893.00/6–447: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 3—11:45 p.m.]
1202. Following is Changchun’s 232, May 29, 4 p.m.:
“Despite attempts Kmt press gloss over Nationalist defeats in current Communist drive, known facts of situation throw into strong relief present impotence and ineffectualness Nationalist military Manchuria. Several factors noteworthy:
- 1.
- Communists have held initiative from beginning to present with Government holing up in respective bastions permitting Communists implement their plans without active interference.
- 2.
- Certain strategically important Kmt garrison points have consequently been reduced by Communists and main bodies available Nationalist troops central Manchuria immobilized by Government’s strategy apparently dictated more by a surfeit of caution than by sound military judgements.
- 3.
- Communists evidently are beginning overall campaign for destruction Nationalist position Manchuria but Nationalists cling even [Page 158] when hope is vain to proposition that Communists, having in past three campaigns returned north of Sungari, will do so again without Nationalists having to fight to put them there.
Military situation is distinctly worse than would appear from tendentious Government communiqués. I invite attention to following revealing facts. Nationalists have lost garrison towns Huaiteh, Kungchuling and Kangping on west and Wulakai and Laoyehling on east. Those towns all have strategic importance. Following garrisons are isolated and immobile: Nungan, Tehhui, Kirin, Changchun and now Ssupingkai. Chinese press occasionally seeks comfort by noting that small garrison in forts of Sungari bridgehead still “holds out”, but as strategy based upon refusal of garrisons of one place to help another when whole position threatened mathematically bound to result in defeat. Press reports of “relief columns” have never been followed in this drive by materialization such relief. If example Changchun warrants generalization, the various garrisons are busily engaged in digging themselves in deeper in very centers towns, to which they have withdrawn for safety rather than with idea using strong points as bases for flexible military action designed to strike at enemy’s weak points. Communists threatened nowhere, Nationalist[s] everywhere. In those circumstances, barring developments thus far unindicated, probabilities point to Communists achieving end of present drive.
Developments thus far show certain Communist pattern. There has been no waste of Communist energy in attacking heavily manned strong points, excepting insofar as necessary to reduce possible threats to Communist flanks. Action in east can be viewed as being for present mere holding operation. Main Communist force is in west where space and Nationalist inaction combine to give Communists nearly complete freedom of action. Movement of certain units eastward, however, shows design to widen corridor between garrisons located respectively in central and southern Manchuria. Ssupingkai is of course of primary importance for full achievement that aim. Presence heavy Communist force to south of Ssupingkai seems to show determination to block any move from south to interfere with reduction Ssupingkai and neighboring garrisons. If those garrisons are reduced, Nationalist position Manchuria effectively cut in half without there remaining any reason in logic to hope for subsequent timely relief central Manchuria garrisons. If that comes to pass, latter garrisons can be reduced at leisure, with combination food supply and morale factors rendering matter relatively easy. In fact, if local garrisons see hopeless situation, final turnover might be nearly bloodless due to disaffection of troops, with Changchun and Kirin falling [Page 159] of their own weight when ripe. Position Mukden of course essentially same. It is hardly open to question that present Communist strategy designed for Manchuria as a whole and that ultimate aim is total conquest. Clubb.”
Sent Department 1202; to Mukden by safe hand.