prevent corruption and graft similar to that seen in the UNRRA–CNRRA
China program. He then expressed the opinion that in event of a
Nationalist victory, China could expect nothing but a fascist state
headed by “this Generalissimo”—a situation which in the long run
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would be disadvantageous
to the United States inasmuch as all other political groups in
China, as well as the Communists, would have been eliminated.
Dr. Lo next launched into his rather nebulous idea of a coalition
government which would involve the Third Party elements in China
reaching an understanding with the Communists and with influential
members of the present government. He felt that certain military
figures not personally allied to the Generalissimo would join such a
coalition thereby giving his group its most essential weapon to
assume power, namely, an army. (When asked to give specific names of
the prominent military, Lo was rather indefinite.)
Biographic Notes Derived from Dr. Lo’s
Conversation:
- 1)
- Dr. Lo has not been in contact with Harold Laski35 except for
the one exchange of correspondence when he was in Kunming during
the war.
- 2)
- Dr. Lo’s last trip to the United States was in 1927. During
the war, he tried several times to obtain a Chinese passport but
was refused by the government.
