740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–1647: Telegram
The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State
priority
209. Cite Zurc 283. Following is an attempt to analyze briefly present Joint Commission deadlock and its implications:
Soviet delegation is clearly seeking to take advantage whenever and wherever possible of a narrow, technical interpretation, in some cases equivalent to distortion, of any agreement, decision, communiqué or minute for the purpose of elimination from consultation parties and organizations (chiefly rightists or moderate rightists) which oppose the establishment in a united Korea of a predominately Peoples Democratic Front (Communist) Government, provisional or permanent. An indication of the nature and stubbornness of this technique will be found in statements of the positions of the American and Soviet delegations set forth in parallel columns in the press release contained Seoul PolAd No. 208, July 15.34
The effect of Soviet position is that the Soviet delegation will not even agree to the preparation of a list of parties and organizations to be invited (Soviet delegation does not consider that eligibility carries with it the assurance of an invitation) for consultation unless the [Page 705] American delegation agrees to a selection procedure in Subcommission 1 which would enable the Soviet representatives on that Subcommission unilaterally to exclude (by refusing to include) any part[y] or organization unacceptable to them. In giving reasons for exclusion, the Soviet representatives will say that the excluded party or organization is not a “social” organization or that it is “non-zonal” organization or that it has not, because of its membership in an anti-trusteeship organization, signed an additional public statement that it has withdrawn from such an association and will support Moscow decision in every respect to the extent presumably (although we have not yet discussed that point) of not even being able to voice during the consultations objection to anything which in the eyes of the Soviet delegation contravenes what it understands and interprets to be the meaning of the Moscow decision. In other words, the Soviet delegation is attempting to prevent any Korean party or organization (and by implication their representatives) from exercising freedom of expression in presenting their views.
The group of rightist parties which the Soviets are attempting to eliminate are grouped under the leadership of Kim Sung Soo, chairman of the Democratic Party. The American delegation is thus defending a segment of the right which while for the moment apparently separated from the leadership of Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo is in fact still sympathetic if not subservient to their policies and leadership. With Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo openly opposing the Joint Commission, the position of the American delegation is somewhat insecure as the Democratic Party and its satellites eventually may have to be eliminated for fomenting and inciting active opposition.
If we yield to the Soviet delegation, we shall find ourselves in a situation where there will be a few rightist parties and organizations (none of importance) to consult. We should then, having most [lost] rightest support, find the Soviet delegation insisting, with much to support its contention, upon a leftist dominated consultative group (see paragraph 9, joint decision 12) and as a next step thereafter, the appointment of a provisional government with members picked from the leftist dominated consultative body. The United States delegation would thus be put in the position of accepting a provisional government dominated by the Peoples Front and headed by Kim Il Sung or refusing to accept the advice of a body which it had helped establish as representing the Korean people. These facts are well known to all thoughtful leaders in South Korea and our yielding to Soviet pressure on present issues would be interpreted by such leaders as evidence of our desire to abandon the Korean people to communism [Page 706] and Soviet domination. Some such talk is now current, probably inspired by the leftists.
The American delegation will resist to the limit the Soviet delegation’s efforts to establish its position as approved by Department in Department’s telegrams 135, July 2 and 142, July 14.
While it is anyone’s guess as to Soviet overall strategic motives, a summary of our thinking is somewhat as follows.
During sessions at Pyongyang, we felt, due to veiled references to Moscow, that the Soviet delegation was fighting for time while waiting for directives from Moscow in the light of developments resulting from Molotov’s recent visit to and hurried departure from Paris. More recently, there has been some feeling that Soviet delegation is merely stalling for time so that the Commission may continue its work beyond the adjournment of Congress in the hope that Congress will take no action on the grant-in-aid program (Seoul PolAd No. 205, July 1235). Whatever may be the immediate motives of the Soviet delegation, all here concerned are pretty much unanimous in the view that the Soviet delegation and Moscow really do not want an agreement unless they are able to set up a provisional government in Korea and establish other arrangements which will ensure the ultimate control of a united Korea by a Peoples Democratic Front (Communist) party and thus establish another Soviet satellite state. How long the Soviet delegation will be authorized to continue to negotiate with the American delegation, we do not know and can hardly hazard a guess. They may permit the present impasse to drag along, attempting to put the blame on the American delegation for the delay, or they may break off any time.
There are several courses of action which the American delegation has in mind to prolong the present impasse for some weeks and these courses will be followed (not necessarily in the order indicated) as future developments may dictate. First, we shall continue the fight for some days along present lines of argument. Second, failing as above indicated, we might propose that the Soviet delegation carry on consultations south of 38th parallel; or probably (this would be preferable), we consult jointly both in the north and in the south with those parties acceptable to the Soviet delegation (note that the American delegation is prepared to consult with all) and the American delegation unilaterally consult with those which are unacceptable to the Soviet delegation. Third, we might suggest that oral consultations be dispensed with entirely and that consultation with respect to the nature provisional government and charter be confined to a joint American-Soviet study of the written replies to the questionnaires [Page 707] filed by parties and organizations (the Soviet delegation would probably in this event refuse to consider replies of the rightists and the same struggle between positions of the two delegations would continue). Fourth, as a final effort, the American delegation might propose to drop consultations altogether and go into the question of discussing the topic, composition and creation of the proposed provisional government.
Failure of all of the above efforts seems certain to result in a breakdown. We must all, therefore, be prepared at any time for the eventuality and the various courses of action that might be followed thereafter. This message has concurrence of General Hodge and General Brown.