The Special Inter-Departmental Committee on Korea, established to prepare
policy recommendations for the Secretaries with regard to Korea, has
reached general agreement with regard to a U.S. course of action in
Korea. It will be a few days, however, before the detailed [Page 609] report and recommendations of the
committee have been prepared and have been discussed with Mr. Grew.24
In view of the early departure of the Secretary of State for Moscow, and
the opinion of this committee that he should discuss the question of
Korea in Moscow, it appears desirable that certain pertinent aspects of
the committee’s proposed report should be considered by the two
Secretaries prior to the departure of the Secretary of State.
Enclosed is an initial draft of the general discussion and
recommendations to be contained in the committee’s final report. It is
the view of the committee that two measures are essential to obtaining a
satisfactory solution of the difficult Korean problem. These measures,
discussed in Section IV of the enclosed initial draft report are:
A governmental approach at this time might be considered by the Soviets
as a sign of U.S. weakness in Korea. A properly planned, aggressive
approach, however, will minimize such an appearance of weakness. It is
felt, furthermore, that such an approach would be of inestimable
assistance to General Hodge in alleviating the situation in Korea, would
clarify the U.S. position with regard to its intentions in Korea, and
would prove to Congress that all possible efforts had been made to
achieve a Korean settlement.
A positive political, cultural and economic program will be necessary,
not only to improve the present unsatisfactory conditions in Korea, but
in order to strengthen our hand for any future negotiations with the
Soviets. It will be necessary to convince Congress that a strong
affirmation of U.S. purposes in Korea, expressed by Congressional
approval of a three year program and separate appropriations for Korea
for fiscal year 1948, is absolutely essential in order to enable us to
approach the Soviets on a sufficiently strong basis to give hope of
securing a settlement satisfactory to the U.S. It is now anticipated
that such a program will amount to approximately $600,000,000 for the
three years, of which approximately $250,000,000 would be spent during
the fiscal year 1948, an increase of $113,000,000 over the $137,000,000
now allocated to Korea in the proposed 1948 War Department budget.
Without such a program, and the necessary legislation, the committee
feels that the Korean situation will so deteriorate as to seriously
impair the U.S. world position.
In order to assure the maximum possibility of success in the governmental
approach to the USSR, the committee believes it desirable to coordinate
the timing of the approach with Presidential submission to Congress of
the proposed special Korean legislation, since it is believed that this
will not delay the approach.
The committee recommends that the course of action proposed above be
approved in principle by the Secretaries of State and War.
[Annex—Extracts]
Draft Report of Special Interdepartmental
Committee on Korea
secret
[Washington, February 25, 1947.]
. . . . . . .
II. Present Situation in
Korea
A. General
- 1.
- U.S. policy towards Korea is based on the following basic
objectives: (1) To establish a self-governing sovereign Korea as
soon as possible, independent of foreign control and eligible
for membership in the United Nations; (2) to insure that the
national government so established shall be fully representative
of the freely expressed will of the Korea people; and (3) to
assist the Koreans in establishing a sound economy and adequate
educational system as essential bases of an independent,
democratic state.
- 2.
- For the purpose of taking the Japanese surrender Korea was
divided into two zones of military occupation, the United States
occupying that part south of 38°, and the U.S.S.R. occupying the
northern part of the country. This division persists. However,
through the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, the United States,
the United Kingdom, and China are committed to the eventual
independence of all of Korea. In its declaration of war on Japan
on August 8, 1945, the U.S.S.R. joined in the Potsdam
Declaration.
- 3.
- In the early days of the occupation the U.S. Commander,
General Hodge, was unable to establish satisfactory liaison with
the Soviet Commander in the north. Political and economic
problems created by the artificial division of the country into
two zones became acute. In December 1945, at the Moscow
Conference, these serious consequences [Page 611] of the bi-zonal occupation
were discussed and an agreement between the U.S., U.S.S.R. and
U.K. was reached regarding Korea. This agreement, to which China
subsequently subscribed, provided that:
- [Here follow provisions of agreement.]
. . . . . . .
IV. Possible Courses of
Action
A. Without Agreement with
U.S.S.R.
