856E.00/9–847
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
| Participants: | The Secretary |
| The Netherlands Ambassador, Dr. Van Kleffens | |
| Dr. Van Mook, Lt. Governor General, N.E.I. | |
| Mr. Hickerson |
Dr. Van Mook, Lt. Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies, accompanied by Mr. Van Kleffens, the Netherlands Ambassador, came in to see me at 2:30 PM this afternoon by appointment made at the request of the Netherlands Ambassador.15
Mr. Van Kleffens opened the conversation by saying he felt that it would be useful for Dr. Van Mook, who was in the United States for a few days to visit his son, to give me a firsthand account of existing [Page 1049] conditions in the Netherlands East Indies. He added that this seems especially important because of the situation created by the intervention of the Security Council in what the Netherlands Government still strongly believes is a purely domestic matter. Mr. Van Kleffens went on to say that his Government had felt that the limited military operations which were opened in July were essential as an ordinary police measure but that the Security Council had intervened and issued a cease fire order. Now, he said, a situation has been created in which the Netherlands Government cannot take what it believes would be the correct course and resume military operations without running the risk of sanctions being imposed against the Netherlands by the Security Council. This has resulted in a situation which is completely unsatisfactory from every standpoint. Mr. Van Kleffens said that he felt that it would, therefore, be of very great interest to the Secretary to hear an account of the situation actually existing in Java and the N.E.I. from Dr. Van Mook who has just come from Java.
Dr. Van Mook gave a long background review of the Dutch position historically in the N.E.I. He said that he was conscious of the fact that there had been growing aspirations for political independence prior to the war and that the Dutch Government had tried hard to take these into account in its course of action there. He said that these independence aspirations were unquestionably stimulated in every possible way by the Japanese authorities during the military occupation of the Islands. The Japanese had very carefully planned to make things as difficult as possible for the Dutch and the Allies by stirring up local independence agitation which would plague the Dutch when the Japanese had to give up the Islands. Dr. Van Mook said that Soekarno’s collaboration with the Japanese was pretty well known but that he did not believe the carefully laid plans of the Japanese to stimulate an independence movement as a part of a scorched earth policy were fully appreciated. The Japanese began to arm the Indonesians when it became clear that the war was lost, and the Indonesians had been able to seize considerable quantities of Japanese arms and ammunitions as well as former Dutch stocks of arms and ammunitions.
Dr. Van Mook went on to say that in spite of the carefully laid Japanese plans it might well have been possible to handle the situation without trouble had it been possible for the Allies to send troops immediately into the N.E.I. to take over the occupation of the Islands from the Japanese. Unfortunately, this had not been possible. The British, in whose area of responsibility the Islands fell, didn’t have the troops. The Dutch, as he said I knew from the wartime days, had been unable to obtain the shipping to send Netherlands forces out there. In consequence, the Japanese remained in the Islands in possession of their arms for several months after V–J Day.
[Page 1050]Dr. Van Mook said that he would not describe in detail the efforts of the Netherlands Government to reach an amicable accommodation with the Indonesians. He said that he felt that the Department of State had already full information concerning this. He said that the basic difficulty was that the Indonesians really do not have a Government which has discipline and which can control itself let alone Java and Sumatra. He said that instead of the Indonesians being a Government, there are in Java a group of war lords each with his own armed forces, subject to no central control authority or discipline, who are preying on the country. He said that most of the people of Java do not support the Indonesian authorities and that he has been frequently importuned by Indonesians to take such action as may be necessary to restore order. He said that when exports are smuggled out of Java, teach military commander receives part of the proceeds; that sometimes there are as many as 5 Indonesian military leaders in the same district and each insists on receiving a share of the proceeds. In consequence, the owner of the goods receives sometimes as little as 10% of the sale price. The military leaders pay their troops and “feather their nests” with the proceeds of such exports. The military leaders are utterly ruthless in their tactics and are badly feared by all of the inhabitants of the Islands. Dr. Van Mook went on to say that in spite of this many Indonesians have come to him privately and have asked him what the Netherlands proposes to do to restore law and order, these individuals knowing full well that they might be executed if their actions became known to any of the Indonesian military authorities.
Dr. Van Mook said that in his opinion the Security Council intervention in this matter had been a failure. The Netherlands military forces had been stopped from taking what they regarded as ordinary police action to restore law and order. The Security Council cease fire order was not being respected by the Indonesians and the Dutch losses were currently running about three-fourths of the losses which they had had during the time the limited military operations were in progress. What is even more serious, he said, is that there is a reign of terror in those areas still controlled by the Indonesians and a terrible uncertainty throughout the entire Islands. He said that he could not see how the Security Council could really settle this matter since there is not really an Indonesian Government.
(At this point Mr. Van Kleffens interrupted to say he had recently commented at Lake Success that the Indonesians do not have a Government but that they are a group of undisciplined people with a microphone and a check book.)
Dr. Van Mook said that the Netherlands is not a rich country and while this present stalemate continues it is becoming increasingly expensive. The Netherlands Government cannot hold out much longer. [Page 1051] If, he said, in the next two or three months there cannot be a settlement of this matter, the only recourse of the Netherlands Government will, in his opinion, be completely to withdraw from the entire N.E.I. He said that he felt that this would result in a reign of terror there but that the Netherlands simply couldn’t hold out much longer.
I allowed Dr. Van Mook to tell his story in his own way. I asked an occasional question as he went along for purposes of clarification. At one point during the conversation I asked Dr. Van Mook whether he felt that there was likely to be much guerrilla activity in Java. He replied that he felt that there was not for the reason that guerrilla activity takes place only in areas where the people are hostile to the occupying force and the Indonesians are not hostile to the Dutch. Other than asking questions occasionally for purposes of clarification I made no comment on Dr. Van Mook’s assertions.
- The Under Secretary of State also received a call from Dr. Van Mook and Ambassador Van Kleffens.↩