Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00/10–1347

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)¹²

undated

United Nations Aspects of Guardianship or Trusteeship for Manchuria

1. The General Problem

This memorandum deals with United Nations aspects of a Great Power guardianship or trusteeship for Manchuria, presumably to be established upon the initiative of the Chinese Government.

2. Possibilities within the United Nations Charter

The United Nations Charter¹³ offers various possibilities for bringing within its terms a change in the present political status of Manchuria. Subject to the possibility of attack on grounds of the Charter, almost any proposal regarding Manchuria could be related to the United Nations in some fashion. Hence, the problem appears to be essentially a political one. The following are the principal ways in which the United Nations might be related to the matter:

(a) General Assembly Recommendations. Under Article 14 the General Assembly might make recommendations to China and to other Governments regarding Manchuria. Such a recommendation would require a ⅔ vote of the Assembly, but would have neither binding authority upon Members nor automatic means of enforcement. There might be some difficulty in obtaining a ⅔ vote of the Assembly for a recommendation which would appear to sanction Kuomintang rule in Manchuria contrary to the wishes of the Manchurians. This would be particularly true if the USSR opposed strongly such General Assembly action and attacked vigorously the character of the Kuomintang Government. If the General Assembly were to act under Article 14, a clear expression of Manchurian opinion through elections or plebiscite would probably be called for as part of such Assembly action. If it is desired to obtain United Nations blessing for an arrangement agreed upon by the Great Powers, a General Assembly resolution or recommendation would be the simplest and quickest action.

(b) Security Council action. Subject to the domestic jurisdiction clause of Article 2 (7), which presumably could be expressly waived by China, any government may bring the problem of Manchuria to the attention of the Security Council under Article 35, or possibly on the ground that it constitutes a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression (Article 39). What action the Security Council could take would depend upon the existence of unanimity among the permanent members.

(c) Trusteeship. Manchuria might be offered by China for trusteeship under the Charter, either as an ordinary trusteeship requiring General Assembly approval (by ⅔ vote), or as a strategic trusteeship requiring Security Council approval (veto rule applying). China might be reluctant to offer Manchuria for trusteeship since the offer would amount to relinquishment of full sovereignty over Manchuria. It should also be noted that the end result of trusteeship would be self-determination of the people of Manchuria, with a choice either of independence or of return to Chinese sovereignty. It should be noted, therefore, that trusteeship might prove to be a device for permanently separating Manchuria from China. A trusteeship would require one or more governments or the United Nations itself to act as administering authority. Further details on this possibility appear below.

(d) Regional Arrangement. The Great Powers might establish a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter. This might take the form of a Great Power guarantee of the Manchurian settlement contained in the Sino-Soviet treaties of August 1945.¹⁴ If other powers were willing to undertake such commitments, there is no reason under the Charter why the USSR would have to participate in such an arrangement, although the nature of the arrangement and the character of the commitments would depend greatly upon the attitude of the USSR. Although this alternative might be considered as a possibility, there is some doubt that Chapter VIII was intended to cover this type of situation.

3. Governmental Responsibility under a Trusteeship

Regardless of the precise character of the arrangement which would be reached, the real issue is which government or governments shall have administrative responsibility for Manchuria. The following indicate the United Nations aspects of the principal alternatives:

(a) China Alone. The National Government of China is not now able to exercise authority throughout Manchuria. Since the effective opposition to the National Government in Manchuria consists at present of Chinese communists and not foreign troops, there is little the United Nations as an organization can do to increase its authority and establish it in effective control.

(b) Five Great Powers. From the Chinese point of view, a five-power administration of Manchuria might appear to be the best means for retaining Manchuria as an eventual part of China, with the assistance of the western powers, as an alternative to the permanent loss of Manchuria to Soviet control. This advantage would appear great enough to overcome Chinese reluctance to admit the present helplessness of the National Government in Manchuria and suggests the probability of prompt Chinese acceptance of the idea. But it is difficult to see how the USSR could accept such a proposal. There is every prospect that Manchuria will fall completely and permanently under Communist, and therefore Russian, domination if the present situation continues. Further, it is most unlikely that the USSR would willingly permit the United States, the United Kingdom and France to establish themselves in this fashion in the heart of northern Asia. Lastly, such an arrangement would mean a heavy commitment by the United States both in manpower and in material resources if five-power administration is to be successful.

(c) Four Great Powers (excluding USSR). An effort to organize a trusteeship for Manchuria including any combination of the great powers excluding Russia as administering authorities would merely increase Russian opposition. With the USSR in opposition it can also be expected that large numbers of Manchurians would actively oppose any such arrangement. Furthermore, the commitments of the participating powers, particularly the United States, would be greatly increased, and the situation thereby created might lead to hostilities with the Soviet Union.

(d) United Nations as Administering Authority. While the United Nations could be designated administering authority, it is not organized to accept direct political responsibility on the scale which would be involved in Manchuria. The United Nations normally acts through its Member Governments. It is yet to be shown whether the United Nations can successfully deal with even such a comparatively minor problem of [as?] Trieste, handed to it by the Council of Foreign Ministers. Any special budgetary arrangement would necessarily involve a heavy commitment by the United States, out of all proportion to the control which the United States could be given through United Nations machinery. It might, therefore be preferable for the United States to participate directly in the job of administering authority. Moreover, if the United Nations were designated administering authority, the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council would be faced with the need for, in effect, legislating for the government of Manchuria, thus the United States would be presented with a great burden upon its leadership in securing timely and effective action by those bodies. Any suggestion for placing Manchuria under direct United Nations administration should be rejected as utterly impracticable.

4. Independent Manchuria.

It would be reasonably simple to obtain United Nations blessing for a declaration by China proposing the early independence of Manchuria. Such a measure would probably have to provide for elections and a renunciation of any general or special rights in that country now claimed by China and the USSR. This possibility is mentioned to complete the general picture from the United Nations point of view but without regard to its relation to Chinese, Soviet, or American policy or interest.

5. Great-Power Guardianship.

A further possibility is Great-Power guardianship under which the Five Powers would agree, in negotiations outside the United Nations, to assume responsibility for administering Manchuria. As this would appear to be an obvious way of avoiding the trusteeship system of the Charter, it would be difficult to relate it to the United Nations and the United Nations could not appropriately be used to press agreement upon any of the Five Powers withholding consent.

6. Conclusions.

(a) The decision of the United States upon the general question posed in the problem stated above turns upon the extent to which the United States is prepared to commit United States forces and resources for the purpose of reasserting and maintaining the control of the Chinese National Government over Manchuria.

(b) If China and the USSR are agreed upon a program of international supervision or administration of Manchuria, there would be little difficulty in relating such arrangements with the United Nations and with the Charter.

(c) On the assumption that the USSR will oppose, the most practicable means for obtaining United Nations approval for the administration of Manchuria by the other powers lies in a trusteeship accepted by the General Assembly. Since heavy opposition could be expected in this case both within Manchuria and from the USSR, such a trusteeship would involve a very heavy commitment of manpower and resources on the part of the other powers, particularly the United States.

(d) On practical grounds, the United Nations itself cannot assume direct responsibility for the administration of Manchuria.

12. Forwarded on October 13 by Mr. Rusk to Mr. Butterworth, who noted: “Seen by Gen. M[arshall]”.
13. Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; Department of State Treaty Series No. 993, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.
14. Signed at Moscow, August 14, 1945; United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 10, p. 300.