1. Continuation of Present Policies and
Programs
The present U.S. program in south Korea (which provides for the use
of Koreans in political, administrative and technical positions
under military government supervision, and for limited imports of
food and other essentials to prevent disease and unrest) was based
on the assumption that the provisions of the Moscow Decision would
soon be carried out. Consequently this program was intended to be
only an interim one. The successful operation of even this limited
program has been hampered by insufficient funds and lack of Korean
cooperation. Consequently, present conditions in Korea are
deteriorating rather than improving. If this trend continues, it is
apparent that our position in Korea will soon weaken to a point
where it may become untenable. The Korean people are daily growing
more antagonistic in their attitude toward military government,
toward U.S. objectives in Korea, and even toward the U.S. itself.
These antagonisms have already caused riots and disorders involving
loss of life. There is every reason to expect an increase in the use
of tactical troops to suppress disorders with all the attendant
complications in world public opinion. It is therefore obviously
extremely unwise to rely solely on present ineffective programs.
2.Recognition of Independent Government in South
Korea.
Both in the U.S. and in Korea there is some pressure, inspired
principally by the Syngman Rhee group, for the recognition by the
U.S. of the independence of south Korea. Many Koreans, anxious for
independence, angered by the proposed trusteeship, and thoroughly
discouraged by the failure of the U.S. and the Soviets to get
started even at that, are clamoring for independence. Superficially
this might appear to be a step which would enable the U.S. to shed
some, at least, of the burdens which are proving so onerous.
However, it is questionable if this single act will solve any of the
present problems, either of the U.S. or the Koreans. It seems
certain, on the other hand, that whether or not accompanied by
withdrawal of U.S. forces, to grant immediate independence to south
Korea would create new difficulties.
Recognition of her political independence will not solve the economic
problem of southern Korea. Only unification, and a program [Page 612] of outside aid in
rehabilitation can do that. The U.S., the only practicable source
for such aid, will be more likely to make grants to a people for
which it has direct responsibility than to an independent country.
No loaning agency could consider south Korea an acceptable risk.
From the standpoint of the U.S., of course, an independent south
Korea might provide an excuse for ending our financial assistance,
but it would mean starvation and economic chaos in south Korea, a
development for which the U.S. could not, in good conscience, allow
itself to be responsible. Moreover, it would represent a direct
breach of our commitments, both to our allies and to the Koreans, to
establish a united and truly independent Korea. These commitments
are Important as a pledge to a liberated people whose treatment by
the great powers is watched with concern by all small powers and
dependent peoples throughout the world. This fulfilment is important
as evidence that U.S. foreign policy is based upon fundamental
principles which will not be abandoned. And again, regardless of
whether we withdraw our forces or not, our recognition of the
independence of southern Korea would inevitably be the signal for a
concerted effort to bring all of Korea under the political control
of groups more interested in cooperating with the U.S.S.R. than in
promoting the welfare of Korea. Our ability to counter such a
campaign, not an easy thing to do under the best of circumstances,
would be greatly hampered in an independent south Korea.
Of course, if our recognition were accompanied by a withdrawal of
U.S. forces, it would be obvious to the world that the U.S. had
suffered a complete political defeat in a test of strength with the
Soviet Union in the only area where we and the Soviets stand face to
face alone. It is improbable that the U.S. could unilaterally
establish safeguards which would assure that an independent southern
Korea would not fall under Soviet domination. The effect on world
power relations, however, would almost certainly far transcend the
mere transfer of southern Korea from the U.S. to Soviet control. The
loss of U.S. prestige and influence, and the consequent increase in
Soviet influence and power, would have prejudicial repercussions not
only on U.S. interests in the Far East but on the entire U.S. world
position.
If, on the other hand, we should make our recognition conditional on
permission for our troops to remain, we could hardly hope to avoid
reaping the antagonism and ill-will which seem the inevitable lot of
foreign troops quartered in a proud and independent nation. Not only
the Koreans, but many other nations would condemn the U.S.
Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the presence of U.S. troops
could effectively offset any of the disadvantages described above
which [Page 613] would result from a
recognition by the U.S. of the independence of south Korea.
3. Reference of problem to Foreign Ministers or
UN.
Unilateral action by the U.S. to refer the Korean problem to the
Foreign Ministers who participated in the Moscow Agreement or to the
United Nations (presumably the Security Council)28 would be unsatisfactory because (1) it
would in effect be an admission by the U.S. of failure in Korea and
would thus have a most damaging effect on U.S. prestige; (2) it
would undoubtedly be countered by the Soviets with the assertion
that the U.S. is committed to an international agreement regarding
Korea which it refuses to implement, thus putting us in a most
disadvantageous position; and (3) it is hardly likely that a
unilateral attempt by us to bring additional protagonists into the
Korean situation would result in hastening a solution to the
problem. The various factors involved in possible prior agreement
with the Soviets for reference of the problem to an international
body are discussed below in IV–B–4.
If, however, all other attempts to solve the Korean problem should
fail, it might eventually become desirable to refer it to the United
Nations. This cannot be done until it is conclusively demonstrable
that the Soviet Union is deliberately preventing a solution of the
Korean problem. Such action, of course, should not be taken without
carefully weighing the importance of a Korean solution against the
possible repercussions resulting form another open U.S.-Soviet
dispute in the United Nations.
4. Adoption of an aggressive positive program for
south Korea.
As pointed out in IV–A–1 above, a continuation of our present
essentially interim and ineffective program is unsatisfactory. As
discussed in IV–B–1 below, any attempt to approach the Russians
regarding a solution of the Korean impasse, while we appear to be so
halfhearted in carrying out our responsibilities in our zone, would
in all probability be rebuffed. It therefore appears necessary, if
we are to remain in Korea and to achieve any success in solving the
Korean problem, to initiate an aggressive, positive, long-term
program. Even though basic agreement on the Korean problem may be
reached with the Soviets in the future, the U.S. cannot postpone
positive action in southern Korea pending such agreement.
Such a program would have the following advantages:
- (i)
- It would show the Russians that we have no intention of
allowing Korea to fall into their hands by default.
- (ii)
- It would strengthen our position in any future
negotiations with the Soviets. For example, if it is obvious
that we are determined to expend money and effort during the
next few years to insure Korean independence, the Soviets
will realize that if they are to retain their present
position in Korea they will either have to expend funds and
effort of their own, which they would be reluctant to do, or
be willing to retreat from their present position.
- (iii)
- It would provide a sound basis for the development of a
country which will be able to maintain its independence
after U.S. and Soviet withdrawal.
- (iv)
- Any new program which provided for adequate civilian
relief and rehabilitation in Korea would make the Koreans
more cooperative and thus strengthen our position in that
country under any circumstances.
In order to succeed, such a program must be supported by sufficient
funds in the form of Congressional appropriations to finance the
substantial political, economic and cultural measures required to
bring about the economic rehabilitation of southern Korea and to
prepare the country for early and complete independence. Lacking
such funds, we will fail to meet our international commitments in
Korea. The essentials of such a plan are outlined in Appendix
“A”.29 This plan calls for the appropriation of
$250,000,000 for fiscal 1948. In view of the present temper of
Congress the outlook for approval of this sum is not encouraging. It
should, however, be possible to obtain Congressional action which
would greatly strengthen our position in Korea. Passage of the
authorizing legislation alone would have a great psychological
effect. The above $250,000,000 involves an increase in the budget of
only $113,000,000 as the War Department occupied areas budget—which
it is hoped will be approved—includes an allocation of $137,000,000
for Korea. Deletion of this item and its approval as a special sum
implementing the Korean “grant-in-aid” legislation would be a
further psychological boost without increasing the presently
proposed budget. If, in addition, Congress could be persuaded to
authorize even $50,000,000 it would at least be possible to
undertake some railway rehabilitation and other absolutely vital and
urgent projects.
