501.BC Indonesia/12–2247: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State
565. From Graham Nr. 73. Further to mytel 69, December 19 [20]79 reDeptel 35, December 11,80 paragraphs 4 and final: Present hostilities on small scale. Low rate Netherlands casualties (one or two killed, four or five wounded per day) cited by Netherlands as proving lack organized resistance behind forward positions. Figures Indo casualties unavailable.
[Page 1091]Dutch appear less concerned by battle casualties than by acts sabotage, intimidation, abduction, and murder civilians allegedly committed by Republic adherents. Insistence by Dutch on primary necessity implementation cease-fire probably stems not only from natural concern over loss lives and property but from desire keep spotlight on disorders and illegal acts they claim Republic condones or encourages and from determination obtain sanction Van Mook line as limit Republic authority.
Republic losses as result non-implementation cease-fire consist (1) loss territories for most part behind Van Mook line over which Dutch consolidating control, and (2) loss troops mostly through dispersal military formations and surrenders. Neither would count against Republic in long run if it could obtain favorable political settlement. Hence political settlement considered primary necessity by Republic.
Apparent that cease-fire cannot be implemented unless (1) armed forces are disentangled through establishment demilitarized zones and forces one party withdrawn from territory the other, and (2) Indos are assured of safety from further Dutch attacks and of early and equitable solution political dispute. Lawless bands constitute separate problem and will probably continue plague country regardless ceasefire arrangements.
Insofar as implementation depends on (2), only Dutch can give requisite assurance. Insofar as it depends on (1) GOC has been pressing its proposals for past month with Dutch balking on various points of what GOC has considered essentially integrated program. Latest Netherlands move, December 20, was acceptance GOC truce plan of December 4, conditional upon establishment demilitarized zones along Van Mook line. (Mytel 72, December 22.81) This leaves US delegate with two alternate courses action:
- 1.
- US delegate can endeavor persuade Australian delegate and Indonesian delegate accept Netherlands program. In 3–hour conversation with US delegate December 19, Van Zeeland urged acceptance this program, stating (1) politically impossible for Beel government agree any withdrawal Netherlands forces, hence demilitarized zones must be established along Van Mook lines, (2) in event failure agreement this program either in GOC or Republic, there would be no implementation cease-fire and no substantive discussions and matter would revert SC which would be powerless take effective action, and (3) that it would be reprehensible for GOC to lead Indonesian delegate believe it could obtain better terms for Republic than terms Dutch December 20 memorandum. He stressed Dutch program was provisional and if accepted, Republic’s rights, claims, and position in final settlement would be unimpaired, that if Republic lived up to program [Page 1092] and Dutch then violated it, Republic’s position would be far stronger in SC. He gave personal view that if Netherlands failed to live up to obligations, it would be assuming with respect both Republic and USI, Dutch would be thrown out of Indonesia in 2 or 3 years. US delegate recognizes force Van Zeeland position. Only reservation concerns fact that Dutch are already proceeding creation West Java Negara or Daerah and that, so far as US delegate has learned, Netherlands will not in fact concede “Republic of Djocja,” as Beel terms it, any rights, claims, or position which could be impaired. US delegate further fears that even if Republic accepted program, it would be too much expect it cooperate sincerely and effectively in perhaps fatal truncation its territory, that acts vengeance and destruction would continue and that Netherlands on this excuse would extend police action to Djocja.
- 2.
- US delegate could take position that in West Java and Madura Dutch have in fact advanced well beyond August 4 positions and that, as condition to preliminary establishment zones along Van Mook line, provision be made for gradual withdrawal Dutch forces to general area occupied August 4 in West Java, which is crucial area. According evidence based both Netherlands and Republican maps, which US military observers consider best available, Dutch troops made following advances in southern portion West Java after August 4: (a) Palaboehanba to Tokiaradoca, (b) Soekaboemi to Djampang-Tengah, Sagaranten and Soekanegara, (c) Tjibeber to Soekanegara, (d) Batoedjajar to Goenoenghaloe, (e) Santoba to Tjik and Jang to Pameungpeuk, (f) Tjitalenka to Garoet and Tjikadjang, Garoet to Band jar and Bandjarsari, (g) Tjitalenka to Panoembangan, Tjiamis, Bandjar and Wangon, (h) Boemiajoe to Poewokerto and Wangon. Prior August 4 Dutch had taken road Tegal-Poerbalingga-Poewokerto-Tjiltjap. If US delegate favored Dutch withdrawal in southern West Java to August 4 lines, it would also, in order open communications between Djocja and evacuated areas, have to favor Dutch withdrawal from this road. This justifiable on grounds Dutch would be permitted retain control many other areas not occupied August 4.
If US delegate took second position, would be on understanding Dutch withdrawal would be piecemeal by very small areas and that entrance Republican troops would be supervised by military observers. Should development demonstrate lack foundation to Republic’s claim to be government enjoying support people and capable maintaining law and order, US delegate would have firm grounds for reconsidering position.
US delegate aware Dutch would reject any proposal based foregoing position and that consequences might be most awkward. US [Page 1093] delegate would not consider taking such position except from reluctance be party to truncation or elimination one of parties to dispute.
ReDeptel 40, December 19,82 US delegate considers Dutch December 20 memorandum a logical complement of Dutch December 9 proposal (mytel 56, December 1083) and that our support of former would be logical consequence our support of latter. US delegate would appreciate earliest information whether Department wishes us support both and reject second alternative course above.
Re paragraph 1, Deptel 40, December 19, Indos agree principles set forth mytel 31, November 19,84 but with principles to cooperation only when all agreed upon. Dutch have never agreed point (d) providing for standfast order to be issued troops all areas, or wording of (e) without which Dutch will consider themselves free continue mopping up operations behind forward positions, which inevitably will provoke retaliation and charges Indo non-compliance. [Graham.]