740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–847: Telegram
The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State
308. CX 57183. With reference to Moscow’s 3310, December 2 (Dept serial 466), suggest consideration of following factors, estimates, and comments concerning Japanese situation and the occupation in determination of policies regarding convocation peace conference:
- 1.
- With exception of relatively few as yet not finalized directives, basic policies of occupation have largely been implemented and firm [Page 589] ground-work laid for effective growth of democratic principles in Japan.
- 2.
- Political stability has been achieved, although continuation thereof will largely depend upon economic rehabilitation which in turn depends upon many factors beyond control of SCAP and which we believe cannot be achieved in adequate measure until private capital and enterprise (including foreign) can be given free play in Japan’s industry and foreign trade. Under present conditions, with continued scarcities raw materials and most vital necessities, attainment of economic stability appears difficult in immediate future.
- 3.
- We feel it is doubtful whether occupation of Japan can be continued for indefinite period without eventually, in part, defeating its own ends and perhaps at some stage hastening an unhealthy reaction detrimental to US prestige in Japan and elsewhere, particularly if it should become apparent that peace treaty is to be unduly delayed.
- 4.
- Considering such intangible factors as Japanese psychology, proneness to follow new leadership, and habits of discipline, the possibility should not be dismissed that continued presence large numbers aliens in Japan may eventually revive xenophobia which could result in loss of much that has been gained and of which Communists would take full advantage.
- 5.
- We believe that with conclusion of treaty of peace within a reasonable time and given strong internal police powers and moderate economic stability, duly constituted Japanese government can successfully resist encroachments of Communist Party, especially as overwhelming majority Japanese people would support any duly elected government making honest effort.
A careful consideration of the above factors leads us to believe that the US has much to gain from an early peace as the Japanese people would thereby be enabled to practice the precepts of democracy and be given an opportunity to put their economic house in order by their own efforts rather than by continued reliance upon the resources and active assistance of the United States. We furthermore believe that an early peace will result in firm establishment of much closer ties, politically, economically, and culturally, between the US and Japan than would a peace deferred for lengthy period under any pretext, especially as later circumstance would give Soviets and other countries additional time to take advantage of Japan’s present inferior position.
In any event, if it should transpire that Soviets refuse to join in peace conference as proposed by US, we feel that entire concept of post-treaty control would have to be reshaped to afford adequate protection to Japan against undue internal influence and encroachment by Soviets in the post-treaty period. In such case, we believe the Japanese government and people would welcome the security afforded by close political and economic ties with the US which such arrangement would presumably envisage. We also share view that posttreaty control must envisage preponderant US role. But we believe [Page 590] also in the essentiality of a US policy of readiness, if necessary, to support duly constituted Japanese government in event internal or external threat should seriously undermine constitutional government, if Japan is to become a battle-ground of opposing ideologies in the future.
General MacArthur concurs in my sending this message.