501.BC Indonesia/12–2047: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 73
secret
Batavia, December
20, 1947—noon.
557.From Graham No. 69. Continued from mytel 68, December 20.74
- 1.
- Either of solutions Indonesian dispute considered by USDel as only realistic ones, admittedly risky with respect stability and rehabilitation NEI. However, while US might exert moderating and stabilizing influence through various forms assistance under either settlement, USDel believes Department should work for one or the other since in questions of ultimate sovereignty there can be no compromise, as events past year Indonesia have shown. Choice best solutions cannot take account local considerations alone but must be based over-all US foreign policy. If Department inclines solution based Netherlands [Page 1089] sovereignty, will be sufficient let nature take course in which case function GOC would be merely “explain to world what has happened”, as expressed by Baud. If Department believes dominion status for Indonesia is the answer, maximum pressure must be exerted have Netherlands accept Linggadjati minus subsequent interpretations and subscribe some such plan as paragraph 3 below.
- 2.
- View large measure responsibility which US will bear for outcome GOC in eyes world, USDel considers that in event failure bring parties together in areas disagreement outlined paragraph 2, mytel 67, December 20,75 it might either alone or as part GOC if AusDel and BelDel concur, solicit request from parties (which request likely forthcoming if sufficient pressure put on Dutch) that GOC offer constructive suggestions for resolving these disagreements along following lines:
- 3.
- Regarding primary area, plebiscites under international observation would appear be only means settling issues to which either party would find it difficult maintain objection in principle. However, despite confidence Indonesian delegation that plebiscites entirely practicable, USDel not yet entirely convinced and fully realizes magnitude problems involved. Other hand, familiarity Indonesians with elections village level gives some assurance plebiscites practicable.
- Regarding second area, bicameral legislature of US type would appear offer method safeguarding interests small states while allowing proportional representation. (Abdul Kadir claims he endorses this system.) If all Java-Madura-Sumatra voted join Repub, Repub would probably be willing subdivide on ethnic lines to obviate gross unbalance size states provided Netherlands not in position take advantage this division.
- Regarding third area, attainment by USI of dominion status seems clearly indicated by letter of Linggadjati Agreement as well as by realities situation. USDel would only add (1) that UN agency should be present during interim period in order help adjust differences set forth in conflicting Netherlands and Repub interpretations of May-July and (2) interim should be shortest possible.
- 4.
- Chances are application this procedure would leave Repub areas holding major power independent Indonesia. Regardless whether this desirable, USDel feels it must take some stand clearing it of appearance sanctioning Repub delimitation.
Appraisal prospects implementing cease-fire (which not possible without making a political decision of first magnitude) will follow.76 [Graham.]
Livengood