893.00/9–347

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Ringwalt) to Brigadier General Marshall S. Carter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State58

Subject: Military Situation in Manchuria

Reports from Manchuria indicate that the CCP is disposing forces for a renewal of offensive operations.

Reinforcements for government units have been inadequate to replace losses suffered during the last CCP offensive. A major obstacle to adequate reinforcement of government units has been a [Page 271] reluctance on the part of commanders such as Fu Tso-yi and Hu Tsung-nan to release troops now under their command. The reorganization of the high command is still to be achieved though there are indications that the Nationalists have adopted the wise policy of keeping their forces concentrated.

Many observers believe the Communists will mount an offensive in mid-September timed to enable them to harvest the crops in areas now held by government forces. The following are considered the most likely objectives of such a drive: (1) capture of Ssupingchieh and establishment of east-west Communist corridor; (2) capture of Yingkow to deny its use to the government as a supply base; (3) capture of Fushun which would render the government’s position around Mukden practically untenable; and (4) raiding against the Peiping-Mukden railroad to eliminate the government’s major supply line for Manchuria. Government-controlled areas have been so constricted by CCP offensives that they cannot now supply the forces stationed therein. As CCP tactics usually avoid assaults on entrenched forces, it is likely the Communist offensive will ignore Changchun and attempt to compress Nationalist holdings in the south. A combination of the operations listed in 2, 3 and 4 above appears most likely.

It is not anticipated that the Communists will drive the Nationalists from Manchuria in this offensive. They can in all likelihood render the government’s position at Mukden untenable, and they can permanently cut the government’s lines of communication bringing in coal, of utmost importance in Manchuria during winter, and other supplies. The government’s outlook in Manchuria is most gloomy.

A[rthur] R. R[ingwalt]
  1. Noted by the Secretary of State.