893.00/9–2947
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 7.]
Sir: I have the honor to report on various recent developments, more in an attempt to interpret their significance than as items of news.
Kuomintang.
Dr. Chen Li-fu and his associates had been losing influence until the recent meeting of the C. E. C. when, by cleverly capitalizing the mood of indignation caused by General Wedemeyer’s statements and the anxieties as to the over-all outlook which these high-lighted, they had an apparently sweeping return to power. But after the adjournment of the formal sessions the internal struggle has continued between the C. C. Clique and its opponents and President Chiang has been actively working out a solution which would avoid either the complete domination of that Clique or any violent disruption. Dr. Chen tried hard to succeed Wu T’ieh Ch’eng as Secretary-General but the settlement now reached is that General Wu will stay in office with two assistants, Wang Ch-i-chiang and Cheng Yen-feng, both of them of the more progressive and democratic type, not allied with any of the inner factions. They were both European trained, the latter having served at one time as a Secretary of the League of Nations.
Another C. C. member, Ku Cheng-kang, Minister of Social Welfare, was to have taken Chen Li-fu’s present position, but that has been thwarted and a decision should be reached today. But a sub-division in the Party Board of Organization has been formed (Chen Li-fu not participating) known as the “Youth Bureau”, with Professor Ch’en Hsueh-p’ing in charge. He has been for years on the faculty of the University of Peiping, a close associate of President Hu Shih and one of its outstanding liberal leaders of thought. He presented an outline of policy to President Chiang which was approved. This stresses two features in the control of students: (1) they should concentrate on their studies rather than concern themselves with political agitation; (2) the Kmt members among them should try to “serve” their impecunious fellow students.
Reforms.
There is not much evidence yet of success in dealing with graft, which is becoming more prevalent in the worsening economic situation. But President Chiang is at least trying to tackle the problem. The Control Yuan has been given considerably more authority with instructions to exercise it in this matter. One hears constantly of [Page 296] those who have been brought to trial. An instance, which is a somewhat acid test for any Chinese official, is the son of an old and honored friend of President Chiang, now at the head of the Postal Administration but charged with flagrant peculation, whom President Chiang ordered to be punished according to law regardless of all other considerations.
The powers of the local police are being enlarged as part of the plan for eliminating or at least restricting the activities of military police and secret service men.
Pro-Russian tendencies.
The recent statement by Dr. Sun Fo is declared by others in the Government to be a characteristic instance of his expression of personal views. But they also point out that it should not be ignored in view of the group around him, including such well-known liberals as Shao Li-tze. These men are advocating Russian help in persuading the Chinese Communists to cease fighting and to withdraw into Manchuria which would become semi-autonomous. Economic difficulties could be largely relieved by substituting a system of barter for foreign exchange. This group have been working hard to win the C. C. Clique to their point of view and their lack of success has been chiefly due perhaps to the attitude of President Chiang. One of the very few Chinese who dares to talk frankly to him, pointed out that this solution would result in his becoming virtually a puppet, and that he would not fit easily into such a role.
Message from Gen. Wedemeyer through Gen. Ho Ying-ch’in.
Madame Chiang sent me word that such a message had been received and that the Gimo was quite incensed over it. It was to the effect that General Wedemeyer hoped the Chinese Government leaders would understand his own reasons for making the criticisms he had, and that if they failed to do so it would be more difficult for him to make recommendations beneficial to China. Having asked that I be told of this, she decided later that it would be better for me not to be told on the ground that this might aggravate the already strained relationships. The Gimo took this message to be a threat or a form of “blackmail”. Were the issues not so extremely grave there would be something ludicrous about the way in which this ugly word is being used by both Americans and Chinese as descriptive of the others’ tactics. Knowing Gen. Wedemeyer as I have now been able to I can understand his intentions in a wholly different light and in keeping with his friendly feeling for China and his constructive purpose. It is also entirely possible that in the use of two linguistic mediums, with telegraphic coding and psychological factors, such misapprehensions could easily result. I have debated whether to narrate this incident [Page 297] or not but have done so on the principle that the best procedure is full and frank reporting of all that has to do with Chinese-American issues.
This episode would be unimportant—or would never have happened—were it not for the tension under which the responsible leaders of the Government are almost desperately trying to find a solution for their mounting problems. They have been waiting so long for American assistance while their need of it is becoming steadily more acute that those who are regarded as having made concessions to placate us are being taunted with failure and other possible remedies are being advocated. This helps to explain why some of the best among them have been saying petulant things, while others either try to frighten us with the Russian bogey or short-sightedly but seriously toy with the idea. These ill-considered comments cause unfavorable reactions in the United States some of which are published here and arouse further misunderstanding. Meanwhile the suffering people of the country, who will in the end determine its destiny, are utterly helpless.
There are not a few hard-working, public spirited progressives in the Government who share our dissatisfaction with it and who earnestly desire for their country all that we have expressed as our hope for China. But their difficulties are very real. Just to mention one of many, the members of the two minority parties brought in to broaden the basis of the Government are showing themselves to be even more rapacious for office and its perquisites than many of the Kmt, with no improvement in administrative efficiency. These progressives and their many sympathizers outside would be immensely heartened by some indication of our intention to assist them and would, in my opinion, be the nucleus through which we can go a long way toward realizing our aims for China and for a stable peace in this part of the world. But they do not see much hope without such aid from us and any authoritative indication of our policy would be very reassuring.
Respectfully yours,