Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI

856E.00/8–547

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

[Washington,] August 5, 1947.

Subject: Proposed Australian-United States Joint Mediation on Indonesia.

Participants:

Mr. Lovett, Under Secretary; Mr. Makin, Australian Ambassador; Mr. Stirling, Australian Minister; Mr. Bohlen; Mr. Rusk; Mr. Matthews

Mr. Makin called this afternoon at his request to discuss the Indonesian problem. At considerable length and without understatement Mr. Makin dwelt upon the important role of Australia in that area, and in the world, its keen interest in seeing peace in Indonesia, and its fears that continuance of strife would result in a threat to Australia. (He did not explain the nature of the threat.) With this background the Australian Government had welcomed American initiative before the Security Council and the American offer of good offices. His Government had, however, considerable qualms as to the possibility that the “cease fire” orders would not continue to be respected in view of the strong feelings on both sides in Indonesia. He referred to some radio charges by the Indonesian “Government” that the Dutch are violating the truce. I asked whether he really believed these charges. With some embarrassment he replied that he did not know whether they were true and that he had cited them merely to show continuance of uncertainty. His Government, he continued, had excellent relations with the Indonesians, with the Netherlands East Indies authorities and with the Dutch Government and was more familiar with the real situation in Indonesia than any other Government. Therefore, in the interests of peace he had been instructed formally to state that the Australian Government would welcome the opportunity to mediate jointly with the United States.

Upon conclusion of his lengthy buildup I asked why, if his Government felt so keenly about the matter, it waited five days to make the offer. Mr. Makin replied that he did not know but that Mr. Evatt was somewhere at sea and perhaps it had been difficult to communicate with him.

I asked further whether his Government had any reason to believe that such an offer of joint mediation would be acceptable to the Dutch. He replied that during the war Australia had rendered great service to the Dutch in the East Indies and had taken care of Dutch wounded and refugees. In view of the closeness of their wartime alliance he felt sure that the Dutch through gratitude would welcome such an offer. I said that the experience of the United States has been that gratitude was a rare and short-lived emotion.

I told Mr. Makin that as he knew, the Dutch had accepted our offer of good offices. A similar offer had been extended to the Indonesians but no reply had yet been received. Thus we did not know whether our offer of good offices would be accepted by both parties. Meanwhile I could only say that we would study the suggestions of his Government. Mr. Makin remarked that perhaps India might make some similar offer and if so he wanted us to know that Australia because of her geographic situation and her important role in world affairs was a much more logical partner in mediation than India or for that matter any other country. I asked if this latter included the Philippines and he said yes. I said that our reply at this time to any similar approach by the Government of India would naturally be the same.

After the departure of Mr. Makin and Mr. Stirling there was some discussion of the Australian proposal⁸¹ and the following general conclusions were reached:

(1) That Australia was motivated largely by Mr. Evatt’s desire to play a leading world role and to take the limelight where ever possible.

(2) That it was probable that the Australians have already been in touch with the Indonesians with regard to the American offer of good offices;

(3) That if the Indonesians should decline our offer of good offices or attach unacceptable conditions the United States should permit its offer to lapse;

(4) That the United States should not mediate jointly with any other power or powers;

(5) That unless hostilities were resumed we would favor giving opportunity to both parties to settle their differences through direct negotiations;

(6) That if an attempt were made by some other country (probably Australia or India) to force further action by the Security Council we should take the position that as long as there were no hostilities the matter was not one for Security Council action. (Mr. Rusk thought that this position would receive good support in the Security Council.)

81. An Australian press release was issued August 7 expressing readiness to act jointly with the United States In capacity of mediator and arbitrator.