893.00/6–2547
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to
the Secretary of State
No. 833
Nanking, June 25,
1947.
[Received July 3.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose a memorandum
of conversation between the Ambassador and General Pai Chung-hsi,
Minister of National Defense, on June 18, 1947. Mr. Philip Fugh, a
Chinese friend of the Ambassador’s, was also present during the
conversation.
It is interesting to note from the conversation General Pai’s veiled
criticism of the Generalissimo which has become more apparent recently
from senior officials of the National Government and prominent private
individuals; for example, see the Embassy’s telegram no. 1373 of June
22, 1947, 5:00 p.m., with regard to certain remarks of Chang Chia-ngau,
Governor of the Central Bank of China, and Li Ming, an influential
private banker.
It is also apparent from the conversation that General Pai is still
convinced that there can be no political settlement with the Chinese
Communist Party and that settlement must continue to be sought by
military means. The measures suggested by General Pai to the
Generalissimo are in themselves laudable if somewhat unrealistic in
light of the current deterioration of China’s overall economic
position.
Very truly yours,
For the Ambassador:
W. Walton Butterworth
Minister-Counselor of Embassy
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation by the Ambassador in
China (Stuart)
General Pai Chung-hsi asked me to his home on June 18 for a
consultation about national problems which he felt had become
extremely serious. The substance of his point of view is set forth
below.
General Pai began by speaking of the critical nature of the situation
and the necessity for drastic changes. I told him that I had just
learned that Chen Li-fu had been dismissed from his position as head
of the Party Board of Organization. He showed his surprise and
pleasure but said that the dismissal of this one man was not nearly
enough. He then described his own discontent in that the Ministry of
National Defense had been reorganized by the American Army Advisory
Group in what was supposed to be the American structure but that
actually any proposals of his had to go to the Executive Yuan before
reaching President Chiang, whereas the Chief of Staff had
[Page 201]
direct access to the
President and full authority over the field commanders. He felt that
his position was therefore quite untenable in seeming to have
responsibilities but without authority to carry them out. He let
drop remarks to the effect that there was much dissatisfaction among
the military officers over the single-handed control vested in
General Ch’en Ch’eng. General Pai was quite emphatic in the opinion
that President Chiang should be retained in his present position. He
knew of attempts from various quarters—apart from the Communists—to
have him displaced, but felt that there was no one comparable to him
in meeting the country’s needs.
He went on to report an interview with President Chiang, who asked
for his opinion on the current situation but in replying to General
Pai’s inquiry as to how much time he might have said, “about fifteen
minutes”. General Pai then asked for at least an hour in which to
express his views fully. This was arranged for in an interview about
a week ago. At that time General Pai told President Chiang that it
seemed to him to be a mistake to be holding out hopes of peace with
the Communist Party, that this perplexed the field commanders and
weakened the morale of the fighting forces. He said that it ought to
be entirely clear by now that the Communist Party had no intention
of making peace. It had repudiated the National Assembly and the
Constitution; it had officially announced that it would not regard
as valid any existing treaties between other countries and the
present Chinese Government; it had utilized the long period of
American mediatory negotiations to increase its own strength; and it
had arrogantly announced that it was not interested in peace talks
with the present leaders of the Government. All this seemed to prove
that it was determined to overthrow this Government. President
Chiang should, therefore, determine on a new and almost
revolutionary policy on the assumption that it would take at least
two or three years to secure a real and lasting peace. He should
cease to rely on foreign aid and to make concessions in the hope of
securing American help. If they were able to have this, so much the
better, but they should try to resist Communism with the weapons
which Communism itself employed so that the Government and the
people would be at one in regarding the Communists as a subversive
influence detrimental to the national welfare. The Government
should, therefore, very much reduce its own organized activities,
retaining only those units as were essential in a time of war with a
minimum of staff. The best men possible should be selected as
provincial governors and then given a large measure of discretionary
authority and held responsible for maintaining efficient
administration. All imports not needed in a time of war should be
ruled out and every effort made to increase
[Page 202]
exports such as tung oil, tea, etc. The people
should be required to live simply, using native goods wherever
possible. He pointed to the suit made of foreign material he himself
was wearing at the time as being unpatriotic. He referred to the
example of England in its practice of postwar self-denial. Wherever
possible local officials should be employed.
He said that he was basing all of these comments upon his own actual
experience in the province of Kwangsi. It was further demonstrated
by the ability of the Communists to spread and increase their
efficiency, relying almost entirely on local resources. In short,
the Government should regain the vigor and heroic devotion which it
had in the Northern Expedition in 1926 in which the two of them had
worked so closely together. He recalled that they had then
altogether about 25,000 guns against over a million possessed by the
Pei Yang Party and the irregulars more or less associated with them.
Such procedure ought to win the support of the people of the country
and with this they could hold the respect of other countries. At the
conclusion of this statement President Chiang expressed himself as
grateful for its frankness and he asked that it be written out so
that he could go over this with the consideration which it deserved.
Two days later the manuscript was delivered.
General Pai impressed me as being sincerely concerned over the
national danger and anxious to cooperate in an unselfish and
constructive program.
