856E.01/6–1947: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State

secret
us urgent

238. Deptel 160, June 17. Representations to Indo Republic authorities will be carried out soonest. Sjahrir returned last night from Linggadjati at request British Consul General. I have requested appointment and expect see him within few hours.

Following suggestions offered as of possible interest to Department: Deptel mentions continued negotiations and urges persistent efforts find meeting ground between two positions. This exactly what Indos want, knowing time on their side, since enables them improve their armed forces and same time weakens Dutch. On other hand Indos have no intention finding meeting ground between two positions. Soekarno and Sjahrir may have such intention but they helpless against Communist Alimin, Indo Generals Soedirman and Soetomo who trying sabotage Linggadjati Agreement. Gani, Indo Minister Welfare and Economic Affairs, told me Indos will not give ground one millimetre. Gani also said while he not Communist he favors them; that he does not favor return of Dutch estates et cetera to private owner.

Military intercept received here today contains orders from Djokjakarta to Republican agents Java, Sumatra and other islands that Indo note is rejection Dutch note and that Indos will not agree formation interim government or government of USI unless Republic predominates in both.

Representations contained in Deptel 160 will give moral support to extremist factions and if they accomplish anything it apt be only further delay. In meantime Chiese [Achinese?] and Batak armies now facing each other in north Sumatra and unrest growing in Java and other parts of Sumatra. Further delay in restoration law and order, which Republic unable to accomplish, may lead to bloodshed among Indos themselves and misery untold among poorer classes of Indos [Page 953] who form 95 percent of population who apathetic towards politics and desire only right to return to work in peace.

My opinion is representations should be stronger. Appeal for continued negotiations may be dangerous and efforts find middle ground useless except as matter of record. Representations should give forceful picture of results of failure to agree at once and then build sovereign USI along constitutional lines with USA and other countries watching and guiding where possible. Weak representations will lead only to increased dilatory or obstructive tactics. This country can not stand much more of this.

Foote