893.00/6–747: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 8—9:26 p.m.]
1235. Embassy considers that Changchun’s 232, May 29, repeated Department as 1202, June 4, together with Mukden’s 131, May 30, repeated Department as 78, and 133, May 31, to Department as 79, contain an excellent summation of current deterioration Government military position in Manchuria. Subsequent messages from both posts indicate an acceleration of this deterioration.
Plans for the reinforcement of the northeast by an additional 100,000 troops have been announced following Gimo’s visit to Mukden on May 30. Mukden reports that Nationalist 93rd Army, formerly in Tientsin area, is now at Chinchow on way to Mukden. Various unconfirmed press reports from Mukden state that from three to four divisions are being dispatched to Manchuria for the Mukden area and at least one of these divisions is stated to be from Formosa; in addition Nationalist Air Force units are being moved to Mukden area from Shantung.
Reinforcement of the northeast at this time raises difficult problems of transportation and supply for National Government. Government military situation in North China is less critical than that in Manchuria merely because it is less active. Embassy considers it highly unlikely that Government has the capability of reinforcing Manchuria sufficiently to effect any immediate improvements [of] Government military position there. Mukden reported on June 5 that Government military units had been withdrawn from Tiehling indicating that Government expects to employ perimeter defense tactics at Mukden extending not far from city limits.
Any effort to reinforce Manchuria at this time will place Government in position of robbing Peter to pay Paul because it is now apparent that Nationalist campaign in Shantung is completely bogged down and all field commanders in that area are asking for reinforcements and additional air support.
Assistant Military Attaché who returned from Shantung on June 4 reports that National Government suffered 45,000 casualties, including 10,000 killed, when 74th Nationalist Army was defeated in vicinity [Page 172] of Mengyin in late May. He also reports that casualties are arriving at base hospitals at Hsuchow at rate of 300 per day. This observer also reports Central Government forces at Hsuchow are already outflanked by sizable Communist forces to the east and southeast and he was informed that it is not now planned to defend Hsuchow in the event a Communist attack develops on that city. It is interesting to note that the AMA observed at least one battalion of American 155 mm guns and motor equipment moving south from Hsuchow, declaring that their destination was Shanghai.
In other parts of North China, notably in Shansi and Shensi, the Communists appear to be in position to assume the initiative at will. In Hopei a National Government drive is developing to reduce Fowping Headquarters of the Shensi–Chahar–Hopei border region government which could well result in the same type of hollow victory as the capture of Yenan. There is no area in which Government forces are making significant advances at this time but the situation in Manchuria is most critical inasmuch as the northeast troops are the best trained and equipped and large numbers of them are isolated in numerous garrison points such as Ssupingkai, Kirin, Changchun, Tehui and Nungan. These forces can not hold out indefinitely without adequate supplies and the Government’s capability to supply them by air drop is definitely limited.
It therefore seems likely that Government efforts will in due course be directed toward the relief or withdrawal of at least a portion of the beleaguered troops before they are forced to capitulate. Relief or withdrawal will constitute difficult operations under constant Communist harassment and the resulting attrition added to that which has already occurred will further weaken the Government’s military position. It is not believed that troops’ morale has thus far deteriorated to a dangerous point, but it is a factor which is assuming greater importance as time passes.…
Nationalist commanders and officials are already evacuating their families and possessions from the northeast, making use of urgently needed transport aircraft for the purpose. Mukden reports that southbound freight and passenger traffic is so heavy that railway officials state that they have 6,000 unfilled passenger travel requests.
General Yu Ta-wei, Minister of Communications, intimated to Colonel Barclay of the Executive Office, when latter paid a farewell call on Minister on June 5, that it may be necessary to withdraw in Manchuria to a point from which the port of Hulutao would become the Government’s main base for northeast. On June 7 Embassy was informed by an unimpeachable source that Admiral Kwei, Commander in Chief of the Chinese Navy, had proceeded to Hulutao for purpose of making plans for this eventuality.
[Page 173]It is obvious that Government faces in the northeast probability of a military debacle of large proportions. It has already withdrawn from substantial areas previously under Government control. Judging from ineptitude and incompetence thus far demonstrated by General Tu Li-ming, it is probable that Government’s defeat may assume even larger proportions. It seems to lie within Communist’s powers either to continue to bleed Government strength in Manchuria or to force further Government withdrawal.51
- The Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) on June 10 called the attention of the Secretary of State to this telegram as indicating an acceleration of the deterioration of the Chinese Government’s military situation in Manchuria.↩