856E.00/5–1047: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State

secret

314. Chief Political Section FonOff last night made following observations to Counselor re Indonesian situation:

1.
Various joint commissions, including Joint Economic Commission, had been set up but as yet had produced nothing concrete. So far no agreement on export-import, foreign exchange and military problems; Dutch insist these problems be put in hands joint commissions which alone would have power make decisions, while Indonesians demand unilateral action; obviously these problems must be handled by central authorities as otherwise chaos would result.
2.
Informant said his impression Indonesians, in spite efforts Dutch to hasten implementation Linggadjati Agreement, stalling for time in hope Dutch eventually would either withdraw from Indies or else initiate military action which they (Indonesians) convinced would be most unpopular US and UK.
3.
Informant observed that in connection with high Netherlands authorities he now studying possible plans of action in event it is found impossible implement Linggadjati Agreement, but he stressed that no decision would be taken until after return early June Beel68 and Jonkman from their fact-finding visit to Indies; possible plans include: (a) military action in order bring Indonesians into line; (b) withdrawal from Java, Sumatra and Madura after lapse certain period. He observed that, in his opinion, plan (a) impracticable inasmuch as public opinion US and UK might be expected strongly oppose coercion Indonesians by force (he said Dutch now have about 100,000 troops Indies and that this number tending decrease inasmuch [Page 922] as more troops now returning home from Indies than going out), and that consequently eventual decision, in event found impossible implement Linggadjati Agreement might be for Dutch announce withdrawal from Indies effective certain date and at same time refer whole matter UN.
4.
Informant concluded with expression personal opinion that time might conceivably come when US could assist in exerting pressure, either officially or otherwise, on Indonesians to cooperate with Dutch with view implementation Linggadjati Agreement. However, he stressed that no US action should be taken until after Beel and Jonkman have returned and made their report substance of which, he added, would immediately be communicated Dept.69

Baruch
  1. Netherlands Prime Minister.
  2. In telegrams 243 and 136, May 22, the Department asked The Hague and Batavia for the latest estimate on the situation with special reference to the danger of the Dutch resorting to military operations. At the same time paragraphs 2–4 of telegram 314 were repeated to Batavia. (856E.00/5–1047)