893.00/10–3047
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)32
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Embassy’s instruction of July 9, 1947,33 directing me to report on the amount of military assistance, if any, being given to the Chinese Communists by the U. S. S. R.
As noted by the Embassy itself in the reference instruction, the available information in regard to the subject in point is extremely limited. It is believed, however, that even negative information is of a certain amount of value in assessing a matter such as that at hand, and I reply in seriatim below to the various points in the Embassy’s instruction.
- (a)
- There has yet been obtained no positive evidence that the U. S. S. R. is supplying the Manchurian Communists with arms, ammunition, or other supplies; excepting, there has been received a report from a Japanese source to the effect that the component chemicals for powder manufacture are received from the Soviet Union and used in Communist arsenals maintained in North Manchuria. There was no indication of the volume of such supplies obtained, but munitions manufacture in North Manchuria cannot be other than in its beginning stages.
- In addition, as is generally known, the Communists have in one way or another come into possession of substantial stocks of Japanese small arms supplies, some artillery and mortars, and machine guns, and are using those in the course of their present military campaigns in Manchuria. It is generally suspected, and it seems almost certain, that there was in the beginning (in late 1945 and the beginning of 1946) at least connivance on the part of the occupying Soviet military forces which led to the Chinese Communists’ obtaining possession of such arms and ammunition. The Chinese Communists are reported as well to possess a very limited number of Japanese planes which have been rehabilitated and are being used for training purposes on airfields in North Manchuria.
- (b)
- There is no positive information confirming that the U. S. S. R. is producing and stockpiling military equipment and supplies in Siberia for the use of Chinese Communist forces. It would appear, on the basis of logic and past experience, that the more probable Soviet approach to the particular matter of supply of the Chinese Communist forces would be to assist in the development of local sources of munitions supplies. That is, it would appear in logic the more probable procedure, particularly in view of the area now controlled by the Communists in Manchuria, for the Soviets to contribute in one way or another, whether by dispatch of experts or the supply of needed materials, to the erection of arsenals in Manchuria itself. With respect to the use of experts, however, it is to be noted that available Japanese reports indicate that it is Japanese technicians who are being used in munitions manufacturing centers.
- It seems possible that the Soviets have stockpiled, either in the Soviet Far East or in Manchuria under their control, certain captured Japanese arms supplies from which current withdrawals are made for delivery to the Chinese Communists in exchange for Manchurian agricultural products.
- (c)
- There is available no information in regard to the use by the Soviets of Japanese tools, dies, and specifications for the manufacture and stockpiling in Siberia of Japanese type weapons and ammunition. Despite the circumstance that this would to all appearances provide a convenient form of Soviet aid to the Chinese Communists, it is unlike the Soviets to expend much effort in the use of antiquated patterns and forms in so far as such use would not serve a useful purpose for the Soviet State. If the reasoning given in the paragraph above is sound, that is, if the Communists themselves are being caused or are able to manufacture their own munitions, those tools, dies, and specifications might be in use in Manchuria but would hardly be in use in Soviet plants in Siberia. Use in Manchuria would adequately serve what might be called the Comintern purpose.
- (d)
- The Consulate General at Changchun has already submitted to the Department, in report form, that information which became available to it in regard to the volume and character of rail traffic from the Soviet Far East into North Manchuria, in regard to road traffic into Manchuria via Outer Mongolia, and in regard to travel conditions across Nationalist–Communist lines. It is pertinent to observe at this point, however, that there is a consensus of opinion that rail traffic over the sometime Chinese Eastern Railway has increased in recent months, and that the Communists themselves subsequent to their “Fifth Offensive” (May–June) reputedly extended their railway net to some degree into the newly occupied areas. This latter phenomenon would indicate a Communist belief that they would be able to hold those areas, and would indicate as well that they possess adequate supplies of railway construction materials. That the latter factor is present derives from the fact that the Communists control practically all of the timber resources of Manchuria and thus are able to manufacture an unlimited quantity of railway sleepers; and that the constriction in the post-VJ period of the extent of the railway network in North Manchuria as well as in those areas held by the Nationalists, has given the Communists a stockpile of rails and other steel materials adequate for restoration of trackage along those [Page 349] rail lines that they consider to be of primary strategic importance. The Changchun Consulate General had available no information in regard to the character of air traffic from the Soviet Far East into North Manchuria, but the implication of general reports was that it is probably small. Likewise, judging from the inadequacy of highways and the uninhabited character of the area, it is believed improbable that the Communists have any considerable traffic from Inner Mongolia into northern Manchuria. That from the Mongolian People’s Republic into Manchuria has been briefly reported upon. In respect to Northern Korea, available reports indicate that rail traffic is carried on through T’umen. The volume of that rail traffic is unknown.
