856E.00/4–1747
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming) and the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat)59
The Netherlands Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Mr. Lovink, called on Secretary Marshall in Moscow to discuss the Netherlands Government’s views regarding the desirability of cooperation between the Western Democracies on problems affecting the Near, the Middle, and the Far East.60 Ambassador Lovink’s proposals were of a general nature and no specific procedure for cooperation was suggested.
Ambassador Lovink left two memoranda with the Secretary. In the first, emphasis is placed upon the need for Western Power cooperation “in the Social, Economic, and Cultural fields with the accent on the necessary work of reconstruction”. The memorandum stresses the vulnerability of the weaker countries of Southeast Asia (Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, Siam, Indo-China, the NEI, and the Philippines) to a Pan-Asiatic alliance under the aegis of India or China, and proposes that some form of joint Western Power cooperation is necessary to prevent such a development. The second memorandum depicts the growing influence of Communism in the Netherlands East Indies; emphasizes the ties existing between Indonesian Communists and Communist organizations in Singapore and China; and states that “the strategic stake for Moscow is high—a Communist stronghold situated between Singapore, the Philippines and Australia.”
In reply, Secretary Marshall expressed himself as being in favor of “some degree of cooperation among the Democratic Powers concerned in the Far East”, but made no commitment regarding the necessity for formalizing the procedure.
Our views regarding the Dutch proposals are as follows:
- 1.
- With respect to the Netherlands East Indies, we feel that a stabilization of the present Indonesian Republican Government within the framework of the basic political accord (Linggadjati Agreement) is desirable and can best be achieved by assisting promptly in the economic rehabilitation of the area, via US Government credits, private investments, and trade. While we are favorably inclined towards discussions leading to this end between a Dutch-Indonesian delegation on the one hand and US representatives on the other, we are not convinced at this time that joint Western Power discussions, including Great Britain and France, are desirable. If, however, the Netherlands [Page 918] Government wishes to make specific proposals concerning a procedure for cooperation, such proposals will be given careful consideration. We further think that such economic aid as this Government may extend, either alone or jointly, should be safeguarded so as not to prejudice a fair implementation of the Linggadjati Pact.
- 2.
- With respect to the danger of Communist domination of the Netherlands East Indies, we feel that Communist influence at the present is neither widespread nor effective. It is our hope that prompt measures to consolidate and strengthen the present Indonesian leadership (which we believe to be Socialist and not Communist, Nationalist and not Soviet-controlled) will eliminate those conditions which may make Communist infiltration effective.
- 3.
- In general, the US Government is in frequent contact with the Netherlands Government on matters concerning the Netherlands East Indies; our views and those of the British are substantially parallel; we feel that care should be taken lest a joint Western Power approach be interpreted by the Indonesians as a threat to their national aspirations and thus result in defeating our purpose of stabilizing the present Indonesian regime. For the present, therefore, we think that no followup of the Dutch proposals is necessary, but that specific proposals along these lines which the Dutch may present should be considered in the light of conditions then existing.
We do not think it necessary for Mr. Acheson to see the attached file.