Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI

856E.01/7–2447

The British Embassy to the Department of State ⁵⁷

Aide-Mémoire

From statements issued by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom the United States Government will have realised how greatly distressed His Majesty’s Government have been by the turn of events in the Netherlands East Indies; Dutch action there represents a breakdown of the constant efforts made by His Majesty’s Government, with the concurrence and support of the United States Government, during the past two years to bring about a peaceful solution of the problem with which His Majesty’s Government were faced on taking over the responsibility for those territories at the time of the Japanese surrender. It may be that militarily the Dutch will gain an initial success; but the resulting situation in South East Asia will make the position of the western powers very difficult indeed. His Majesty’s Government are of course fully aware of the juridical arguments which may be advanced by the Netherlands Government; but it cannot be overlooked that these events in the Netherlands East Indies will cause dislocation in the whole of the area and must therefore be considered on a practical and realistic basis.

2. On the 21st July His Majesty’s Government made a public offer of good offices to both parties, with the knowledge and approval of the United States Government. The Netherlands Government replied on the same day that they were grateful to the United States Government and to His Majesty’s Government for the help that they had offered, that they had taken note of the offer of His Majesty’s Government to lend their good offices in the future and that it would depend on developments whether, and if so when, it would be considered opportune to make another appeal to the friendly governments of the United States and the United Kingdom. No reply has been received from the Indonesian Republican Government.

3. It is significant that in their statement the Netherlands Government have been at pains to stress their friendly relations with, and help received from both our Governments (although in fact no offer of help has been made by the United States Government to the Netherlands Government since the latest crisis occurred) rather than to respond to the offer of good offices made by His Majesty’s Government alone.

4. Mr. Bevin is accordingly convinced that the only hope of arresting the present tragic course of events is for the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government to induce the Netherlands Government to accept some form of arbitral solution which would first have to be agreed between our two Governments. It seems fairly certain that the Dutch will dislike and perhaps resent this though the Indonesian Republican Government is likely to agree readily to any reasonable solution which will put an end to the fighting.

5. A factor which in Mr. Bevin’s view renders it extremely urgent to try to solve the matter on these lines is the likelihood of an appeal being made to the Security Council in the near future by some other power. It has already been proposed in Parliament that His Majesty’s Government should take this action and it is believed that other governments are considering it too. His Majesty’s Government are anxious to anticipate what may otherwise become an inevitable development.

6. His Majesty’s Government are not at present in a position to suggest the concrete terms of any solution which it might be possible to urge upon the Dutch. This would require further careful consideration by the United States and United Kingdom Governments. But His Majesty’s Government consider that to have any chance of success the solution must aim at finality and must provide that the Dutch and the Indonesians bind themselves in advance to accept whatever recommendation the British and United States arbitrators propound after conferring with both sides.

7. His Majesty’s Government hope most earnestly that the United States Government will feel able to act with them, and along the same lines, in striving to put an early end to a conflict of which the consequences—quite apart from humanitarian considerations—may be incalculably damaging to the peace and stability of Asia and to the revival of economic prosperity in that and other parts of the world.

Washington, 24 July, 1947.

57. This communication was left with Under Secretary of State Lovett the afternoon of July 24 by the British Minister, Sir John Balfour, who discussed the matter with Mr. Lovett. The matter was reported to London in telegram 3210, July 26, 1 p.m. (856E.00/7–2547) and, more briefly, to New Delhi in telegram 448, July 26, 3 p.m. (856E.00/7–2347). In telegram 3210, after reviewing the discussion, the Department stated that Mr. Lovett informed Sir John that “we felt we must be realistic and face fact that Dutch would not accept arbitration at this time.” In telegram 448, the Department said that the “British note and entire situation receiving urgent consideration at highest level.”