856E.00/7–1847: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
516. Following is résumé situation sent last night by Foreign Office [to] Netherlands Embassy Washington without instructions transmit Department. Foreign Office stated similar procedure followed towards Netherlands Embassy London.
- 1.
- On July 15 Sjarifoeddin stated to Van Mook that Republic representatives considered our (Dutch) demands and proposals reasonable. They furthermore expected that these demands and proposals would prove acceptable Djocja.
- 2.
- However, it was proved in Djocja that no majority could be found agree Netherlands desiderata. Sjarifoeddin then did not follow Sjahrir’s example by resigning as Prime Minister. Events past few days once more prove incapacity existing in Djocja to take necessary decisions. Important fact in this situation is also that Republic Government know that orders issued by them and which are contrary to negative and dilatory tactics pursued until now, will not be obeyed by many Republic authorities, civilian and military who presently have acquired more power or greater financial benefits than they deserve.
- 3.
- Last Republic answer is highly unsatisfactory. Refusal accept Dutch assistance for special police forces (according Netherlands proposal Indo units would accept Dutch assistance for instruction and leadership these police forces, whilst Dutch units would be attached to Indo police in certain special circumstances only) means, in view situation existing in Republic territory, that the essential conditions reestablish law and order have not been accepted by Republic.
- 4.
- Republic proposal regarding end hostilities and withdrawal of troops to a distance of two kilometers of the demarcation lines cannot [Page 980] be taken seriously as this two kilometer zone is already in force (in theory) since October 14, 1946 when truce was established.
- 5.
- Number times Republic forces have violated truce exceeds one thousand. Dutch infractions do not exceed several dozen. It may furthermore be pointed out every time Republic complained about infraction of truce by Dutch troops an enquiry took place and extensive reply was sent competent Indo authorities, Republic on other hand has up until now not once replied to complaints about Indo violation truce.
- 6.
- Netherlands Government now consulting Van Mook regarding road to be followed to bring end to present untenable situation.
Foreign Office informed today contents Department’s telegram 358, July 17 as instructed, which elicited following comments from Vredenburch:
- 1.
- Present “Netherlands demands” should be more properly regarded as “concessions” when earlier Netherlands position as presented by Van Mook taken into consideration.
- 2.
- Cease fire order is already established on mutual basis. Vredenburch claims that Republic insistence for current Dutch declaration cease fire would be tantamount to admission October 14, 1946 declaration at time truce concluded (see paragraphs above) had been violated by Dutch which admission Republic desire for propaganda purposes.
- 3.
- While Sjarifoeddin gave evidence acceptance last Dutch “demands”, he unable swing Djocja in line and then unwilling resign as case Sjahrir fearing lest Sjahrir return to office which according Vredenburch Sjarifoeddin wishes prevent at all costs. This comment made with reference to “present moderate Republic Government”.
Vredenburch states that Batavia advises Sjarifoeddin wanted return Batavia discuss situation with Van Mook night 16th but was prevented by and yielded to Djocja opposition. He also states before reply was made to Van Mook “demands” as disclosed by intercept messages from Djocja all Republic military commanders instructed continue military preparation in anticipation Dutch military action. He added that in face continued bad faith on part Indos, Dutch cannot further recede from present position until some evidence given cessation (1) food blockade from interior, (2) attacks, (3) Republic propaganda. He said he realized that all these could not be put into effect at once but if any one were undertaken this could be regarded as beginning show good faith on part Indos. As far as Dutch withdrawal on any perimeters to distance 10 kilometers Vredenburch pointed out that in some instances e.g. Surabaya this would push Dutch troops into sea; furthermore withdrawal would only open up more territory for Republic propaganda giving appearance to presently friendly population that Dutch were withdrawing and that instinct self-preservation would cause some elements to join over with Republic forces.
[Page 981]Foreign Office states no Government statement expected for time being.
Sent Department 516, repeated London 73. Department pass Batavia.