B. Collaboration With the
USSR
1. Local level negotiations in Korea
General Hodge is, as pointed out in II. A. 6. above, corresponding
with the Soviet Commander with a view to reaching agreement on a
formula for reconvening the Joint Commission. It is improbable that
agreement will be reached under present conditions, as the Soviets
are apparently unwilling to change their position and the U.S. is
unable [Page 615] to make further
concessions from the position taken in General Hodge’s letter of
December 24, 1946,30 without
compromising our basic belief in freedom of expression and risking
Soviet domination of all of Korea. Thus, under present
circumstances, we cannot anticipate progress toward solution of the
Korean problem through negotiations on a local level in Korea.
There is, however, nothing to be gained by formally breaking off
these negotiations. By allowing the situation to drag on along its
present lines, the door remains open for Soviet concessions if and
when the operation of our positive program and other developments in
Korea convince the Russians that it is to their interest to retreat
from their present intransigeant position.
Any further negotiations in Korea should be kept strictly within the
terms of the Moscow Agreement and any contemplated modification
thereof should be discussed on a governmental level.
2. Governmental negotiations
-
a.
- Desirability of governmental approach
- An approach to the Soviets on a governmental level under
present circumstances has certain disadvantages:
- (i)
- Without any evidence of a firm U.S. determination
completely to fulfill our Korean responsibilities,
such an approach would undoubtedly be regarded by
the USSR as a “lead from weakness” and could
therefore not be expected to result in progress
towards a solution of the Korean problem. The
Russians, anticipating U.S. concessions if they
continue their intransigeance, could be expected to reject
our approach or, more probably, give a
procrastinating reply or no reply at all. The
impression of weakness engendered by such an
approach might persist to some extent even after the
initiation of a positive program in our zone, and
thus prejudice future attempts to reach an
agreement.
- (ii)
- An approach now, or in the near future, might
prejudice our overall position vis-à-vis the
U.S.S.R. The committee is not in a position to
evaluate this factor. It is noted, however, that
governmental approaches have been made to the USSR
on other matters where, even though the approach
appeared foredoomed to failure, it was felt
important to make clear to the Soviets and to the
world that the U.S. would adhere to its
international commitments.
- A governmental approach would also have advantages:
- (i)
- Most important it should greatly ease the position
of the occupation authorities. Lack of any
substantial action by the U.S. Government has
apparently given many Koreans the impression, which
may be shared by the Soviets, that the U.S. has no
great interest in the Korean problem and has more or
less abandoned General Hodge to his own devices. An
early governmental approach would provide positive
evidence to the Koreans of our desire for early
Korean independence. [Page 616] Until such evidence is forthcoming
it will undoubtedly become increasingly difficult to
maintain our position in the face of constantly
growing Korean impatience.
- (ii)
- Congress will not approve special Korean
legislation without a careful analysis of the record
of our Korean negotiations with the U.S.S.R., and
will wish to be assured that every possible step has
been taken to reach agreement before it approves
special legislation. The fact that a governmental
level approach had been made would be added evidence
of the extent of our attempts to implement the
Moscow Agreement. Absence of such evidence might
lead Congress to question the need for the desired
legislation or at least to defer approval pending
results of a governmental approach. On the other
hand, it might be possible to persuade the Congress
that a strong affirmation of U.S. purposes in Korea,
expressed by Congressional approval of a three-year
program, is needed in order to enable us to approach
the Soviets on a sufficiently aggressive basis to
give hope of securing a settlement satisfactory to
us. Evidence of further Soviet procrastination, even
if only for a month or two, will clearly indicate to
Congress the necessity for special legislation if we
are ever to achieve a solution in Korea.
- It is believed that on balance the advantages of making a
governmental level approach to the U.S.S.R. in the near
future outweigh the disadvantages.
-
b.
- Timing of approach
- It is unlikely that discussions with the Russians would
result in substantial progress toward a settlement if made
before a positive program is actually in operation in south
Korea. However, they would have much greater chance of being
substantially effective if accompanied by some evidence of
our determination to carry through in Korea, such as a
strong Presidential statement submitting Korean legislation
to Congress. It is suggested, therefore, that the timing
should be thus coordinated if this can be done without
unduly delaying the approach. In order to be effective for
its purposes (in Korea and vis-à-vis Congress), it should in
any event be made before the conclusion of the coming Moscow
Foreign Ministers’ meeting.
