740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–747: Telegram
The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State
priority
184. Zgcg. In light of experience with Soviet technique in Albania, conclusion, after 4-day visit to Pyongyang, capital of North Korea, is that Soviet has established there Korean Communist state with all its trappings (although not yet as well organized as Balkan satellites), viz.: Korean stooges installed and maintained by Soviet advisers chiefly military and Soviet trained Korean army and security police; fear rampant; liquidation of opposition; photos of Stalin and Korean stooge Kim II Sung everywhere; Soviet and Korean flags everywhere; book stores full of Communist literature in Korean language; purging of non-Communist from government agencies; youths sent away for training and indoctrination (some say to Moscow and others say to special school for Koreans at Voroshilov near Vladivostok); preponderance of youth in all walks of official life (among 50,000 who paraded for Commission, at least one half were under 20 and two-thirds under 25); distribution of land under conditions which peasants did not expect; nationalization of large industries and businesses; [Page 691] suppression of all except National Front groups; favoritism toward army and officials in rationing; and so on. For economic highlights, see Bunce’s message in my 183, July 5.21
Even if Joint Commission ultimately succeeds in implementing Moscow agreement, foregoing situation will present difficult problem in the integration of North and South Korea. Organized Communists in the north linking up with fellow travelers in the south and backed up by Soviet trained Korean army and security police will endeavor to carry out their program which is of definite nature. They are certain to clash with rightists in the south who are divided into dissident groups with no fixed plans and little force to support them. Large numbers of these rightists are not supporting Joint Commission’s efforts to solve the problem and many of them are publicly expressing hope that Joint Commission will fail so that United States (so they think) will remain to protect them from Korean Communists and from Soviet encroachment.
In submitting foregoing I do not wish my approach to the Korean problem to be interpreted as that of a pessimist but rather that of a cynic not yet devoid of hope.22