Conclusions: The best available positive information indicates that the Soviets have in the past connived in the obtaining by the Chinese Communist forces of certain war materials, particularly arms and other munitions of a type not especially desired by the Soviets themselves, from stocks left behind by the Kwantung Army at V–J Day. Despite the circumstance that Assistant Military Attachés and American consular officers and others have repeatedly requested the local Chinese military authorities for evidence, including serial numbers, of the supply of arms and other munitions to the Chinese Communists by the Soviet Union, as frequently alleged in the Chinese press, no convincing evidence of such supply has yet been forthcoming. There have been a few occasions where American observers have had the opportunity to view an isolated Soviet tommy-gun or two, et cetera, but those instances have been so isolated as to lead to the logical conclusion that such items may have been sold or lost by, or stolen from, the Soviet forces during the term of their occupation in Manchuria. In respect to American Lend-Lease material now in Communist hands, most observers are inclined to agree, until convincing contrary evidence in form of serial numbers is presented, with General Chang Hsuehming’s conclusion (in conversation with me at Mukden on October 24) that “the Communists took it from us (the Nationalists)”. Likewise, there has been obtained to date no convincing evidence, despite continually recurring reports in Chinese propaganda agencies, of the actual participation of Soviet nationals, either as advisers or in the capacity of combat groups, in the civil war in Manchuria. As has been previously pointed out, all logic would lead one to believe that any direct Soviet participation along such lines would be through the participation of Communists, perhaps trained in the Soviet Union and perhaps even possessing Soviet citizenship, of Asiatic nationality. Such Communists of either Chinese, Korean or Mongol nationality would be readily available to the Comintern for such use.
There have been consistent and recurrent reports of the exchange of agricultural commodities on the part of the Chinese Communists [Page 350] in Manchuria for consumption goods from the Soviet Union. Kuomintang propaganda has frequently suggested that the commodities received from the Soviet Union have included arms and ammunition. No concrete proof of that allegation has yet been adduced by the Chinese National side, but that at least some materials of assistance to the Communists in developing their overall military power are received from the Soviet Union in barter, appears highly probable, if still unsubstantiated by concrete evidence.
In sum, there is good reason to suspect that, because of the sympathy the Soviet Union undoubtedly has for the revolutionary movement in China, they have aided and abetted in indirect ways with the development of Chinese Communist military power in Manchuria. The tentative conclusion to be drawn from available evidence, however, is that, presumably by reason of considerations deemed by the Comintern leaders to be compelling in the international field, the Soviets have stopped short of any direct intervention. This conclusion is drawn from the absence of direct evidence to the contrary. That there may nevertheless be that direct intervention, and that evidence thereof will possibly be forthcoming in due course, is of course a logical possibility. Until that evidence becomes available, however, it is to be concluded that the assistance rendered to the Chinese Communists by the Soviets in Manchuria has thus far been indirect, and limited in absolute amount. The assistance rendered along economic lines naturally bids fair to increase in importance as time goes on—assuming by hypothesis that the Chinese Communists continue to extend territorially and develop their control in Manchuria. Such increase of economic interest between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets would in due course lead naturally to the development of a greater political—and perhaps military—interest as well. This would almost inevitably happen in the event that the domination of Manchuria by the Communists were followed by the establishment in that area of a semi-autonomous “State” operating under some sort of agreement with a Communist regime in North Manchuria and the Soviet dominated Mongolian People’s Republic.
Respectfully yours,