-
c.
- Substance and manner of approach
- The Soviets invariably view with horror any alteration of
the wording of an existing agreement and a direct proposal
involving modification of the Moscow Agreement would
therefore in all probability be brusquely rejected and would
result in vigorous Soviet accusations that we were failing
to live up to our agreements. The U.S. approach should be
aggressive in order to minimize any impression of weakness.
Any U.S. proposals should be so worded as to come within the
letter of the Moscow Agreement although they might, in
effect, represent a considerable modification thereof. For
example:
- (i)
- It might be possible to fulfill the consultation
provisions of the agreement by avoiding a definition
of “democratic organization” and [Page 617] having the
Commission divide into two sections, a northern
(Soviet) section which would consult with
organizations in north Korea and a southern (U.S.)
section which would consult with organizations in
south Korea, each section establishing its own rules
of procedure. Other possible variations which might
be developed during the course of negotiations are
discussed in succeeding sections. The details of
proposals and counter-proposals would, of course,
have to be worked out in the light of day-to-day
developments.
- (ii)
- It might be possible, during the course of
discussions, to work out a formula nominally within
the framework of the Moscow Agreement, but which
would in effect bring about early trusteeship
through the elimination or simplification of the
steps of consultation and establishment of a
provisional government. For use in the event such an
opportunity arises, there is attached, as Appendix
“C”,31 a
draft trusteeship agreement which it is believed
would be acceptable to us and to which it might be
possible to attain Russian agreement. In this regard
consideration must be given to possible Korean
resentment if a trusteeship is established without
consultation with Koreans.
- (iii)
- It might further be possible to refer the Korean
problem, in agreement with the U.S.S.R., to the
Security Council of the United Nations. An attempt
to obtain Soviet agreement to such action would have
the same disadvantages, in reduced measure, as
United States unilateral action along the lines
discussed in paragraph IV–A–3 above, and is
therefore undesirable unless no more promising
courses are available to us.
- It is believed that any governmental action approach made
in the near future should in essence consist of a statement
of concern over U.S.S.R. delaying tactics and an expression
of our desire to expedite implementation of the Moscow
Agreement. At the discretion of the Secretary of State this
approach should be made either by note from the Embassy in
Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Office or informally by
Secretary Marshall to Molotov.32 As discussions progress, the
alternatives mentioned above should be useful in the
development of specific U.S. proposals.
V. Recommendations
It is recommended that:
- A.
- The program outlined in Appendix “A”33 be implemented,
action to include:
- 1.
- Request to the President to forward to the
Congress draft legislation for a “grant-in-aid” to
Korea and implementing appropriation of $250,000,000
for fiscal 1948.
- 2.
- Allocation of $ . . . . . of the War Department
deficiency appropriation for the remainder of fiscal
1947 to Korea.
- 3.
- Gradual civilianizing of Military Government in
Korea, appointment of a High Commissioner and
cooperation by State and War Departments in
providing him with appropriate staff.
- 4.
- Termination of CINCFE’s political responsibilities in
Korea.
- 5.
- Issuance of new directive to CG
USAFIK.
- 6.
- Intensification of present policies regarding
participation of Koreans in government.
- 7.
- Institution of a publicity campaign in the U.S.,
including a statement by the President to be issued
upon General Hodge’s return to Korea.
- 8.
- Despatch of a high level business and industrial
group to Korea to make recommendations on economic
and financial rehabilitation.
- 9.
- Despatch of a high level education group to make
recommendations regarding Korean educational
problems; intensification of public information and
education program in Korea.
- B.
- The door be left open to a continuation of current
U.S.–U.S.S.R. negotiations in Korea.
- C.
- An early governmental level approach be made to the
U.S.S.R. expressing our concern over Soviet obstruction to
implementation of the Moscow Agreement.
- D.
- A Soviet proposal for mutual withdrawal of forces from
Korea should be approved in principle, subject to the
establishment of adequate safeguards assuring the political
and territorial integrity of Korea.34
