Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI

IO Files

⁴⁵

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)

[Washington,] July 29, 1947.

The following rough outline is presented for consideration in the ad hoc committee on Korea⁴⁶ as a possible basis for discussion. It is believed that in general it presents a series of steps which need to be taken and which are designed (1) to prove to the discouraged and explosive Korean people that the United States Government is making every possible effort to speed their independence, and (2) to prove to American and world public opinion that the United States Government is acting in accordance with its international commitments, particularly under the Charter of the United Nations.

A. If Soviets Break Off Joint Commission Negotiations Prior to Aug. 5.

1. Immediate letter to Molotov with copies to the United Kingdom and China calling urgent conference to discuss further steps—(letter to be along lines of draft telegram to Hodge—not sent, and to include as an enclosure proposals in 2 below.) Letter to be made public.

2. Presentation to 4 Powers of specific plan.

a. early elections by secret, multi-party ballot in both zones to choose provisional legislatures,

b. wholly elective legislatures to pick provisional executives,

c. provisional legislatures in cooperation with provisional executives to choose representatives to meet with representatives from other zone to discuss formation of a provisional government for a united Korea on a basis bearing in mind the proportional population in each zone,

d. this provisional Korean Government to meet with representatives of 4 Powers to discuss with them what aid and assistance is needed in order to put Korea on a firm economic foundation and on what terms this aid and assistance is to be given,

e. that upon agreement by the Korean Provisional Government with 4 Powers on aid and assistance all occupation forces shall be withdrawn unless specific agreements are entered into by the Korean Provisional Government and the Powers concerned. Such agreements would naturally provide that as long as armed forces remained their commander and his government would naturally have final say as to their use, although acting as far as possible in accordance with the wishes of the Korean Provisional Government,

f. during stages a, b and c, the United Nations will be invited to have observers present so that the world and the Korean people may be assured of the wholly representative character of the provisional legislatures and executives.

3. In presenting the above plan to the 4 Powers they should be informed that, in justice to the Korean people, no undue delay can be permitted and that, if speedy agreements cannot be reached, the United States Government intends to present the whole problem of Korea at the earliest possible date to the United Nations. They should also be informed that in the meantime, in order that there may be no delay in making preparations for a united Korea, the United States Government in the zone of its responsibility intends to take the steps outlined in 2 a and 2 b above along with a positive program of political, educational and economic help and assistance. That in carrying out this program, including steps in 2 a and 2 b, the United States Government will welcome United Nations observers. This statement should be made on the first day of the Conference in public session.

B. If Soviets Drag Out Joint Commission Negotiations.

1. Letter should be sent to Molotov on August 6 calling attention to his original suggestion that Joint Commission should report in July or August; that United States Government deplores present lack of progress made by Commission; that United States Government requests a report by August 10 from Commission of such progress as has been made so that consideration can be immediately given as to what further steps can be taken to hasten the establishment of a united, independent Korea.

2. On August 12, after receipt of report from Joint Commission, United States should present a letter to 4 Powers adhering to Moscow Agreement along lines in A 1 and A 2 above.

3. Public statement provided for in A 3 above should be made on opening day of 4-Power Conference, which should meet in Washington on August 25. If no progress is made by September 10, United States should announce its intention of submitting matter to next session of General Assembly of United Nations.

C. In Case of Soviet Refusal to Meet.

1. Should Soviet Government refuse to meet as requested or endeavor to delay meeting unreasonably, United States Government should announce that after informing other adherents to Moscow Agreement on Korea it intended to submit whole problem of Korea to next session of General Assembly of United Nations and that in meantime it would take steps outlined in A 2 a and A 2 b above, welcoming at same time United Nations observers should United Nations so desire.

D. Preparation of Case for United Nations.

A State Department working team should immediately be formed to prepare case for submission to United Nations.

E. Grant-in-aid Program and State Department Takeover.

It is believed present report should stress urgency of continuing with efforts to obtain approval for grant-in-aid program and the necessity for setting a definite date for takeover of civil functions in United States zone of Korea, by the State Department. The urgency should also be pointed out of designating a Civil Commissioner who could begin at once preparations for this takeover.

45. Master Files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.
46. See footnote 41, p. 713.