501.BC Indonesia/10–2947: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 32
416. From Graham 12. Following are highlights special report of US Navy and Army Advisory Group to Consulate General not submitted Consular Commission (text airmailed Army and Navy):
- 1.
- Although influential men both sides sincerely wish agreement, divergence views Dutch and Indo leaders such that no agreement possible without pressure third party.
- 2.
- All racial groups in areas surveyed have strong ethnological feelings but will remain united pending Dutch-Republic settlement, after which may be expected seek degree local autonomy under Republic. Republic not unduly concerned by Dutch efforts set up separate areas this time.
- 3.
- Determination Republican leaders and intelligentsia not diminished by Dutch military superiority. Masses primarily desire peace and security.
- 4.
- Republic political structure appears sound with no rift evident between political and military leaders, although popularity latter may be threat in future.
- 5.
- Capabilities Republic limited by shortage technicians and inexperience international relations. Leaders admit need Dutch assistance preferably under third power supervision.
- 6.
- Commerce Republic areas at standstill owing war effort and blockade. In Dutch areas, some industrial rehabilitation middle and west Java, little in east Java and Madura. Some resumption production foreign enterprises Sumatra. Textiles and medicines principal shortage both sides. Both badly need all types machines and tools. Food plentiful both sides but distribution difficult Republic areas. Sabotage continues detrimental economy Dutch territories. Health populace better than would be expected owing great efforts both sides make showing for political reasons.
- 7.
- Good cohesion in Republic military forces Java, but poor communications result continued operation irregulars Sumatra. Weakness armaments compensated by ability Indos wage continuous economic guerilla warfare.
- 8.
- Dutch army can move anywhere without serious difficulty, but given continuing determination Indos, it inadequate to secure areas it might take.
Above is consensus nine officers who have travelled widely past month Java and Sumatra. In conversation, ranking two officers expressed view Dutch already over-extended and aware of it. However, Dutch believe they have capability taking Djocja, silencing Indo radio propaganda, then gradually mopping up resistance in plantation areas.
Regarding cease-fire, officers feel impossible make effective with Dutch in advance positions and that only solution is pull Dutch back to July 20 positions with possibly internationally-supervised joint police maintain order and prevent Republic reprisals which would otherwise follow against Indo collaborationist officials in areas evacuated. However, they feel only threat sanctions would persuade Dutch agree withdraw. [Graham.]
- Repeated by the Department to The Hague in telegram 535, October 30, 7 p.m.↩