740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–2547: Telegram
The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State
priority
234. Cite Zurc 945. From Hodge, Brown and Jacobs. Reference is made to the Joint Commission deadlock described in Seoul Pol Ad 209, July 16. It is confirmed opinion of American delegation that Soviet delegation stalling, that present lines of argument are virtually exhausted and that new lines must be adopted. American delegation is [Page 732] continuing to press Soviet delegation to submit proposals for overcoming present difficulties. It will also propose that matter of consultation be referred back to Subcommission number 1 with directive to prepare lists of all parties and organizations requesting consultation and those unacceptable to either delegation with reasons therefor. If accepted, it is estimated that this will require one week. If above proposals fail or are not acceptable, the American delegation will offer proposals outlined in afore-mentioned radio in following order:
- (1)
- Soviet delegation carry on consultation north of 38th parallel and American delegation south of 38th parallel;
- (2)
- Both delegations consult jointly in North and South Korea with those parties acceptable to both delegations, and American delegation consult unilaterally with those which are unacceptable to Soviet delegation. This proposal would carry necessary safeguards against future elimination of parties from the consultative body provided for in paragraph 9, Joint Commission decision 12, and from the provisional government;
- (3)
- Oral consultation to be dispensed with entirely and consultation with respect to future provisional government be confined to written replies to questionnaires already filed.
If none of above proposals is acceptable to Soviet delegation, then American delegation will consider proposing that Joint Commission drop for time being the question of consultation, and paragraph 1. Proceed under paragraph 9 of Joint Commission decision number 12 to discuss the creation of the consultative body, and paragraph 2. Discuss type, composition and method of creation of the provisional government.
It is estimated that these proposals will have been presented within the next 2 weeks. The probability of acceptance or rejection by the Soviet delegation is dependent upon their instructions and good faith. When the above approaches have been exhausted, it would appear useless to proceed further with discussions except in pursuance of the course of action proposed below:
- (1)
- Review of the progress of the Joint Commission (upon Marshall’s initiative), by the Foreign Ministers, for which purpose and prior to their meeting the two delegations would prepare joint or separate statements reporting progress to date and setting forth points of difference between the two delegations. (See reference to July and August review, from last paragraph Molotov letter April 19 to Marshall).
- (2)
- Prior to the meeting for review by the Ministers, the US Government instruct the American delegation to propose a recess until instructions are issued by the two Ministers following their joint review.
American delegation is pessimistic over possibility of reaching satisfactory agreement with respect to consultation and is convinced that Soviet delegation is waging systematic campaign in South Korea assisted by leftist parties, directed first against American delegation to force acceptance of Soviet views, and second against Korean rightist parties, hoping to eliminate them by goading them into overt acts which would constitute fomenting and inciting active opposition within the meaning of the Marshall–Molotov agreement, and thereby eliminate themselves. In latter event American delegation would be forced to acquiesce in elimination of rightist parties from consultation and probably from participation of their representatives in provisional government. There are indications that the present condition of disagreement is causing loss of confidence among Koreans in the ability of the Joint Commission to reach any agreement under the Moscow decision.
Soviet delegation here with about 90 members and Soviet radio station at Pyongyang are taking full advantage of situation to breed unrest. Our intelligence officers report increasing stream of visitors to residence of that delegation and visits of members of the delegation on Koreans at late hours of the night. Their presence and activity in Seoul increases probability of disorders and difficulties of the American commander.
Would appreciate receiving as soon as possible any instructions that State and War may wish to give.