856E.00/8–247
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)73
| Participants: | Dr. van Kleffens, Netherlands Ambassador |
| Mr. Lovett | |
| Mr. Rusk (Mr. Notter)74 | |
| Mr. Villard | |
| Mr. Matthews |
The Dutch Ambassador called this morning at his request and conveyed personally his Government’s acceptance of our offer of good [Page 1007] offices. He also expressed his appreciation and understanding of the position taken by the American Representative on the Security Council.
I asked Dr. van Kleffens whether it was true, as reported to me, that he had asked the Security Council for a two-hour delay in its consideration of the question to consult his Government to suggest a cessation of hostilities on its own initiative and that this had been refused. He confirmed that this was the case and said that the Indian Representative had actually given as his reason for opposing such a delay his belief that the United Nations should get the credit for stopping hostilities and that it would be unfortunate to have this take place by voluntary Dutch action. I said that we thought the whole performance of the Security Council in its precipitate haste had been both childish and shocking. Dr. van Kleffens referring to his own previous experiences as a member of the Security Council then dwelt at some length on what he described as a serious threat to the integrity and aims of the United Nations, namely, the growing tendency on the part of the Soviet Union and its satellites, the “colored” nations and some of the Latin Americans to form a bloc to utilize the United Nations as a forum for propaganda to serve demogogic ends and to block constructive treatment of questions which should properly come before the United Nations. He said this tendency was true not only of the Security Council but likewise of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council.
Turning to the situation in Indonesia, Dr. van Kleffens spoke of the great difficulties of getting any agreement with the Indonesians implemented. He described some of the leading personalities, some of whom are Moscow trained, and said that whenever agreement was reached with the Dutch the Indonesian negotiators were repudiated by their own people and were unable to produce any respect for the agreements reached. The so-called “truce” of last October, he said, had never been observed for the moderate Indonesian elements were unable to enforce observance. There had been over a thousand violations since it had been in effect. He likewise cited as an example of Republican failure to live up to their agreement the unwillingness to release hostages and the continuing scorched earth policy under the truce long before the recent Dutch action had been started. All reports now reaching him from Java indicate that wherever Dutch troops have penetrated the countryside is completely peaceful and tranquil with the population flocking back to their labors. Many of the Indonesian officials are doing their jobs under the protection afforded them by the presence of Dutch forces. He is confident that if the moderate Indonesians who have the support of the overwhelming majority of the population are afforded protection, order and stability will be restored and the Linggadjati Agreement can be implemented. He said [Page 1008] that he thought the Indonesian Republic officials would probably try to insist that Dutch troops must withdraw to the areas occupied prior to the recent “police action”. This, he said, his country could not afford to accept since it would expose the peaceful natives and officials to the most violent forms of reprisal—particularly the Chinese elements of the population who are not popular with the Javanese—and mean a return to a more chaotic state than before. As an example, he cited the fact in many villages the Dutch on entry had found long rows of shoes. These belonged to members of the Indonesian Army who had promptly discarded them and their arms and taken to working peacefully in the fields. The danger was that on Dutch withdrawal they would attempt to avenge themselves on other natives.
Dr. van Kleffens also spoke of rampant corruption on the part of the Indonesian Republican leaders. He said that the Dutch had been accused of blockading Republican ports. This was not true. His Government was only insisting that the proceeds of exports from Indonesia should accrue to the benefit of the Indies and not line the pockets of corrupt officials. The Dutch required only two things: (a) evidence that the exports had not been stolen, and, (b) evidence that the goods were being sold at fair prices. The ports which the Dutch have occupied are now operating and a vessel loaded with rubber has already sailed from Cheribon.
Dr. van Kleffens was asked the extent of Communist influence in the Indonesian Republican area. He said that his Government had indications that it was considerable, that many of the leaders there were Moscow trained. He had some doubt whether he should emphasize this factor in his public discussions of the question and asked for some advice on this subject.
Dr. van Kleffens insisted that the Government groups in East Indonesia were bitterly opposed to the irresponsible Republican leaders and had demanded protection. We should bear in mind, he said, that the so-called Republic does not represent the views of these large and important areas in any sense.
He said he did not yet know what reply his Government would make to the Security Council but he hoped and believed it would agree to an immediate cessation of hostilities even though this might cause a little difficulty when certain objectives had not yet been reached. He did not know what the Indonesian leaders would do but he feared they would suggest withdrawal to previous positions.