893.00/10–347: Telegram
The Consul General at Mukden (Ward) to the Secretary of State
297. While Communists’ sixth offensive began September 16 [it] did not gain great moment until October 1.
Initial attack apparently caught Nationalist unprepared indicating once more their intelligence deficient. Nationalists expecting attacks between Mukden–Changchun had bulk forces concentrated there. Communists moved units south and struck in Chinhsi area where little resistance met. After several days fighting Communists succeeded annihilating or capturing 13,000 Nationalists of 49th Army with all heavy equipment thus practically wiping out unit which had just arrived as reinforcements. Communists pushed advantage and seized rail line between Hsingcheng and point 20 kms. north of Shan-haikwan. Thus land communications between Manchuria and intramural China cut. At same time value port of Chinwangtao to Manchuria considerably lessened.
Communists then moved north to Hsinmin where three spans on each of two bridges destroyed. This destruction cut land communication between Mukden and Hulutao port. At same time other Communists cut Mukden–Yingkow rail line between Haicheng and Tashinchiao [Page 307] [Tashihkiao?] thus cutting land communication between Mukden and Yingkow port. Simultaneously Mongolian cavalry troops moved on Faku 50 kms. north of Mukden and after surrounding city moved east towards Kaiyuan. Simultaneously other Communist troops in the Hsifeng area moved west towards Kaiyuan.
Further north Communist forces are reported hitting points on railway between Ssuping and Changtu.
Nationalists are in much worse position than at end of fifth offensive. Manchuria has temporarily lost all land communication with China. Two divisions Nationalists reinforcements have been neutralized and even further appears that they have surrendered to Communists together with all equipment. Two more divisions Nationalist reinforcements have arrived at Shanhaikwan but they will have to fight their way through Communist territory to be benefit to Nationalists.
Nationalist bewilderment seems complete. Using same tactics as in fifth offensive, namely building all defenses around highly rated New First and Sixth Armies. Have already started moving these armies from place to place and soon have them completely tired out so that should it become necessary for them engage in actual combat their efficiency will be greatly lessened. Nationalist intelligence again conspicuous by inefficiency or absence. Intelligence consists of knowledge Communist units and where formerly located but apparently without knowledge Communist intentions or capabilities.
Morale rose upon arrival Chen Cheng but his later repressive moves vis-à-vis northeasterners, plus these initial Communist successes, have had depressing effect and present indications Nationalists can receive no more assistance from northeasterners than they did during fifth offensive.
Sent Nanking, repeated Department as 297; Tientsin as 95, Changchun by mail as 283.
- Notation on the original: “Message delayed in transmission.”↩