501.BC Indonesia/10–1547: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
1027. For Rusk from Noyes.25 The following is a draft statement in the Indonesian case based on our telephone conversations:26
“Mr. President, I should like to review, briefly, the parliamentary situation as I see it. On August 1, the Council passed its first cease-fire order. On August 25, the Council organized the Consular Commission to report on the observance of the cease-fire order and the conditions prevailing under military occupation, or from which armed forces now in occupation may be withdrawn by agreement between the parties. By that same resolution the Council tendered its good offices to the parties through a committee of three members of the Council. On August 26, the Council called upon the parties concerned to adhere strictly to the Council’s cease-fire order of August 1. On the 22nd of September, the Council received the interim report of the Consular Commission of Batavia. On October 8, the Council’s Committee of Good Offices held its first informal meeting. In accordance with decisions taken at that meeting, the Committee left last night27 by plane on its way to Australia and eventually to Indonesia. On October 13, the Council received a telegraphic summary of the conclusions of the first full report of the Consular Commission.
The Council has held several meetings in the last few weeks on the Indonesian question and now has before it proposals of several delegations. We have, first, the Russian resolution; second, the Australian resolution, and, third, the United Kingdom resolution as revised by the suggestion of the delegate from Belgium.
The Council has discussed these resolutions at some length and certain delegations have presented informally to the Council proposals for modification of these resolutions.
I have already given our views regarding the resolution put forward by the Soviet Union. My delegation continues to believe that it would not be wise for the Council to approve this resolution. We cannot help but feel that that is the wrong approach to the problem which the Council faces.
The real problem which the SC has before it seems to us to be the long-range settlement of the dispute between the parties concerned. In this respect we agree with the excellent statement made by my Chinese colleague at our last meeting.28 Both of the parties concerned continue, as I understand it, to subscribe to the principles of the Linggadjati Agreement. That is a fact of vital importance which we should never lose sight of. We have embarked on a course which has as its [Page 1057] main objective agreement between the parties on all issues involved in the present situation. Our main hopes, therefore, should be placed on the success of the efforts of our Committee of Good Offices in promoting a settlement of the basic issues involved in the dispute. It is quite clear that our cease-fire order was an essential prerequisite to the attainment of resumption of negotiations between the parties. Likewise, the work of the Consular Commission in observing and reporting on the effectiveness of our cease-fire order is subsidiary and accessory to the main purpose which we have before us. I do not wish to minimize the importance of the cessation of hostilities towards the solution of the long-term problem; I merely wish to present it in its proper perspective.
If we approach the problem which is being considered by the Council under the various resolutions before it in this way, it seems to me we may reach a wise solution and one which will lead us toward, rather than away from, a successful disposition of the whole matter.
We are in full agreement with those who wish to find a practicable method of bringing to an end the continuing hostilities. We are prepared to support measures which will accomplish this result. It appears to us that the first paragraph of the telegram of October 11 from the Consular Commission provides the best basis for action by the Council at this time. That paragraph reads:
‘Cease-fire orders were duly given but there was no confidence by Dutch or Indonesians that the other side would carry them out, and no attempt was made by either side to come to an agreement with the other about means of giving effect to the order.’
I call the Council’s attention to the fact that the parties have apparently made no effort to reach an agreement regarding the cessation of hostilities. It seems obvious that the effectiveness of our good offices committee will be substantially prejudiced by the failure of the parties to reach an agreement regarding the cessation of hostilities. It seems to us that an effective truce is a prerequisite for fruitful negotiations. This problem, therefore, naturally becomes the first matter for consideration by the Good Offices Committee. We have no doubt that they can find the way to bring this about without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned in regard to the merits of the dispute. It is our opinion that we can most effectively further the solution of the problem by calling upon the parties to agree upon arrangements for the cessation of hostilities with the aid of the Good Offices Committee.
If we are to follow this course, it would appear to be the part of wisdom for the Council to avoid any attempt, on the basis of the limited material before it, to determine whether either or both of the parties in any way bear any responsibility or blame for the present situation. We are hardly in a position to judge whether any technical violations have taken place, or whether any such technical violations are justified under the circumstances—even if it were profitable to make such a determination. Since our Committee of Good Offices will be considering this matter on the spot and in detail very shortly, it would, I submit, be desirable to leave the entire matter in their hands for the present.
It may, however, be advantageous for the Council to make certain that all concerned have a clear understanding of the general principle [Page 1058] underlying the Council’s cease-fire order. In the view of my Government, the Council’s cease-fire order cannot be interpreted to permit the use of the forces of either party to alter substantially the area under its control on the date of the original cease-fire order. As pointed out by several members of the Council, there will of course be special cases where action by one or the other party is justified by reason of special circumstances.
We have discussed the various methods which are available to put an end to these hostilities, and various points of view have been expressed. My own view is that we should not attempt to decide, even in principle, on the basis of the evidence before us here in this Council which of the various methods would be best suited to this case. We should, I believe, have confidence at this state [stage] in the desire of the parties to reach an agreement on all matters, and the ability of our good offices committee to aid them in this endeavor. I agree in this respect with my Chinese colleague. It would be my thought that after clarifying our own order, the Committee of Good Offices should be left free in the first instance to try to work out a satisfactory solution. It may of course be necessary, if this effort is unsuccessful, and if the situation requires it, for the Council to take some further action.”
Austin
- Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council and General Affairs, U. S. Mission to the United Nations.↩
- This statement in substantially the form here was made to the Security Council on October 22 by Ambassador Austin (SC, 2nd yr., pp. 2601–2604). Additionally in his statement he submitted a draft resolution (ibid., p. 2604) which is printed in telegram 1060, October 21, p. 1059.↩
- October 15.↩
- October 14.↩