893.00/10–1747

The Consul General at Tsingtao ( Spiker ) to the Ambassador in China ( Stuart )95

No. 63

Subject: Some Aspects of the Political Situation in Shantung and in China Generally.

Sir: I have the honor, in continuation of my despatch no. 46 of July 25, 1947,96 on the above subject, to submit, more as a matter of record than as an expression of new ideas, the following résumé of comments made by an intelligent and well-informed foreign observer of many years’ experience in China, who prefers to remain anonymous and who is referred to hereinafter as “the observer”. Since he enjoys close contact with a large number of thinking Chinese, his comments on the results of the Wedemeyer Mission’s visit will, it is believed, make an interesting addition to the record of that visit.

The observer states that General Wedemeyer’s statement, issued on the eve of his departure from China for Korea, has been discussed in his hearing by many thoughtful Chinese, most of them the impoverished victims of international and civil war, all of them basically patriotic, none of them avowed communists. The consensus of opinion among them (which appears to be widely shared by foreigners) is that General Wedemeyer would have performed a great disservice to this country if he had glossed over the well-known failures of the [Page 313] Government and the Kuomintang, or if he had implied that unlimited American aid was likely to be forthcoming, for one party in the civil war at an early date and virtually without conditions. If he had so implied, they point out, there would have been no incentive to independent action by the Government, either in the field of arms upon which it has elected to rely for unification of the country or as to the implementation of its announced programs of reform in domestic politics (for example, the establishment of constitutional government by free elections to be held this year), finance, foreign trade, or any other question. In fact, this frank though unpalatable utterance by one who is known to be a friend of China has, according to the observer, at least caused the Government to bestir itself, and although some of its decrees (for instance, those relating to reduction in office servants, dishes at feasts, new buildings, the use of cosmetics, and the giving of presents, as elements in a policy of national thrift) are hardly likely to be taken seriously, there does appear to be some widespread conviction that Heaven (in this instance the American Congress) may help those who first help themselves.

Yet the most important newspaper at Tsingtao contained an editorial which commented in the most bitter terms upon what it called “foreign interference in our national affairs”, and claimed that China ought not to petition America for assistance but to demand this as a right, in exchange for this country’s having fought the first and the longest fight against the common enemy and thereby, perhaps, prevented American soil from being invaded. (Otherwise, it should be added that local press comment contained little of an original nature concerning the Wedemeyer Mission, but generally followed the lead set by the Shanghai and Nanking press). The observer states that the one phrase in General Wedemeyer’s statement that has heartened Government authorities is the expression of his “conviction that if the Communists are truly patriotic and are interested primarily in the well-being of their country, they will stop voluntarily the employment of force in their efforts to impose ideologies”. On the other hand, the observer states that he has heard it sardonically asserted that anyone who imagines that the communists (now in a stronger position than when General Marshall was mediating a year ago) are likely to abandon their struggle after twenty years of effort is by this admission unqualified to pass judgment upon the affairs of China. The observer adds that this, of course, is not far removed from the other idea that frequently comes up in conversation with some Chinese; that no foreigner, however intellectual or long resident in this country, can ever expect to understand the characteristics of its people or the working of their minds, or, above all, their acute sensibilities in regard [Page 314] to national prestige (“face”). The observer continued that the same speaker, steeped in his classics and reflecting in terms of dynasties and two thousand or more years, will often go on to say that history has shown the Chinese nation to be imperishable, that civil strife from time to time is inevitable, that another hundred years may not be too long on this occasion to bring about peace and order, that foreign intervention on one side may only have the effect of combining the aggressors against the nation concerned, and that the best hope for China lies in an all-out conflict between Russia and the United States (or the United States and one or two allies) during which Russia would be too preoccupied to assist the Chinese communists, and following which the democracies, inevitably victorious, would find it to their commercial and other advantage to rehabilitate this country, including the dispersal of whatever remnant of communists might still be lurking in its northern provinces or on an international battlefield in Manchuria.

The general impression among reasoning Chinese, according to the observer, seems to be that as the result of General Wedemeyer’s mission some measure of aid will be forthcoming for the Central Government, though not much in the form of military supplies; that what is needed, among other things, is a properly controlled project of rural, industrial, and economic relief on the original UNRRA97 pattern but devoid of the corruption and incompetence that have marked too many of the operations of CNRRA.98 The observer adds that currency stabilization is another obvious need. He continues that a standard for “proper control” has been set by the Government of the United States in regard to the disbursement of its grant of US$350 billion [million?] to Greece, where American technicians and supervisors will safeguard the interests of American taxpayers by closely governing all expenditures. He states that this is a replica, adapted to local conditions, of the method which has been succesfully followed on a smaller scale in South America. Continuing, he states that it goes without saying that any proposal to introduce such control in China will meet with strong opposition from many sides; yet if the country at large is to be benefited, and foreign funds are not to be dissipated, it will be necessary to circumvent the central and provincial officials who were described by General Wedemeyer as being “notoriously marked by greed, or incompetence, or both”.

In conclusion, the observer suggests that Great Britain could perhaps make a valuable contribution to China’s well being by aiding in the reorganization of its civil services “according to the British pattern, [Page 315] generally admitted to be the finest in the world”. He says that experience in foreign supervised Chinese Government services has shown not only that good moral and practical leadership can make itself felt at once, and in the place of its immediate operation, but that its influence widens and endures. He is convinced that Chinese civil servants can also be tenacious, industrious, loyal, honorable and mutually helpful, but that, as General Wedemeyer pointed out in a wider aspect, they await “inspirational leadership”.

Respectfully yours,

C. J. Spiker
  1. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in China in his despatch No. 1056, October 17; received October 24.
  2. Not printed.
  3. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.
  4. China National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.