856E.01/1–2347: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State
31. Following my comments on subject my telegram 30, January 23.
De Boar is non-political businessman with strong principles and thus less likely than politically trained colleagues on ComGen to compromise [Page 895] with convictions. If he signs he probably will issue statement explaining why he felt he must and reiterating objections. He may refuse to sign in which case I presume one dissenting voice will not impair agreement’s validity.16 It is of course possible further Republican action will cause other members ComGen share De Boer’s view.
While I think KNIP will approve agreement, I concur with De Boer that cannot be carried out unless present attitude Republican leaders reversed and militarists controlled.
Loss influence by Soekarno and many former moderates reflected in their urging mere political expediency as reason for approval. Leadership now appears passing to extremists over whom moderates have little control. Significant that Soedirman essentially a nonentity can flout truce rulings made on highest civil level. Sjarifoeddin, Hatta and other former cooperators clearly leaning more and more toward extremist position. Having aroused people’s support by assuring them Republic was sovereign state, they unwilling tell them now this [ap]parently not so under agreements terms and their altered attitude probably due to political impasse of their own making. Republican press now occasionally critical of alleged weakness Sjahrir’s diplomacy.
While Dutch not blameless violation truce, it obvious any impartial observer here guilt lies almost entirely with Republican militarists led by Soedirman. Dutch statements of fact draw violent, often hysterical, denials by Republic press and spokesman in which note of desperation discernible.
Dutch forces here now number about 120,000 and their effectiveness increasing. Republican forces about 151,000 of which maximum 20% armed while they largely lacking ordnance, tanks, planes, etc. In recent fighting their leadership and spirit generally poor, they plainly far less formidable than Indochinese.17 Dutch victory would be easy but inevitable aftermath bitterness would be hard to overcome even by energetic sincere implementation Cheribon Agreement. While some Dutch military favor all-out attack now they in minority and well under control. I sure Dutch would not attack until after signature agreement and then only as last resort. Other restraining considerations would be fear world opinion such as now directed at French, fear foreign or international intervention and fact that at least 190,000 internees still in Republican hands.
I feel American press poorly informed of present nature of Republic due to ignorance, bias or false glamorizing by many correspondents. I feel recent implication Republican officials in brutal murder Australians [Page 896] last April and in later murder Indo Red Cross doctor, subsequent mock trials by Republican courts (details in later tel) probable partnership Gani18 in Chinese smuggling ring, neglect starving people Madoera and elsewhere while shipping rice to India for political purposes, increased shooting, kidnapping peasants by Republican forces, numberless acts bad faith Republican military leaders, ineradicable taint of Jap influence, continued use large number Jap soldiers, technicians, selfish British support and Australian Communist assistance, all indicative that authoritarian misnamed Republic no longer worthy exponent honest healthy Indo nationalism. If Jap [I feel?] further weakening European position Java and Sumatra would precipitate ruthless Chinese economics domination and that Indo reaction there now might have repercussions dangerous to American interests and security in southeast Asia.
In short I feel time now ripe for reexamination our attitude toward situation here.
Because of above am sure Indos will hasten to sign agreement and Ghentry [sic] force approval by National Committee.
Browne concurs these.