856E.00/8–2047
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Landon)
| Participants: | Former Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir, Republic of Indonesia; |
| Foreign Minister Haji Agus Salim, Republic of Indonesia; | |
| C. Thamboe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia; | |
| Mr. James K. Penfield,2 FE; | |
| Mr. Dean Rusk, SPA; | |
| Mr. Kenneth P. Landon, SEA; | |
| Mr. John H. Morgan, NOE; | |
| Mr. Philip W. Bonsai, Counselor appointed to the American Embassy at The Hague; | |
| Mr. Joseph W. Scott, IS. |
The Indonesian officials named above called according to previous arrangement. In the course of two hours of conversation they made it [Page 1038] clear that they were very eager to have a neutral commission observe the “cease fire” order; that they hoped that such a commission would enlarge its functions to those of arbitration in such a way as to support the purposes of the Indonesians; that they would abide by any decisions made by the Security Council; that in the event the impossible happened and the Security Council should recommend that they return to a colonial status they would then become a “fighting colony”; that their purpose in signing the Linggadjati Agreement was to save the face of the Netherlands Government and provide an easy way to end the de jure sovereignty of the Netherlands Government over Indonesia; that they expected that by means of the Linggadjati Agreement the various states to be set up aside from the Republic of Indonesia would be established in consultation with the Republic and would accordingly form one sovereign state which would really be an enlarged Republic of Indonesia; that they intended to achieve their sovereignty immediately and not eventually; that they believed the Dutch intended to hold them within the old framework of empire if they could do so; that therefore Indonesian and Dutch purposes were fundamentally irreconcilable by negotiation and for that reason they did not wish to make use of the good offices of the United States or any other nation which would merely bring about the resumption of negotiation; that negotiation was impossible anyway as long as the Dutch forces held a pistol to the heads of the Indonesian negotiators; that they believed that the most important factor in the Security Council was the United States and that they had come to Washington to attempt to secure the support of the United States for their objectives. They made it clear that they hoped the United States would begin by supporting the idea of a neutral commission to observe the “cease fire” order and that subsequently the United States would continue to support them in achieving their objectives stage by stage.
It was made clear to the Indonesian officials that the United States’ offer of good offices was aimed to provide a method of settlement by negotiation in harmony with the resolution of the Security Council of August 1; that in expressing their willingness to abide by the findings of the Security Council the Indonesians should not only abide by the “cease fire” order but by that part of the resolution which advised them to reach a negotiated settlement; that Department officials had not understood from a careful reading of the Linggadjati Agreement that the Republic of Indonesia itself would become a severeign state but would be one of several states in an eventual United States of Indonesia; that it is not at all clear to us that the Security Council is the place to decide the issue described by the Indonesians as immediate sovereign independence; that we have been going on the assumption as had probably other nations that their differences [Page 1039] with the Dutch were negotiable; and that although we had the utmost of sympathy and interest in their ambitions to become independent we were in increasing doubt as to just how we might be useful in the present situation. The attempt was made to give the impression that the Indonesians should not count too heavily on United States support in the Security Council in the achievement of objectives which did not seem to us to fall within the frame of reference of the Security Council. We pointed out that it might be necessary to refer the question of jurisdiction to the World Court. The Indonesian officials took the point of view that if the United Nations Charter was not adequate to cover such a situation and to help all of the nations from Korea to Morocco achieve their independence that then the Charter should be changed.
We inquired finally whether negotiations would be possible if the Security Council did send a neutral commission to observe the “cease fire” order and so create a better atmosphere free from coercion on the Indonesian negotiators. They made no clear reply to this beyond reaffirming their desire for such a neutral commission.
856E.00/8–1847: Telegram
- Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.↩