Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI

740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–2147: Telegram

The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State

secret
urgent

Seoul, July 21, 1947.

219. Cite Zpol 935. Recent exchange of telegrams regarding proposed issuance of statements by the Secretary (several messages were General Hodge’s without Pol Ad numbers), following are my comments, some of which have bearing on other aspects of present situation here:

1. It was not contemplated here that statement would refer to Dr. Rhee or any other Korean leader by name. Our thought was that statement would be of broad general nature reaffirming United States policy and proclaiming that General Hodge and other United States officials here are doing everything possible to carry out that policy (somewhat as set forth in Deptel 142, July 14th). In other words, we felt there should be a general statement from the highest authorities to scotch rumors that American officials in Washington and here are working at cross purposes.

2. Although have not hitherto so stated, I have felt that if a statement is issued the Secretary of War should also issue similar statement simultaneously.

3. It seems almost certain that Joint Commission will soon be deadlocked a second time, which will require major reorientation of United States policy with respect to Korea. Mere fact that the President has announced that General Wedemeyer will come to Korea can only be interpreted here (and has so been interpreted) that the highest authorities in Washington feel that our past policies have failed and therefore require revision. Announcement of Wedemeyer’s mission has encouraged rightist leaders, especially Doctor Rhee, to tell their followers “I told you so” and given renewed impetus to Rhee campaign for South Korea state which he will head, so he thinks, with United States furnishing both protection and money. He thus continues, as he has been doing, to compromise our effort to find some solution with the Soviets and to oppose General Hodge against whom he nurses violent and unreasoning hatred. General Wedemeyer’s telegram to Rhee quoted PolAd’s 220, July 21,⁴⁰ will if delivered add fuel to Rhee’s fire.

4. Present situation is having unfortunate effects upon moderates who have hitherto supported us and who deserve our support. Their effectiveness is becoming impaired and they themselves, sensing that they are likely to be crushed between Communists on one hand and reactionary rightists under Rhee and Kim Koo on the other hand, are beginning to become lukewarm and are deserting some to leftist and some to rightist camps.

5. It is unfortunate that events are forcing us into a position where we may be compelled for reasons of expediency (opposition to the Soviets) to support extreme rightist leaders such as Rhee and Kim Koo, who continue to hold to concepts and practices, which, while suited to their positions as messiahs when the Japanese occupied their homeland, are not suited to the situation today, I have a feeling that in dealing with the rightist group we shall eventually be compelled to arrange somehow that they select other leaders.

6. I feel, therefore, that, because of these developments, the timeliness of the proposed statement have been lost although if issued now by State and War, it would counteract further adverse and unfair criticism of General Hodge which is certain to arise if and when the State and War Departments do actually change policy as a result of a breakdown in the Joint Commission negotiations and General Wedemeyer’s report.

Jacobs

40. Not printed.