740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–2347
The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs (Molotov) to the Secretary of State, at Moscow59
Dear Mr. Marshall: In reply to your letter of April 8 on the question of Korea, I am communicating the following:
At the Moscow meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom in December 1945, an agreement was reached which determined the policy of the three powers with respect to Korea. A basis for this agreement were the proposals of the Soviet Government, to which the Government of the U.S.A. also agreed, having consequently abandoned its first intention not to establish a National Korean Government in Korea. The Moscow agreement held the establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government which could take all the necessary [Page 633] measures for the development of Korean industry, transport, agriculture and the national culture of the Korean people, to be a problem of primary importance.
Having made these proposals, the Soviet Government deemed that the unification of Korea under the leadership of the Korean National Government was the most important prerequisite for the restoration of Korea as an independent state and the establishment of bases for the development of the country on democratic principles. The Soviet Government continues to adhere to this point of view and insists on a steadfast implementation of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, being certain that, on the basis of the execution of this agreement, Korea would be successfully developed along Democratic principles, would become an independent and prosperous state and an equal member of the United Nations.
However, the legislative program provided for Korea by the Moscow Agreement has not yet been carried out. A Provisional Democratic Korean Government has not been established. The work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, established for the purpose of collaborating in the establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government was suspended as a result of the fact that the American Delegation on this Commission took a stand contrary to the Moscow Agreement on Korea. Furthermore, the American Command in Southern Korea did not agree to a serious consideration of the proposals by the Soviet Command in Northern Korea on the question of an economic exchange between the two zones, which made it impossible to reach an agreement on this question.
In the course of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission during the period from March to May 1946, the Soviet Delegation made every effort to effect the execution of the aforementioned Agreement on Korea and, first of all, provide for a prompt establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government and for the unification of Korea under its leadership. However, the Soviet Delegation met not only with difficulties in this connection, but also with direct counteraction on the part of the American Delegation. Basing itself on the Agreement on Korea, which provides that the Joint Commission, in formulating its proposals, should consult Korean democratic parties and social organizations, the Soviet Delegation insisted on a wide-scale attraction of such parties and organizations to consultation with the Commission. The American Delegation excluded participation by a whole series of large democratic organizations in Southern Korea and insisted on consultation with groups which had taken a stand in opposition to the Moscow Agreement, consultation with which, naturally, could not facilitate the execution of this Agreement. The American [Page 634] Delegation included in the list of parties and organizations submitted by it for consultation with the Joint Commission, seventeen political parties and social groups of Southern Korea which took a stand against the Moscow Agreement, and only three democratic parties which supported the Agreement. The American Delegation excluded such large democratic parties and social organizations as the All-Korean Labor Confederation, the All-Korean Peasant Union, the Korean National-Revolutionary Party, the All-Korean Youth Union, etc., from participation in consultation. Deeming it impossible to agree to this position of the American Delegation, the Soviet Delegation nevertheless did its utmost to find a way to reach an agreed decision. This, however, appeared impossible and the work of the commission, on the suggestion of the American Delegation, was curtailed.
The intolerance of the resulting situation is evident. As a result of this, as you know, it was necessary to take new measures in endeavoring to find a way out of such a situation.
The Soviet Commander in his relations with the American Commander endeavored to find a basis for the renewal of the work of the Joint Commission. As a result of an exchange of letters, there has been a considerable rapprochement of the points of view of both sides, which fact was noted by both Commanders. It was expected that an agreement would soon be reached and the Joint Commission would begin its work very shortly. However, no reply has been received to date from the American Commander to the last letter of February 28 from the Soviet Commander and the proposed agreement was not reached. Disagreement of action was a serious obstacle for the opportune fulfillment of the program of measures proposed in the Moscow Agreement on Korea as a whole.
In connection with Northern Korea, during the period beginning with the capitulation of Japan, considerable progress was made in the field of democratization, and also with respect to the restoration of national economy and culture. Wide democratic reforms have been made which guarantee political freedom and raise the standard of living of the population. I have in mind, first of all, the introduction of an over-all electoral right; a law on equal rights for women; the establishment of local authority agencies and the People’s Committee of Northern Korea on the basis of free democratic elections; land reform, as a result of which 725 thousand landless peasant farmers and those having little land received more than 1 million hectares of free land, which formerly belonged to Japanese colonists and their accomplices in Korea; the nationalization of former Japanese industries, the 8-hour work-day, safeguarding of labor and social insurance; public educational reform, as a result of which the Korean language has [Page 635] been reestablished, the network of schools was increased and the number of students was increased, etc. However, such wide democratic reforms have been carried out only in Northern Korea, where there is only two-fifths of the population of Korea.
The Soviet Government, closely adhering in their policy toward Korea to the program planned in the Moscow Agreement, believes the following to be points of primary importance:
- 1.
- The establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government on the basis of a wide-scale participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations, in order to expedite the political and economic unification of Korea as a self-supporting state independent of foreign interference, which would do away with the division of the country into two zones.
- 2.
- The establishment of democratic authority agencies throughout Korean by means of free elections on the basis of a general and equal electoral right.
- 3.
- The aiding of Korean people in the restoration of Korea as an independent democratic state and in the development of its national economy and national culture.
In conformity with the steadfast aspiration on the part of the Soviet Government for the prompt restoration of Korea as a united sovereign state and elimination of difficulties arising from the fact that Korea to date has not been unified and does not have a national government, I propose that the Joint Soviet-American Commission resume its work on May 20 of the current year in the city of Seoul, on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, and that the Commission present the result of its work on the elaboration of recommendations with respect to the establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government for consideration by the two Governments in July and August 1947.
I am sending copies of the present letter to Mr. Bevin and to the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow.
I beg [etc.]
- Copy transmitted to the Department with memorandum by Brig. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Special Assistant to the Secretary, on April 23 from Moscow; text was sent in telegram 1517 (Kosmos 59), April 23, from Moscow and repeated by the Department as telegram 75, April 30, 8 p.m., to Seoul. The Moscow press on April 22 printed the exchange of letters of April 8 and 19 between the Secretary and the Foreign Minister. The Soviet reply was printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 4, 1947, p. 812.↩