856E.00/11–1747: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 46
461. From Ogburn.47 Twelve days Djocja and talks political and military leaders make clear Indos bent upon immediate unqualified independence with Dutch reduced status “most favored nation”. Appear unable comprehend why they should be expected accept any form or shadow of control by Dutch who regarded since police action as supreme national enemy. Whereas police action evidently extinguished remnants trust in Dutch, respect for Dutch apparently completely destroyed during Jap invasion. Alleged failure Dutch offer any real resistance and servility Dutch internees to Japs stressed in every conversation. Believe Dutch lost prestige this period most powerful single factor their subsequent difficulties. In addition contempt for Dutch, Indos seem completely convinced Dutch prewar psychology and intentions unaltered.
Although in bearing, Indos Djocja seem almost different race from those Batavia, must be stated Djocja scarcely suggests bastion embattled nationalism. Singular placidity city and surrounding country may evince capacity Republic maintain order but seems more directly related passivity mass Javanese and from contacts Pemoeda, which claims 2½ million members, believe passivity not characteristic Javanese youth, however. Obvious new generation now of age who not habituated Dutch rule and whose idea foreign domination learned under exceedingly oppressive Jap occupation. Consider this embittered and determined element formidable factors situation. Indo leaders themselves admit only fraction whole population politically minded but contend Dutch cannot govern without intermediary this minority and are convinced that hostility to Dutch so widespread that even Dutch controlling all cities, country can be denied by underground [Page 1073] forces. (Four members present Cabinet fought in Dutch underground against Germans.)
Colonel Tjokrone Goro, Deputy Chief Staff, and Colonel Simatu Pang, Assistant Chief of Staff, discussed military situation frankly. While stating Republic could raise volunteer army any size, equipment being only limiting factor, they admitted serious weaknesses army not only in equipment but poor training officers, and stated Indo roadblocks (with which approaches Djocja fully covered) could not stall Dutch columns anywhere owing lack weapons to defend them. Viewed Indo military position weaker than Vietnam’s owing latter’s access Chinese supplies. However, they claimed real pacification Indonesia impossible, that fragmentation army would not seriously impair its ability make situation eventually intolerable for Dutch. Tjokrone Goro, who was trained Japan and returned Java as platoon leader Jap invasion force, gives impression disabused realist and carries considerable conviction.
Believe adequacy food, simplicity of economy, continuing (if diminishing) serviceability essential physical plant, and effect Dutch in giving all Indo political elements single simple aim and providing scapegoat have so far saved Indo leaders from critical test their statesmanship. They frankly confess unreadiness assume full burden running country but apparently envisage Dutch assistance only technical, non-governmental fields. On such basis, difficult estimate Republic’s chance success. Although government based party system, it clear parties lack real definition. Haziness of the principles and programs affect even Communist Party. Discussions lead conclusion Government purely one of leaders with personal followings and that understanding of function parties in representative government scarcely exists. Enormous size present Cabinet (33 members last week, 37 now) indicates all boys must be taken care of. Fact not only limits Government’s ability act with expedition and decision but suggests unreadiness deal with internal rivalries which might shatter coalition in absence external foe, particularly since prerogatives public office will be main plums independent Indonesia. Despite ingenious plans for elections based universal suffrage and far-reaching activities Minister Information, clear public opinion in no state provide check political forces for years.
Present Cabinet, which mostly professionals (about one-third educated Holland), probably from [form?] best material available. Program apparently simple one raising standard Indo life and education in mildly socialist system with recognition necessity encourage foreign investment. West evidently regarded as source guidance (no interest shown even in SEA union). While some leaders stress Moslemism [Page 1074] as source politicial principles, seems have little practical meaning. Believe important keep such men in office. Present obsession is for recognition Indo national equality. If satisfied in form, possible Indos will prove pliant substantive matters. If not, end impossible foresee.
In sum, best Dutch policy would seem be to roll with punch much more than heretofore in expectation being on hand when Republic faced with inevitable difficulties and through control main commercial activities, on which revenues state will largely depend, to exert stabilizing force. Risks such course great but may grow greater with delay. Despite uncanny parallels Indonesia and Indo-China, believe situation here simpler and less dangerous in (1) lack dangerous Communist influence, (2) absence third party with foreign backing analogous national union, (3) comparative lack fanatacism Indo character, and (4) failure passions so far lead systematic brutalities. [Ogburn.]