Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI

856E.01/6–447

The British Embassy to the Department of State ³

June 4, 1947

Aide-Mémoire

135/129/47

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have been perturbed by reports which have reached them from their representatives in the Netherlands East Indies to the effect that there is a serious danger of armed clashes if the Republican Government of Indonesia fails to accept the proposals contained in a note which was presented to Indonesian representatives by the Dutch on the 27th May. A summary of the proposals contained in that note, furnished by His Majesty’s Consul General at Batavia, has already been given to the State Department. His Majesty’s Government have made it abundantly clear to the Dutch Government that they would deeply deplore the use of force in Java and that they would not expect its use to lead to a solution of the problems with which the Dutch Government is faced.

2. His Majesty’s Government are also anxious for the Dutch and Indonesians to reach agreement on those clauses of the Linggadjati Agreement which require further elaboration so that the trade of the territory may resume its former volume. Under settled conditions the Island of Java is a valuable source of oils and fats of which the British people and indeed most of the peoples of Europe stand in urgent need.

3. The Dutch Commission General and certain Dutch officials have informally put forward two suggestions. They are:—

(1) that if the proposals communicated by the Dutch to the Indonesians on the 27th May are considered to be sound, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom should bring their influence to bear on the Indonesians to respond favourably to them, and

(2) that if the proposals are rejected, joint Anglo-American arbitration might be acceptable to the Dutch.

4. These proposals have not received the official backing of the Dutch Government.

5. So far as the first point is concerned, His Majesty’s Government understand that they are not likely to receive any official request from the Netherlands Government to use their influence with the Indonesians but that the Dutch would nevertheless be glad if it were used informally, as on various occasions in the past. On the other hand, His Majesty’s Government have been given to understand that the Dutch would prefer to make the second proposal themselves rather than have it made to them by the United States or the United Kingdom Government.

6. On the basis of the information available to them, His Majesty’s Government consider the Dutch proposals to be on the whole sound and sensible and they think that an approach to the Indonesians recommending their acceptance, with a view to avoiding further bloodshed and disorder, seems desirable. They would be glad to learn whether the United States Government would be disposed to act in a similar manner if they themselves made such an approach.

7. If the Indonesians refuse the Dutch proposals, a critical situation will have arisen and the Dutch authorities may then sound the Governments of the United States and United Kingdom about a solution by arbitration. Should they fail to do so, His Majesty’s Government might consider taking the initiative in proposing it.

Washington, 4 June, 1947.

3. Notation by Alexander Schnee: “Handed to Mr. Landon, SEA, by Mr. Everson of the British Embassy on June 4, 1947. Reply made by Mr. Landon orally on June 5”.