856E.00/8–2847
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
| Participants: | Acting Secretary Lovett |
| Dr. E. N. van Kleffens, Ambassador of The Netherlands | |
| Mr. Dean Rusk, Director, Office of Special Political Affairs | |
| Mr. John H. Morgan, Acting Chief, Division of Northern European Affairs |
The Netherlands Ambassador, Dr. van Kleffens, called on me this afternoon to inform me in advance of announcement by his Government that the Netherlands cabinet had now definitely decided not to take military action against Djokjakarta but to restrict their activities [Page 1044] to mopping up behind their lines where guerrilla attacks made this necessary. He indicated that he did not know what acceptance this decision might receive in all quarters and that there might be some resignations in the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies as a result. Upon my inquiry he further stated that his government was ready to accept the good offices of the Security Council as provided in the United States resolution of August 25. I informed the Ambassador that I welcomed this decision but felt that the United States, since its original offer of good offices had been rejected by the Indonesians, could not accept designation as one of the three members of the Council “to assist in the settlement”.
Following this, the Ambassador having inquired as to the procedure which the United States might follow in its eventual implementation of the Marshall Plan, I took the occasion to stress strongly to the Ambassador and to urge him to stress strongly to his Government that we felt that the Paris conference had so far produced only sixteen shopping lists and that postively no aid for Europe would be forthcoming from the United States unless Europe produced a reasonable, realistic plan providing for the fullest utilization of Europe’s own resources, for the elimination of present European production bottlenecks, and a progressive diminution of United States aid.
When leaving, Dr. van Kleffens expressed the hope that we might find it possible to advise Salim and Sjahrir to induce their government to desist from the constant exhortations to kill and burn which continued to be broadcast from Djokjakarta by high officials in spite of the cease-fire order.