893.00/10–1447: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

2068. On October 111 accompanied members House Military Affairs Committee to call on Gimo.17 After usual amenities representatives questioned Gimo with regard to Chinese Communists: What relation they had to Moscow, whether they were aided by Moscow, etc. Gimo replied Chinese Communists thoroughgoing Communists working in collusion with and taking orders from Moscow, that even apart from Japanese military supplies in Manchuria made available to them by Russia Gimo believed that they constantly receiving supplies and technical advisers from Russia.

Congressmen then put series pointed questions to Gimo as to needs of China and what China looked to US for; what complaints Gimo had as to American policy and whether AAG18 as now functioning seemed worthwhile, and whether its usefulness and numbers should be increased. Gimo at first demurred but went on to say that since these questions were asked he would answer frankly. That having equipped troops so extensively with American arms, China looked to US to supply ammunition according to original understanding and that this applied especially to eight and one-third group program; that AAG under existing restrictions had virtually no combat value but that he would wholeheartedly welcome its enlargement and advisory assistance in actual field operations.

When asked how urgent China’s needs and how imminent China’s danger, Gimo replied especially in case Manchuria situation was extremely critical; that Manchuria was temporarily stabilized but danger was by no means past; that within the Great Wall situation was fairly well under control and at least presented no serious immediate problem.

[Page 326]

Gimo referred more than once to predicament in Manchuria as an American responsibility due to Yalta Agreement19 and remarked that if Nationalists finally defeated it would not be because of Russia or the Chinese Communists but because of China’s ally during war and China’s trusted friend who failed to give promised assistance at this time of desperate need. There was no tone of bitterness or resentment in Gimo’s comments and he seemed reluctant to make them, hesitating several times before he answered.

Stuart
  1. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
  2. Army Advisory Group; for correspondence on this subject, see pp. 785 ff.
  3. Signed February 11, 1945, by President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, and Marshal Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Commissars of the Soviet Union; Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984.