501.BC Indonesia/12–447: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State
secret
Batavia, December
4, 1947—10 a.m.
503. Following are highlights views expressed by Vredenburch during 3-hour talk with Scott and Ogburn December 1:
- 1.
- Re possibility shipment food and textiles to Republican areas and implementation May 1947 Netherlands-Indo agreement (Graham telegram 44, December 153), it fantastic expect Dutch cooperation view continued Indo destruction mills and use trucks by Indos for military purposes. Sabotage and insulting Republican propaganda unabated despite activities GOC which this case even used as vehicle for such propaganda.
- 2.
- No improvement situation possible until agreement reached paragraph d of GOC proposals for implementing cease-fire (Graham telegram 31, November 1954), demarcation lines established, and forces both parties withdrawn from behind lines. (This connection parties still deadlocked paragraph d, Indos accepting GOC text, Netherlands maintaining prohibition alteration troop positions can apply only forward elements, permitting continuation mopping up rear areas. Vredenburch’s apparent conviction these matters contain key whole problem suggests possibility Dutch working for demarcation lines confining Republicans to central Java which would become permanent arrangement).
- 3.
- Republican ability or desire control looters any conditions highly doubtful and its word worthless. Too many Djocja politicians out for graft and “everybody in Djocja is in Government.” Republican intention is foment chaos and wreck GOC as means obtaining SC arbitration of dispute. Republic is totalitarian state denying freedom speech and employing methods terrorism.
- 4.
- Republic only one of many groups working for independence. Plans federal USI slowly taking shape. Areas states would be determined accordance democratic procedures articles 3 and 4 Linggadjati with Republicans probably confined central Java. No possibility liberated areas would vote Republican in plebiscites which already projected. Plan autonomous west Java already far advanced by Abdul Kadir, with early plebiscite likely. Defections from Republicans in Java and Sumatra increasing with populations many localities requesting Dutch protection, and might soon snowball such extent as completely change present situation. It was pointed out to Vredenburch that Dutch views of Republic and plans for federation appeared extraordinarily similar French views Viet Nam and plans federation. [Page 1078] He was asked what factors here would prevent duplication disastrous Indochina situation; namely, devastation country and inability metropolitan power either hold on without serious drain its resources or let go without risking wholesale reprisals against elements drawn to its side. Vredenburch replied would refer [prefer?] question answered by person better informed than he.
- 5.
- Linggadjati Agreement “terrible mistake”. Was approved by Netherlands representatives only because Netherlands Government insisted on agreement any price. Dutch now intend “program based principles underlying Linggadjati”. Linggadjati misled majority SC members into assuming Republic and Netherlands were parties dispute. Real parties are Republican Indos and non-Republican Indos. This connection, Netherlands had not recognized de facto authority Republican Government any time but only that it exercised de facto authority at one time in Java, Madura, and Sumatra.
- 6.
- Settlement Netherlands-Republican dispute present conditions impossible. Even under favorable conditions, settlement details would require services GOC 6 months or more. View obvious inability present US member remain more than 2, seem most desirable senior foreign service officer be appointed succeed him.
Livengood