893.00 Manchuria/6–1047: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 10—9:30 a.m.]
1251. From Butterworth.52 Contrary to our practice in other cities visited, in Mukden Penfield53 and I made formal calls on the appropriate local officials in order to draw attention to US interest in Manchurian situation. The Assistant MA54 of that area accompanied us on calls on: General Hsiung Shih-hui, Director of President’s Northeast Headquarters; Mr. Kuan Chi-yi, Acting Chairman, Northeast Economic Commission; General Cheng Tung-kuo, Vice Commander, Northeast Chinese Command.
The first named offered comment of bland confidence, the second admitted that all considered economic plans were abrogated in the face of the existing military situation, and the third freely described [Page 175] the withdrawal and concentration of Government forces with the avowed purposes of frustrating Communist tactics in ferreting out weak spots and in order to be in a position to engage a main Communist force.
It was evident to the passing observer that Mukden was in a state of semi-panic with high army officers and officials, rich merchants and bankers evacuating their families and effects. This, together with Generalissimo’s visit—whatever its effects may have been on high command—had augmented nervousness among non-Manchurian Chinese and served to create the leave-the-sinking-ship atmosphere. Well-placed Chinese as well as foreign officials and other residents expressed conviction that Communists would ultimately control Manchuria. The Communists apparently have means and ability to accelerate this development. My own instinct is that they will not change their tactics to force prematurely the issue and will be satisfied to see reinforcements come into Manchuria in the sure belief that these too will in due course be infected by the dry rot which now seems to pervade Nationalist forces under Tu Li-ming’s wavering hand in order to bleed the National Government in the advantageous circumstances which Russia’s hold on Dairen augments. There seems to be no doubt about the ineptitude with which the National Government has run its military affairs in particular and its civil affairs in general, and the provincialism of the Manchurians has been taking on, as a result of their experience of past 2 years, a decided anti-Government character. Allowing for the fact that the farther away army and civil officials are from Nanking the freer they talk, I was surprised at the lengths which General Sun Li-jen, who is on the shelf in the Yamato Hotel, and others did in fact go. This applies to General Li Tsung-jen55 in Peiping as well. One has the sense that there is by no means a united National Army in Manchuria and that non-Whampoa group is distinctly critical.
Incidentally, I gave General Cheng an opportunity to talk about ammunition needs, and it was quite obvious that that was not one of his main preoccupations.
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Stuart
- W. Walton Butterworth, Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China.↩
- James K. Penfield, Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, at this time on a tour of China posts for the Department.↩
- Assistant Military Attaché, Col. David D. Barrett.↩
- Director of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s Headquarters at Peiping.↩