Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI

740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2047: Telegram

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Seoul, August 20, 1947.

288. Zurc 1044. Reference Department’s telegram 172, August 18.⁷⁴ In compliance radiogram War 83983, August 12, full unilateral report of US Delegation, US–USSR Joint Commission, being dispatched by courier today.

Report covers agreements initiating commission, first session (1946), interim correspondence, current session (1947) and conclusions of US Delegation. Condensation of last two follows:

From May 21, 1947 until August 21, 1947, 31 meetings were held. Early indications of divergent positions were apparent in Subcommission No. 1, when Soviet delegate (1) proposed narrowing consultation to 30 organizations, (2) refused to arrive at definitions of “social organizations” and “political party”, (3) refused to establish criteria as basis for elimination of local and small organizations from consultation, and (4) contended that in order to be consulted organizations must fully uphold Moscow agreement, including every paragraph. US delegate rejected all, and on May 27 pointed out there could be no unilateral exclusion under terms on which Joint Commission reconvened.

In Joint Commission meetings positions were amplified. Then in agreeing to principles in Joint Decision No. 12 Soviets on June 6 unexpectedly receded from position of narrow consultation, and by specific statement agreed to broad consultation.

Large registration of South Korean parties under provisions of Joint Decision No. 12 (copies of which are in your hands and also are attached as appendix to full report) resulted in Soviet concern and retreat from principle of broad consultation. Soviet position was (1) fact that organization is eligible for consultation under Marshall–Molotov agreements as published in Joint Decision No. 12 does not mean it must be admitted for consultation, (2) in order to be consulted, organization must be acceptable to both delegations: in short, Soviet can use veto, (3) following would not be consulted: non-social organizations, purely local organizations, and organizations not intending to fully uphold Moscow agreement, particularly members of anti-Trusteeship Committee, and (4) signatures of latter on applications (Joint Communiqué 5) not in good faith and members must publicly withdraw from membership.

US position was (1) Under Marshall–Molotov agreement signing declaration in Communiqué No. 5 acceptable as good faith, (2) organizations signing declaration are automatically eligible and cannot be excluded except by agreement of both delegations, (3) US willing to exclude non-social organizations on basis of “social” as used in dictionaries throughout world, (4) US submitted proposals which, if accepted, would have eliminated large number of purely local organizations, (5) US willing to exclude organizations for fraud, provided that only fraud was not exaggeration of membership, and (6) whereas nothing in any agreements authorizes exclusion by unilateral veto, two specific agreements provide for exclusion from consultation by mutual agreement.

Results of Soviet and US positions evident after consideration of following:

(1) Extreme rightists under Kim Koo and Syngman Rhee with total claimed membership of 11.25 million failed to apply for consultation.

(2) North Korea applicant parties totaled 38, all Democratic People’s Front, while South Korea parties totaled 422, representing all shades of political views.

(3) Soviet list of 147 North and South Korea parties of membership in excess of 10,000 whose eligibility for consultation Soviets willing to discuss, omitted 24 parties with claimed membership of 15.2 million, which Soviets say are members of Anti-Trusteeship Committee.

(4) US acceptance of proposal would have driven majority of 71 rightist and moderate groups from further support of Joint Commission.

(5) Although Soviets deny their purpose is to eliminate rightists, US acceptance of Soviet proposals would make Commission entirely or almost entirely dependent on Communist-dominated Democratic People’s Front for formation of provisional government.

It is the opinion of the US delegation that the objectives of the Soviet delegation’s position were:

(1) To insure Democratic People’s Front control of provisional Korean democratic government similar to that established in North Korea, and

(2) To establish a Communist-controlled satellite state on the border of USSR which, in the words of the Soviet Chief Commissioner at the opening meeting in March 1946, “will not become a base for attack on the Soviet Union” and which will outflank a hoped for Communist Manchuria.

To effect realization of objectives, Soviet relied on (1) suppression of all but Democratic People’s Front in North Korea, (2) exclusion from consultation of non-Democratic People’s Front organizations in South Korea and (3) strategic aid to Communist-dominated groups in South Korea (fifth column activities).

Failing to obtain agreement on consultation, US delegation successively submitted three proposals as per radios Zurc 970, Seoul PolAd 245, July 30; Zurc 982, Seoul PolAd 250, August 1;⁷⁵ Zurc 1018, Seoul PolAd 271, August 12. Soviets rejected first two and have not replied to third.

US delegation concludes:

(1) The Soviet objective was announced by the Soviet Chief Commissioner to the Joint Commission in March 1946. This objective is: (a) To create the provisional Korean democratic government by a wide unification of all “democratic parties and organizations supporting the decisions of the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs”; (b) through such a government, to eliminate “reactionary, pro-Japanese, anti-democratic elements” and “to carry out radical measures of economic and political reform”; (c) to establish a Korea “friendly to the Soviet Union so that in the future it will not become a base for an attack on the Soviet Union”.

(2) The Soviet Government and its agents have followed the Soviet objective as above announced during: (a) The 1946 sessions of the Joint Commission; (b) the exchange of correspondence between the commanders; (c) the 1947 session of the Joint Commission;

(3) The Moscow agreement, the Marshall–Molotov correspondence, and Joint Commission Decision No. 12 constitute adequate and detailed terms for conducting consultation and for the implementation of the establishment of a provisional Korean democratic government.

(4) The Soviet delegation to 1947 session of the Joint Commission shows no intention of divergence from the objectives announced by the then and present Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation at the opening session of the Joint Commission in 1946.

(5) Unless and until the Soviet Government directs the Soviet delegation to the Joint Commission to follow policies other than those announced by the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet delegation in 1946 as the Soviet objective, it will be impossible to draft any agreement with the Soviet Government which will lead to successful evolvement of Korean independence through the medium of the Joint Commission.

[

Hodge

]

74. Not printed; it asked for a report by the Joint Commission or by the U.S. delegation by August 21 (740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1747).
75. Latter not printed.